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Abstract 
When major incidents occur, whether in the form of natural disasters (for example, 
Tsunamis, hurricanes) or man-made incidents (such as acts of terrorism or war), there 
is an impact on travel flows and patterns. These impacts can be in the form of the 
volume of tourists that flow to a particular area, the characteristics of those tourists 
and/or the expenditure they make whilst there. The time required for destinations to 
recover from such incidents and the loss of tourism receipts depends upon a variety of 
factors such as the nature of the incident, the response of the destination to the 
incident and the impact that such events have on the travel risk perceptions of tourists. 
The purpose of this research is to examine the nature, magnitude and direct impacts of 
a selection of incidents and the time recovery period. Case studies of high profile 
events such as those that occurred in Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Spain, the UK and the 
USA have been selected because of the relative importance of the events and, to 
include a broad range of destination types. 
The incidents that have occurred will be examined through secondary data drawing 
heavily on related journal articles and the analyses of data that are published by the 
UNWTO, the World Bank and the relevant national governments. The literature 
analyses will look at the research that academics have undertaken when looking at 
specific incidents that occurred in the case study areas and in terms of their effects on 
tourism in general and to the areas involved. Data from published statistics will be 
used to examine tourist arrival trends prior to the incidents, immediately following. the 
incidents and the time period needed for the level of tourism activity to be restored to 
where it was likely to have been if the incident had not happened. Although the 
incidents are examined as individual case studies the analyses will also take a 
chronological approach to examine whether the impacts of major incidents diminishes 
with exposure to such events. That is, did the earlier terrorist attacks have a greater 
impact because of their novelty and therefore enhanced shock effect compared with 
later events even though the latter may have been of greater magnitude? 
xvi 
The secondary analyses will also examine aspects such as whether there is a 
difference in impact if the incidents are specifically targeted at tourists in general 
rather than tourists of a particular nationality. 
Whenever events occur they may influence the perception of travellers in terms of the 
potential risks they face. Therefore, the thesis will move on to look at travel-related 
risks and how they may impact on the travel decisions of tourists, particularly non- 
business or discretionary tourists. There is a variety of risks that may influence the 
travel decisions of tourists including those relating to physical harm, financial loss 
and also the risk of dissatisfaction from their travel experience. The different types of 
risks that may influence travel decisions will be examined together with demographic 
characteristics of the travellers in order to explore whether there are differences in risk 
averseness between travellers from different countries of origin, age groups, gender, 
education and occupation. This aspect of the analysis will be driven by primary data 
analysis in the form of a questionnaire (physical and on-line) that uses both 
quantitative and qualitative instruments to determine travellers' travel-related risk 
perceptions and identify regions and countries that are felt to be high risk destinations 
by type of risk. 
The perceived risks will also be compared with actual risks as identified by insurance 
company claims data. Although limited in scope, this aspect of analysis will seek to 
identify whether travel-related risk perceptions mirror actual risks or whether they are 
driven by other factors such as media coverage of events. 
Using the man-made risks as the identifier, the regional aspects of travel-related risk 
will then be focused to one region of the planet in particular. This region is the 
Middle East plus some selected countries that share the same issues in relation to 
tourism development. Countries in this area have been beset by man-made incidents 
that have deterred the development of tourism in spite of the attractiveness of the 
region in terms of climate, heritage and culture. A comparative analysis is undertaken 
to look for commonalities and factors that explain the lack of tourism development in 
some countries. 
xvii 
Using the findings from the secondary and primary data analyses the potential future 
of the region in general and Iran in particular will be examined using the Delphi 
technique by drawing upon the collective wisdom of some experts in tourism who 
have an understanding of tourism development in difficult political areas. 
Finally the research will attempt to pull all of these strands together to see if there are 
any identifiable guidelines that may help our understanding of travel related risks and 
whether there are any lessons that can be learned to inform the policy makers in 
troubled areas. 
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Chapter one 
Introduction 
Introduction 
The desire of people to experience different places is not new, but today's tourism has 
seen this desire grow to unprecedented levels (Kanso, 2005). Travel was once limited 
to only the prosperous, but has now become commonplace for hundreds of millions of 
people. There are many factors that could be cited as being responsible for this strong 
growth in tourism and they tend to fall into one or more of the following categories; 
economic factors; political factors and technological factors. There are also factors, 
particularly economic and political, that are working against this strong growth in 
tourism activity. More recently, some of the negative factors, such as natural 
disasters, disease and acts of terrorism, have managed to capture global headline 
status and cause the growth in tourism activity to stutter. Such negative factors not 
only interrupt the flow of tourists in the short run, they can also bring with them far- 
reaching impacts on the future development of tourism in a country. Although it 
seems that potential tourists may have a relatively short-lived memory, the 
implications for investment in the industry may be a different matter. As has been 
documented in a number of cases (e. g. Rome and Vienna in 1985) terrorism is a real 
obstacle to tourism expansion (Wahab, 1996); terrorism not only reduces tourism 
activity but also relocates tourism and has an impact on long-term investment in 
tourism (Wall, 1996). 
These factors that work against the flow and growth of tourism include terrorism, 
natural disasters, health scares, oil price rises, exchange rate fluctuations and 
economic and political uncertainties WTO (2006). In spite of the obstruction of 
various negative events in recent years the number of travellers crossing national 
boundaries increased from a mere 23 million in 1950 to 842 million in 2006, 
corresponding to an average annual growth rate of 7% (UNWTO, 2007). Much of 
this growth can be attributed to the development of transportation and 
communications. 
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Once one turns attention away from global tourism trends and instead looks at 
regional and country trends, issues regarding aspects such as safety and security can 
be seen to have seriously curtailed tourism development in some areas/countries. 
Indeed, discretionary or leisure tourism can be highly affected by security issues, and 
the tourist's behaviour and destination choices are significantly determined by the 
tourist's perceptions of security, risk and safety (Edgel, 1990; Hall 1994; Pizam and 
Mansfield 1996; Wahab et al. 1996; Clements and Georgiou 1998; Sonmez and 
Graefe 1998; Sonmez et al. 1999; loannides and Aposopolos 1999; Poon and Adams 
2000; Cooper, 2001; Hall, Timothy and Duval 2003; Aktas et al. in Theohold 2005). 
Risk, real or perceived leads to changes in the level of anxiety and uncertainty in the 
mind of a would-be traveller with respect to particular destinations (Douglas and 
Mills 2006). More importantly, from studying risk and travel, some authors have 
found differences in the perception of risk among tourists (Douglas and Mills 2006). 
Furthermore, it seems that some travellers tend to be more risk averse than others. 
The primary purpose of this research is multifaceted. It is to examine the effects of 
extraordinary events on tourism flows around the world. These events are varied but 
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tend to have in common the fact that they are man-made rather than natural. In 
addition to evaluating the extent of these effects on those countries that were 
subjected to the events, this research moves on to examine the role that risk 
perception may have on the behaviour of the tourists. By examining the relationship 
between different types of perceived risks and the demographics of travellers it is 
hoped that this research throws some light on the nature of risk how it is perceived, 
what determines it and whether there is any strong correlation between perceived and 
actual risk. Finally, the research then turns its focus upon the Middle East in general 
and Iran in particular. The Middle East has an abundance of cultural and natural 
resources that could give it a competitive and comparative advantage in the tourist 
markets, however it is perceived as not being physically secure for tourists to visit 
UNWTO (2001). Due to the negative stigma associated with Middle Eastern travel, 
advisories and warnings are almost always in effect. 
Iran has been a magnet for tourists since the days of Marco Polo and its position as a 
land bridge between Asia Minor and Asia proper have made it an essential point of 
transit or sojourn for thousands of world travellers every year. The country's natural 
beauty, rich culture and diverse climate can give the destination wide appeal. 
However, the political environment has obscured the significance of tourism in the 
country. Following the political change in 1979, there has been a drastic shift in 
tourist demand away from Iran and in favour of its competitors. Experts believe that 
while Iran has some of the world's most important tourist attractions listed by 
UNESCO, pilgrimage sites, coastal areas, mountains, deserts and rivers, these 
impressive resources have remained untapped due to the state's lack of attention to 
the tourism industry. 
1.1 The rational for research 
The main driving force for choosing this topic of enquiry is the observation that the 
Middle East has so much to offer tourism in terms of heritage and culture, not to 
mention climate and leisure facilities, but has failed to attract the absolute growth in 
tourism enjoyed by other regions of the world. Once this area of research came to 
mind it was hard to ignore the negative aspects associated with traveling to the region 
that must deter visitors from outside the region. This led the researcher to examine 
the ways that serious events, such as bombings and shootings have affected the flow 
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of tourism activity in different areas of the world. Could differences in impact be 
explained and how long did it take different countries to recover from the effects of 
the incidents?. This leads the research into the area of what influences people when 
they are making their travel decisions. If it really is a concern for physical safety that 
deters people from traveling to, say, the Middle East, then how are these risks 
perceived and is there any way to explain the affects of these travel risk perceptions 
by analyzing the responses of travelers? 
It is hoped that this research will help draw out a set of guiding principles that will 
help people understand the various relationships tested throughout the literature 
review and analyses of this thesis. Such insight and principles could then be used in 
the planning and policy processes of countries or regions affected by these serious 
incidents. 
1.2 The Research aim 
To investigate travel risk perceptions and the effects of incidents on tourism. 
1.3 The Research objectives 
The main objectives of this research are: 
o To examine the literature with respect to travel risk; 
o To determine the effects of major incidents on travel to specific destinations; 
o To explore the differences in recovery time and to attribute such differences to 
factors such as the nature of the incidents or the marketing response of 
destinations; 
o To evaluate the work that has been done in determining risk perceptions; 
o To study the travel risk perceptions of travellers from different backgrounds; 
o To examine the differences between the perceived risks and actual risks of 
specific destinations; 
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o To explore the effects of perceived travel risk on future travel (using Delphi 
Technique) 
1.4 Research Hypotheses 
1. That major incidents such as natural and man-made disasters affect tourism 
activities differently according to the level of tourism development in the 
affected destination; 
2. That travel related risk perceptions are influenced by the demographics of the 
traveller; 
3. That the previous experience of tourists is more important in determining 
travel related risk perceptions than any other factor; 
4. That travel-related risks are a major determinant of the travel decisions made 
by tourists; 
5. That travel related risk associated with political unrest is more significant than 
any other form of travel related risks as a driver of travel decisions; 
6. That there are significant differences between the different regions of the 
world and the perceived travel-related risks; 
7. That travel related risk perceptions are highly correlated with actual travel 
related risks; 
8. That the Middle East region's tourism development has suffered because of 
the perceived level of travel-related risk; 
9. That it is the travel-related risk perception of Iran that hinders the development 
of tourism activities in that country. 
Using hybrid methods will help create the platform to examine and resolve the aims 
and objectives of this thesis. The quantitative methods will be based on a 
questionnaire survey and the qualitative research will involve the Delphi technique 
using globally acclaimed experts in the field of tourism. 
6 
Thesis structure 
Chapter 1 provides the background to the research topic under investigation, giving 
an insight into tourism growth and negative events and travel related risk, the 
rationale for the research, and identifies the aim and objectives. 
Chapter 2 presents a through review of the body of knowledge related to the research 
topic. It introduces the concept of the tourism system and its key components, the 
relationship between tourism and political stability, in the light of political violence, 
terrorism and war on tourist behaviour and the tourism industry. 
Chapter 3 explores the impact of terrorism attacks in terms of revenue, arrivals and 
the recovery periods on three selected case of study in developing countries namely 
Egypt, Indonesia and Kenya. 
Chapter 4 examines the impact of terrorism in developed countries in terms of 
arrivals and the expenditure of tourists and contrasts the recovery period and impact 
with the impact in developing countries that was examined in chapter 3. The selected 
cases are the USA 9/11 attacks, Madrid bombings and suicide attack in UK (London 
Transport System). 
Part two 
Chapter 5 The purpose of this chapter is firstly to look at the current literature about 
tourism in Middle East in general and Iran in particular. The chapter addresses 
pressing issues and impacts of political impediments that may be responsible for the 
relatively poor development of tourism in the region and in Iran. 
Chapter 6 The purpose of this chapter is to explore the concept of risk, as it applies to 
tourists when making decisions with respect to travel and to explore how perceptions 
of risk may impact on the travel decisions of tourists, particularly for the non-business 
or discretionary tourists. 
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Part three 
Chapter 7 presents the research methodology underpinning the thesis and outlines the 
chosen research method, the primary and the secondary data collection techniques 
along with the reasons behind their use. 
\ 
Chapter 8 This chapter examines the questionnaire survey, and explains the various 
methods that have been chosen to analyse the data in greater detail and the outcome of 
that research. 
Chapter 9 presents the results of the Delphi Exercise and analyses the results in the 
context of the questionnaire survey results and the indications provided by the 
literature analyses. 
Chapter 10 Conclusion, discusses the key study findings, through the literature 
review and the primary research. It also qualifies the research that has been 
undertaken by explaining the limitations of the study. Finally, the thesis ends with 
recommendations and suggestions for further research avenues. 
C 
l-, 
8 
Chapter 2 
Literakute review 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the concept of the tourism system and its key components, the 
relationship between tourism and political stability, in the light of political violence, 
terrorism and war, on tourists' behaviour and that of the tourism industry. It also 
looks at the place of risk, largely that arising from political violence and/or terrorism 
within the tourism system and how this affects the operation of the tourism system in 
host destinations. 
A recurring theme within tourism and security literature is that a successful tourism 
industry requires political stability. Tourism analysts seem to share the view that 
international visitors are aware of and concerned about issues that influence their 
personal safety (Poop and Adams 2000; Edgel 1990) and that tourism only can thrive 
under peaceful conditions (Pizam and Mansfield 1996). 
Political instability is endemic in much of the developing world. Insufficiency, 
shortages, remnants of colonialism and proxy wars of the superpowers set the stage 
for random violence, ethnic conflict, revolution and acts such as hostage taking. At 
the same time, the antiquities, culture, flora and fauna associated with the less 
industrialized societies make tourism a seemingly attractive option in nations with all 
too few alternatives (Ritcher, 1989 in Harrison 1992). 
Sun, sand, sea and sex, the four s's, are often seen as the core of a developing nation's 
appeal (Cick, 1989, in Harrison, 1992, p 308). A fifth is even more critical: security. 
Tourism as a discretionary activity is incredibly vulnerable to political stability. Even 
major natural disasters, such as earthquakes or hurricanes, do not have the lasting and 
devastating impact associated with political unrest, with subsequent media coverage 
visitor numbers and expenditure can fall drastically (Smyth 1986). Considering that 
within the purchase-on-faith world of tourism perception is reality, the implications of 
any security/safety issue can prove disastrous to a destination (Santana 2001). 
Depending on the source of political stability, a developed nation may be able to 
exercise effective damage control or contain the political upheaval so that tourists are 
out of harm and relatively unaware of problems. The developing nation has far fewer 
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resources with which to cope perhaps because of the lack of economic diversity often 
found in non-industrialised countries. In such circumstances, tourism is not one 
among many industries, but often the chief or leading industry. Secondly, developing 
countries rarely have a domestic base for tourism with which to cushion seasonality or 
to absorb some spare tourism capacity when international tourism falters (this aspect 
will be examined in the case of Indonesia and Egypt, chapter 3). Thirdly, if or when 
political instability occurs, the developing nation's ability to cope is far less (Harrison, 
1992). 
2.1 Tourism system and development 
A system can be defined as a group of consistent, interdependent and interacting 
essentials that together form a single purposeful structure. Among other 
characteristics systems tend to be hierarchical, in that they consist of subsystems and 
are themselves part of a larger structure (Oppermann et al. 2000). Leiper (1995) has 
defined the tourism system (see figure 2-1) with five interdependent core elements as 
follows: 
" At least one tourist 
" At least one -tourist-generating region 
" At least one transit routes region 
"A travel and tourism industry 
The traveller-generating region represents the generating market for tourism and, in a 
sense, provides the push to stimulate and motivate travel. The pull factors, on the 
other hand, energise the whole tourism system and, in this way, create demand for 
travel within the generating region. 
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Figure 2-1 a basic tourism system 
-- --------------------------- ------- ---- ----------------------------------------------------------------, 
,, 
Departing travellers 
Traveller=, " Tourist 
Generating Transit route destination 
region Region 
Returning travellers 
, 
., 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: adapted from Leiper, 1990 in cooper et al. (2003) 
Additionally, there are many environmental and external systems (socio- cultural, 
economic, political, physical, and so on) in which the tourism system is entrenched 
(see Figure 2-1). The dynamics or energies of the system are reflected in the passage 
of a tourist from their normal place of residence to a destination, via a transit region. 
The dependencies and interdependencies are also paramount. The tourism system can 
be seen to be supported by a variety of external systems, including the oil industry 
(providing fuel for the transportation), agriculture (supplying food to restaurants) and 
the government (formally managing the access process to the destination country). 
These external factors can have a significant effect on the formation of a tourism 
system. For example destruction of an island airport by a hurricane or earthquake can 
hinder the establishment of a tourism system on the island albeit temporarily. The 
dynamic effects are not one way, tourism systems can also influence the external 
environments where, for example, tourism may be used to stimulate a destination's 
economy, or to open the way for the improvement of diplomatic relations between 
countries. 
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According to Gunn (1988) any one small part of tourism, such as a change in market 
preference or international currency exchange, can upset the rest of the system. 
Within tourism there are several important components whose functions greatly affect 
one another. One way of illustrating how tourism works is shown in Figure 2-2 and 2- 
3, which shows the major components of the tourism system: 
Figure 2-2 the tourism system 
Economic 
environment 
Tourism system 
Tourism object 
Institutional subsystems 
Subsystem 
Tourism 
subject 
Technological 
environment 
Tourism 
enterprises or 
companies 
Political 
environment 
Source: from Kaspar (1998 in Glasser 2003) 
Social 
environment 
Destination 
Tourism 
organization 
Ecological 
environment 
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Figure 2-3 The functioning tourism system 
r 
Population 
Interest in travel 
Ability to travel 
Information 
promotion 
Resource development 
For quality visitor 
satisfaction 
Services 
Variety and quality of 
food, lodging, 
products 
Source: adapted from Gunn (1988) 
PIN 
Demand 
Transportation 
Volume and quality 
of all modes 
Supply 
*#) 
The development trends of tourism are not uniform and, as such, tend to exaggerate 
the separateness of the structural elements within the system, such as hotels, airlines, 
and advertising. However, Gunn (1988) believes, important as these elements are, 
they tend to confuse rather than help in identifying the components important to 
tourism planning. Without attractiveness to tempt travellers, hotels, airlines, and 
advertising would not be needed. 
2.2 Factors associated with increased tourism demand (push factors) 
The single most important economic factor associated with an increased demand for 
tourism is probably the level of wealth in a particular country. Tourism tends to be 
highly income elastic so that the range and volume of tourism increases as a society 
becomes more economically developed and discretionary household income becomes 
available to an ever-increasing proportion of the population. Economic wealth is most 
commonly measured by the per capita Gross National Product (GNP), or the total 
14 
value of all goods and services produced by the country in a given year divided by the 
total resident population. In terms of economic development, Burton (1995) defines 
four phases of tourism participation (see Table 2-1). 
Table 2-1. Four phases of tourism participation 
Phase Economic development 
One Mainly subsistence -based and pre-industrial 
rural, agrarian 
large gap between poor masses and small elite 
Two Industrializing 
Rapid growth of urban area 
Growing middle class 
Three Almost industrialized population mostly urban 
Middle class becoming dominants 
Four Fully industrialized, 'high tech' orientation 
Mostly urban 
Tourism participation 
No mass participation a tourism elite 
travel to domestic and international 
destination 
Widespread participation in domestic 
tourism 
Increased scope of international 
tourism by elite 
Mass participation in domestic 
tourism, and increase in short haul 
international tourism 
Elite turns towards long-haul 
international tourism 
Mass participation in domestic and 
international( long haul and short - 
High levels of affluence throughout the haul) tourism 
population 
Source: adapted from Burton 1995 in Oppermann et al. 2000. 
According to Burton's model (1995) phases three and four include the most important 
traveller generating regions. If this is true it is worthwhile looking at the type of 
tourism generated by these two phases and types of tourism generated by these 
regions. 
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2.2.1 Social factors 
If one had to identify the major social trends that have influenced participation in 
tourism, it would include the increase in unrestricted time, its changing distribution 
and the shift in the way that society perceives this use of time. In phase one situations, 
the regularity of life is largely dictated by necessity, the seasons and the weather. 
Phase two societies tend to move away from this domination of nature and are instead 
characterized by an artificially constructed system. In this world the direction and 
constraints are such that leisure and rest are structured into rigorous segments of clock 
time, where participation in leisure is determined by work and school timetables and 
alarm clocks. 
The amount of time that people are at work is clearly of importance to the 
development of the tourism industry, but even more important has been the 
introduction of the 5 day working week, facilitating overnight stays, as well as the 
concept of annual paid holidays. 
2.2.2 Demographic factors 
As any parent knows, children are expensive in terms of both time and money! 
Therefore, small family size is usually associated with higher levels of discretionary 
time and household income. If the per capita GNP and fertility rates of the world's 
countries are examined, a strong inverse relationship between the two can readily be 
identified. That is, fertility rates tend to fall as affluence increases. Modem birth 
control methods, driven on by material desires can explain this in part and so too can 
the decline in mortality and morbidity rates, making it less important to have so many 
children to continue the family. Also of great importance is the entry of women into 
the workforce and the removal of children as an important source of labour 
Oppermann et al. (2000). 
All things being equal, a larger population base equates with a larger overall incidence 
of tourism activity. Burton's (1995) Phase Four societies tend to have large and stable 
populations, as compared with the earlier phases of development. Increases in life 
expectancy brought about by better diet and the technological advances of the 
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industrial and post-industrial eras. In the 1850s the life expectancy of males in the UK 
was just 40 years and the corresponding figure for females was 44 years. Today the 
average life expectancy for someone born in England and Wales in 2004 is 78 years. 
In a Phase Two society, such as that of Australia in 1901 men and women could 
expect a lifespan of just 55 and 59 years, respectively. This meant that the average 
male worker survived for only 5 years following retirement. Today life expectancy in 
Australia is similar to that of the UK being marginally higher in 2004 at 80.26 years. 
Thus, the average worker can look forward to 15 or 20 years of survival on leaving 
the workforce. 
Furthermore, another push factor that stimulates engagement in tourism activities is 
urbanisation. This may, in part be a result of urban congestion, over-crowding and a 
loss of environmental quality but it may also be because of a correlation between 
urbanisation, higher levels of discretionary income and education, and lower family 
size. 
2.2.3 Technological factors 
Technological change may at one be seen as both a push factor and a pull factor. 
Aspects of technological change can increase the desire of people to travel (push) and 
at the same time make them more aware of the attractiveness of particular destinations 
(pull). Technological change also impacts on Leiper's tourism system by effectively 
shortening the effective or economic distance between origin and destination, or even 
making the journey an attraction in itself. The development of high efficiency and 
convenient forms of transportation (air travel) has clearly influenced the development 
of tourism and its distribution across regions. 
An adequate infrastructure (transportation facilities and services, water supply, 
electric power, swage and solid waste disposal, drainage, and telecommunication etc) 
is necessary for the successful development of tourism. The lack of infrastructure can 
be problematical to the development of tourism in less developed countries and 
regions (Heraty, 1989 in Inskeep 1991). 
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Information technologies have also played an important role in the diffusion of 
tourism. Computerized reservation system (CRS), for example, are now the norm 
among travel agencies and carriers, providing greater flexibility, integration with 
other components of the industry and improved cost effectiveness Poon ( 1993). 
2.2.4 Political factors 
According to Gunn (1988), `politics and foreign policy have much to do with 
international tourism'. A review of tourism politics generally suggest that the 
dimensions and results of tourism planning will be influenced most by the nation's 
ideology and its interpretation for overall social, political, and economic goals 
(DeKadt, 1979, p. 33). In general one would expect the policies and practice for 
tourism to reflect the overall policies and practices of the nation as a whole. The roles 
of government bodies and their private sector counterparts will all, to some extent, be 
determined by the policies and practices and so too will the relative level of 
dependence on tourism. According to Cooper et al. (2003); Opperman et al. (2000); 
Gunn (1988) political factors have an effect on travels properties in a variety of ways, 
these include: 
" The degree of government involvement in promoting and providing facilities; 
" Control level of prosperity for travel overseas by limiting the amounts of foreign 
currency that can be taken out of the country; 
9 Government restrictions also include visa and passport controls as well as taxes 
for travel. (Cooper et al. (2003); Opperman et al. (2000); Gunn (1988). 
For many years the United States' opposition to the political ideologies of China and 
Cuba and Libya was manifested by the prohibition of travel to such countries. Today, 
the United States is more relaxed in its opposition to these countries and new 
destinations have been subject to restrictions including travel to Iran, and North 
Korea. Further political complexities are exhibited by international organizations that 
foster tourism development, such as UNWTO or the Pacific Area Travel Association, 
and the Caribbean Tourism Association. If one examines the recent era of terrorism 
that has captured the media attention and distracted tourism flows, the underlying 
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problems can be associated with the policies and practices of both sending and 
receiving countries and regions. Ronkainen (1983) argues that political factors seem 
to offset the benefits created by the development of the technological factors. 
2.3 Pull factors influencing a destination 
The Pull factors are distinct from push factors as they are focused on the supply or 
destination side of the tourism equation rather than on tourism demand. As with the 
push factors, the use of the term `pull' is figurative, since, of course, there is no actual 
physical pulling of tourists into a destination, or pushing of tourists out of a particular 
origin region Oppermann et al ( 2000). Furthermore, as with all forms of motion, 
once in play it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between where a motion is a result 
of pull or push forces. It could be argued that the desire to escape (a push factor) is 
really a pull factor because it relies on there being somewhere to escape to! 
One very important implication of this geographical differentiation between supply 
and demand is that, generally speaking, destinations are better positioned to exert 
influence over the pull factors than they are over the push factors. For example, a 
destination cannot significantly influence whether some other country evolves into a 
tourist-generating country, but it can make tangible efforts to develop its supply of 
attractions and create an attractive environment to appeal to potential visitors from 
that originating country. 
The destination is a key feature within the tourism system, acting as the main 
motivating factor to stimulate tourism activity. The volume, value and type of tourism 
will depend on many factors such as quality, diversity, accessibility of the location 
and the attractions, accommodation and facilities offered. The destination is at the 
receiving end of the tourism system and consequently benefits and/or suffers from the 
events that take place. 
" Geographic proximity to a market 
" Accessibility to markets 
" Availability of attraction 
" Cultural links 
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" Availability of services 
" Affordability 
" Pro-tourism policies 
" Positive image 
" Peace and stability 
2.3.1 Geographic proximity to a market 
The number of visitors from an originating region to a destination is dependent on the 
economic distance separating the two. The economic distance may be longer or 
shorter than the geographical distance depending on the ease and cost of travel 
between the two regions. In general though there may be a strong correlation between 
economic and geographical distance as manifested in higher transportation costs and 
extended travel times. In addition, the volume of traffic is likely to be proportional to 
the size and prosperity of the origin market, with large and wealthy markets 
generating larger flows (Opperman et al. 2000). While tourism managers, of course, 
cannot change the geographical location of their destination relative to the market, 
distance can serve as an incentive to pursue strategies that will offset the tourism 
consequences of this distance. 
2.3.2 Accessibility to markets 
The effects of distance can potentially be counteracted by developments that make 
destinations more accessible to origin regions. This issue can be addressed in terms of 
infrastructure accessibility, subsidisation of transport and the development of tourism 
products that will appeal to travellers whose primary concern is not cost and political 
accessibility. Whether or not a suitable degree of physical accessibility can be 
maintained depends on many factors, including the availability of resources, physical 
barriers and the ability to coordinate business with other destinations and intervening 
jurisdictions in the transit region to establish effective air, land and sea linkages 
(Opperman et al. 2000). 
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Political accessibility refers to the conditions under which visitors are allowed entry 
into a destination. It is clearly critical to the success of international tourism. The right 
to allow or deny entry to potential arrivals is a basic sovereign prerogative of all 
states, and in some cases this right has been eroded or conceded altogether as a result 
of bilateral or multilateral treaties. For instance, permanent residents of Australia and 
New Zealand share the right to reside in each other's country for an indefinite period 
of time. Political access is one of the pull factors over which destination countries can 
exercise a high level of control, it is also a control that carries with it little or no direct 
cost for allowing access can be changed almost immediately and a little or no direct 
monetary cost to government. However, the consequential costs (economical and 
political) of restricting access may, perhaps, be quite significant. 
According to Inskeep (1991), some countries may want to control tourism flows in 
order to limit outside influences on their religious and cultural systems, while other 
countries may wish to develop tourism rapidly for economic reasons. With respect to 
the former, it may be felt by the government that there are aspects of tourism that run 
contrary to the principles of Islamic law, in which case certain types of tourists and 
tourism activities may be deemed undesirable. According to Gunn (1988) in many 
regions, ideological stress sometimes reduces the efficient functioning of the tourism 
system. Polarized and antagonistic approaches to development versus conservation 
can slow and even deny tourism development. Even when planning, design, and 
management practices can reduce the level of conflict, they are not given a chance to 
do so because of heated ideological arguments. 
2.3.3 Availability of attractions 
There is widespread agreement among tourism researchers that attractions, because 
of their crucial role in drawing tourists, are one of the most important components of 
the tourism sector, and a major factor around which the development of a destination 
will depend (Gunn 1988; Inskeep 1991, Opperman et al. (2000); Cooper et al. (2003)). 
R 
In terms of the influence exercised within the destination itself, attractions range from 
those over which little control, other than conservation, can be exerted to those which 
are entirely `created'. Examples of the former include spectacular natural features 
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such as forests, canyons or waterfalls or significant heritage/historical sites. Such 
features exist independent of any tourism activity and it is simply a matter of how 
those responsible for the management of tourism are able to exploit the available 
opportunities presented. On the other hand, destinations may, and often do, create 
attractions in order to introduce a tourist flow and/or to augment existing attractions. 
Examples may include such attractions as major theme parks (such as Disneyland) or 
in the case of natural attractions such as the Niagara Falls and the Gold Coast, where 
outstanding inherent natural attractions are augmented by theme parks, shopping 
opportunities and other attractions. 
A final point to be made here about attractions is that the demand for them is not only 
vulnerable to events that alter perceptions of travel risk, such as political instability, 
they are also vulnerable to changes in fashion and social values, suggesting that the 
ability of a destination to manipulate the incoming tourist flows will always be subject 
to a demand-side factors beyond its control Opperman et al .( 2000). 
The extent of political stability of an area and popular perception of political stability, 
whether realistic or not, by the potential tourist markets is a significant factor in 
attracting tourists. Several destinations have and still do experience low volume 
tourism due to political disturbances, or concern by potential tourists about being 
affected by political disturbances, even though there have not been any specific 
problems in those particular destinations. A pattern of terrorist actions in particular 
areas can also be a deterrent to tourist travel in those places, or tourists may be 
reluctant to use particulars types of transportation that have experienced terrorist 
attacks Hall (1994). 
Leisure tourism is a discretionary activity, and most tourists will not spend their hard- 
earned money to go to a destination where their safety and well being may be in 
danger. In this sense, when the attractiveness of a destination has been damaged or 
perceived negatively, the pull factors for these specific destinations and the role of 
tourism marketing staff and managers is far more difficult, particularly if they are in 
an early stage of development. 
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2.3.4 Cultural links 
A desire to seek out unusual venues has certainly been one of the most important 
motivating forces for tourism throughout history. However, in spite of this, travel is 
still more likely to occur between countries that share similar elements of culture, 
such as language and religion (Burton 1995). In part, this is because of the increased 
probability that people will travel to culturally familiar countries and subsequently 
foster VFR tourist flows between their old and new countries. Furthermore, the 
tendency of destinations to attract culturally similar markets attests to the importance 
of convenience and risk-minimization factors in tourism travel. From a travellers 
point of view, regional travel or travel to similar destinations (as they may not be the 
same) may minimise their perceptions of risk as it reduces the uncertainties and 
numbers of unknowns in the travel decision equation. 
2.3.5 Availability of services 
Another pull related factor is associated with the level of services (quantity and 
quality) that is available at a specific destination. Tourists will tend to avoid 
attractions if associated services are not available or of poor quality. The importance 
of transportation accesses, the presence of adequate tourism-related facilities such as 
accommodation and related facilities and visitor bureaus are all obvious but vital 
services that have to be in place. At a broader destination level the presence of basic 
services non-specific to tourism, such as policing and medical facilities, may also be 
critical as they can help reassure the tourist that travel-related risks, such as crime or 
health, are being minimised or at least mitigated if the worst should happen. The 
private sector usually responds to the tourism-related elements, while public sector 
authorities tend to provide the general services. In general, the tourism generating 
countries are able to offer a superior level of general service provision because of 
their greater wealth and higher level of physical development Opperman et al. (2000) 
and therefore one could argue that it is the relative provision (from the point of view 
of their norm to the provision within the destination) of such services that will 
determine the level of risk perceived by tourists. 
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2.3.6 Affordability 
Tourism, like most goods and services, is faced with a downward sloping demand 
curve. Therefore, all other factors being equal, a reduction in cost will generate an 
increase in the number of tourist arrivals to a destination. The cost of living in a 
destination region relative to an origin area is another important factor, since a high 
proportion of total trip costs are normally incurred within the destination. Many 
travellers from the more affluent countries are attracted to LDCs such as Indonesia or 
Thailand because of the low relative costs of locally-provided goods and services. 
Because of this price effect, the tourist flows are usually highly sensitive to significant 
exchange rate fluctuations. 
Although destination may have little short-term influence over the cost of living 
differential between originating country and destination, they may have some degree 
of influence over exchange rate stability, as national government can and sometimes 
do intervene in the money markets, instigate currency revaluations, etc., when such 
actions are deemed to be in the national interest Opperman et al. (2000). Again 
stability reduces uncertainty and therefore reduces the financial risk for potential 
tourists. Therefore, destinations that exhibit exchange rate stability may find it easier 
to maintain their tourism flows, all other things being equal. 
2.3.7 Pro-tourism policies 
The pull effect of a destination can be positively influenced by the introduction and 
reinforcement of pro-tourism policies by the government. It can take place in different 
ways among the local population to promote a welcoming attitude toward visitors, in 
order to create a positive market image. Countries such as Thailand and the Solomon 
Islands positively encourage this image to attract tourists to their destinations. 
However, a brief search on Google will show that many destinations not normally 
perceived as friendly also stress the friendliness of their destination in an attempt to 
mitigate bad publicity or image. Even where there is an innate friendliness, however 
measured, associated with a destination, this can be countered over night by random 
acts of violence. Other pro-tourism measures available to governments include the 
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easing of entry requirements and the reduction or elimination of tourism-related taxes, 
duties and other costs incurred by tourists or the tourism industry. 
2.3.8 Positive market image 
Like any individual, the tourist's knowledge of the world is made up of experience, 
learning emotions and perceptions. Such awareness described as knowledge results in 
a specific image of the world. This image is critically important to an individual's 
preference, motivation and behaviour towards tourist products and destinations, as it 
will provide a `pull' effect resulting in different demand schedules (Glaesser, 2001). 
This knowledge and image will also be coloured by the perception of travel-related 
risk for various destinations. There are various kinds of definitions adopted to 
describe the world image in different fields. The UNWTO defines image to be: 
" The artificial imitation of the apparent from of an object; 
" From resemblance, identity; 
" Ideas, conceptions held individually or collectively of the destination. 
Trommsdorff (1990, p. 121) describes image as `a multidimensional construct made 
up of denotative and connotative product characteristics, which simultaneously 
reflects the structure of a one dimensional attitude phenomenon'. If the attitude 
towards characteristics was illustrated along a good-bad range, 'the image has 
characteristics on several dimensions, namely the subjective impressions of the 
product's individual (non-material) characteristics'. Image may be defined as the sum 
of beliefs, attitudes and impressions held by a person or group of people towards 
some phenomenon (Crompton 1979; Baloglu and Brinberg 1997). In general, images 
can be either descriptive or evaluative (Walmsly and Jenkins 1993). Images are of 
immense importance in discretionary forms of tourism such as recreational vacations, 
where the destination is not predetermined by business demands or social necessities. 
This is because the product, at least for the first-time visitor, is an intangible one that 
cannot be directly experienced prior to its consumption. In these cases, potential 
visitors must rely on their images in choosing one destination over another. 
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According to Glaesser (2003), the general image of a country is built routinely and 
separately of whether the country in question is a holiday destination. The image is a 
result of general information that the consumer continually takes in during their 
everyday life. It is the constant news stream of political, economic and social events 
as well as the impressions that have been gained about the country's products when 
actively seeking a destination. The result is a non-tourism specific country image. The 
term country image used in the following can be seen as being synonymous with 
destination image. As a rule, however, this image is closely related to political or 
geographical borders with which the country's characteristic details are particularly 
emphasized (Meyer, 1981; Fakeye and Crompton, 1991 in Glaesser 2003). According 
to Mayerhofer (1995, p. 142), country image particularly influences the following 
area: 
" Population characteristics, 
" Countryside, 
" Cultural aspect, 
" Landmarks, 
" Food and beverages, 
" Famous personalities, 
" The country's competence as product and service manufacturer 
" Representative products of the country. 
Glaesser (2003) argues that a country's image is also formed dependent on the 
respective political system and the relationship with other nations. In that sense, a 
national component of consumers has to be taken into account for the country's image 
assessment, similar to the cultural difference of risk assessment previously discussed. 
Many tourists consider Iraq and Afghanistan to be high risk destinations due to the 
lasting political tensions. Therefore, they prefer products from `free' countries to 
those from `un-free' countries (Lebrenz, 1996; Sonmez and Graefe, 1998) or judge 
products from more developed countries to be of a higher quality (Lebrenz 1996). All 
of these factors may be considered, to some extent, stereotyping destinations into risk 
categories, but it is this process that often prevails when individuals consciously or 
sub-consciously assess their travel risks. Baloglu and McCleary (1999) define the 
categories of factors which influence destination image ( see Figure 2-4). 
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Figure 2-4 Influences of destination image 
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Source: adapted from Baloglu and McCleary (1999) in Beirman (2003) 
The potential tourist must be aware that a destination exists. This is generally not a 
problem for well known destination countries such as the United States, France, Italy 
or the UK but it is a major problem for the more obscure countries such as Namibia, 
Surinam or Qatar. Next, it is vital that the awareness of the potential destination is of 
a positive nature. The issues of political stability and political relations within and 
between states are extremely important, because of the intangible nature of the travel 
experience; tourism depends heavily on positive images (Chon 1991; Echtner and 
Ritchie 1991; Gartner 1993; Bramwell and Rawling 1996; Dann 1996). Random acts 
of terrorism limit travel activity until the public's memories of the publicized incidents 
fade. Repetitive acts of terrorism, however, can tarnish a destination's image of safety 
and attractiveness and put at risk its entire tourism industry. As far as the tourism 
originating country is concerned the perceived risk of a particular destination is 
everything because it is that perception that will influence demand. 
It can be argued that there may be more likelihood of being involved in acts of 
violence and other incidents at home where the statistical odds are much greater than, 
say, being mugged in London's street or murdered in Egypt. However, the reality is 
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that tourists travel in order to experience travelling attributes such as relaxation, 
pleasure, peace, calm, enjoyment, comfort, etc., and not to be exposed to risks, other 
than where the travel is for acceptable risks such as skiing or white water rafting for 
instance. Anything that might suggest a move a way from tourists being exposed to 
risks, other than those normally associated with their activity, is not considered part of 
most travellers' equation. The main problem is that, often, the tourists' logical base 
for fear is poor. From this point of view their perception of risk usually has little to 
do with logic. An example of this break between reality and perception could be 
Egypt during the Gulf war. Although in fact it was safe to travel, tourists perceived 
the risk to be too high and stayed away (Santana 2001). 
The role that the public sector (national and local governments) play in tourism 
development highlights the importance of governments and their response to incidents 
that may affect perceptions. In this respect so too are the media and the inherent 
tourists' perceptions of a destination in determining the effective attitude towards the 
political characteristics of a destination and its tourist image (see Figure 2-5). 
Figure 2-5 Political instability, violence and image-making process 
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relation and interest 
Source: adapted from Hall. et al. (1994) in Pizam et al. (1996). 
A study of three major tourism offices dealing with major crisis which affected their 
destination (Hong Kong after Tianamen Square student massacre in china; Fiji, after a 
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bloodless military coup in 1987; and San Francisco, after the Loma Prieta earthquake 
in 1989) revealed that a crisis can very quickly cripple the travel industry (Cassedy 
1992). In these cases the crises to the industry were ones of perception and it was 
observed that they could be just as devastating, if not more so, than the physical 
damage created by the crises. The industry suffered because people lost their 
confidence in the destination as an attractive and safe place to visit and stay in, safety 
mis-perception can indeed be a formidable issue for destinations. 
2.3.9 Peace and stabili 
The relationship between tourism and peace has two dimensions. On the one hand, 
tourism can be vital force for world peace (UNWTO, 1980) and on the other, tourism 
needs peace for its development and prosperity. The nature of the concept of peace is 
very diverse. One definition says that within the context of tourism, peace applies to 
the concept of harmonious relations (Var et al. (1994) in Pizam et al. (1996)). 
The tourist market is sensitive to the existence of social or political instability within 
destinations because of the simultaneity of production and consumption of the tourism 
product, that is, consumers must travel to the product in order to engage in this 
`consumption'. It frequently happens that tourism demand is running along a strong 
steady development path when, suddenly, a new factor appears which turns all 
previous expectations upside down. Such an occurrence could be caused by political 
problems (war, political tension, terrorism, etc. ), and can have a powerfully negative 
influence on tourism demand (Mihalic 1996 in Pizam et al. (1996)). However, the 
effects of this on ý the flow of tourism activity can vary wildly from circumstance to 
circumstance and this is something that will be explored later in this thesis. 
Tourism analysts seem to share the view that international visitors are very concerned 
about their personal safety Edgel (1990) and that tourism can only thrive under 
peaceful conditions Pizam et al. (1996). People travel for many different reasons. 
Regardless of their purpose of travel, their decision to travel is based on several 
psychological traits, such as desire for adventure, peace, comfort, 
education/experience and so forth. However, none of those desires have the capacity 
to over-rule one of the most basic human desires - that of safety. It is important to 
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emphasise that the safety in this case refers not only to actual safety but, more 
importantly, to perceived safety. An examination of the growing body of literature 
that analyzes the relationship between tourism activity and politically motivated 
violence, (and any other situations that reduce the feeling of security at a destination) 
indicates that they all severely inhibit tourism (Ryan 1993; Mansfeld, 1995; 
O'Sullivan, 1996; Sonmez 1998; Wahab 1996; Hall and O'Sullivan, 1996). According 
to Ritcher and Waugh, 1986, p, 231: 
"Tourism may decline precipitously when political conditions appear unsettled. Tourism 
simply chooses alternative destinations. Unfortunately, many national planners either do not 
understand or will not accept the fact that political serenity, not scenic or cultural attractions 
constitute the first and central requirement of tourists". 
Moreover, as far as tourism is concerned security issues always have spillover effects. 
That is, tourists tend to associate a security incident not just with a specific location, 
but with an entire region. According to Ritcher and Waugh (1986) the negative effect 
of instability on tourism is not necessarily confined to a central war zone or even to 
the period of actual conflict. Ritcher and Waugh (1986) demonstrated the 
destabilizing impacts of the Sri Lankan civil war upon tourism in India and Maldives, 
and of the war in Afghanistan on tourism in Pakistan. Accordingly, and not 
surprisingly, significant declines in the number of tourist arrivals have occurred 
during periods of warfare in the Middle East (Mansfeld 1994). 
In many cases, it is a question of being guilty by association, as shown by fact that the 
tourist market extends what is happening in Iraq to the entire Middle East region. 
Similarly, the un-informed potential tourist may apply a national stereotype to all 
destinations within a particular region, perceiving all people in Middle East to be 
strictly Muslims or even practise it. Such extensions and stereotypes can, of course, 
complicate the ability of tourist destination managers and marketers to project a 
positive image to the tourism market. 
Some authors argue that, on a macro scale, the low growth in international stay-over 
arrivals in the Middle East that was recorded in 1991, was only in part attributable to 
the Gulf War itself, and was also because of the market insecurity that was generated 
in the month preceding the conflict (French 1991; Watkins 1991). While Wahab 
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(1996, p 176) suggested that it is important to note that tourists are not discouraged 
from travelling altogether when there is a crisis of some form, but rather deflected to 
other destinations. Thus, when some event deters tourists from visiting one particular 
destination, other destinations, whether proximate or far away, may well benefit. 
Turkey is an example of drawing benefits as result of war, and political tension in 
Middle East since 1979 (BBC, 21.09.05). Santana (2001) argues that a change in the 
primary purpose of travel could happen because of security issues. Generally 
speaking, the strength of the effect on the destination subject to crises may be 
dependent on the strength or uniqueness of its attraction. For instance, a cultural 
destination like Egypt or capital city like London cannot be easily substituted whereas 
destinations that simply rely on the `4s' can find that their products are replicated in 
many other destinations and can be easily substituted. 
Political instability refers to circumstances where conditions and mechanisms of 
government and its rule are challenged by elements operating from outside of the 
normal operations of the political system (Hall et al. 1996). When challenge occurs 
from within a political system and the system is able to adapt and change to meet 
demands on it, it can be said to be stable. If the forces for change fail to be satisfied 
from within a political system, the use of non-legitimate activities such as protests, 
violence, or even civil war to seek change may render the political situation unstable. 
Political instability, whenever it occurs (particularly when it is accompanied by acts 
of violence or hostility of any kind) is likely to have a damaging effect on the tourism 
industry (Ritcher and Waugh 1986; Lea and Small 1988; Millman 1989; Mansfeld 
1995; Bar-On 1996; Vukonic 1997 in Wahab et al. (2001); Santana 2001). The 
development of a successful tourist industry depends largely on political stability 
(Mansfeld 1995; Sunmez 1998; Teye 1998; Hall and O'Sullivan 1996). Political 
instability can take a number of forms including: international wars, civil wars, coups, 
terrorism, riots, religious and ethnic conflicts, political and social unrest, and strikes 
(Hall, 1996). 
The increasing economic disparity between developed and developing countries and 
its consequences such as poverty, increasing state debt, population explosions and 
inadequate living standard have contributed significantly to the instability of some 
regions. These factors have led to local wars and crises, ethnic and religious conflicts, 
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and resulted in regional arms races and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. Consequently, it has become a major threat to local, regional, and 
international security. Instability and a state of disorder in some regions have also 
encouraged drug trafficking and international organized crime. Regions that have 
been affected, among others, are the Balkans, some regions of the former Soviet 
Union such as Uzbekistan, some parts of Africa and Asia, some countries in Latin 
America, and some parts of the Middle East. All of these factors and resulting states 
will hinder tourism development in general and increase perceived and actual risk 
levels associated with international travel and tourism. It is important to emphasise 
that terrorism may also result from political instability (Hall and O'Sullivan 1996; 
Vukonic 1997; Sonmez 1998). 
Political instability is believed to have strong adverse effects on economic prosperity. 
However, to date, the evidence on this matter is scarce, probably because it is difficult 
to know how economies would have evolved in absence of political conflict Abadie, 
et al. ( 2003). An extensive VAR study of the macroeconomic effects of terrorism 
(Blomberg et al. (2004a) and Blomberg et al. (2004b) used a panel set with annual 
observations for 177 countries from 1968 to 2000. It controls for the interactions 
between terrorism and other forms of internal and external conflict and it is therefore 
able to differentiate between types of political disruption. On average, terrorism 
(captured by the ITERATE data) is found to depress economic growth in a market. 
However, this effect is considerably smaller and less persistent than that exerted by, 
say, external wars and/or internal conflicts. Frey et al. (2004) concluded that the 
negative association between terrorism and economic growth is small and statistically 
insignificant for advanced (OECD) economies, which are most affected by terrorism. 
Given that tourist destinations may offer easily substituted products, crisis-hit regions 
are usually left with the difficult, long, and always expensive task of rebuilding their 
image and regaining the trust of travellers. The resilience and ability to cope with the 
crisis situation and to attract tourists back, is largely dependent on their stage of 
tourism development. It is also sometimes dependent upon the level of diversification 
of the local economy, its strength and the scale and nature of disaster. 
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2.3.9.1 War, coups and revolution; their impact on tourism 
War is defined as the clash of arms among countries (Lexicon 1987 in Pizam et 
al. (l 996)). Since the tourist product is inextricably connected to the destination, some 
of its fundamental components are its attractions, such as natural and socio-cultural 
factors (Kaspar, 1991). According to Burkart and Medlik (1974, p 193 in Pizam et al. 
(1996) attractions may be defined as those elements in the tourist product which 
determine the choice of the tourist to visit one destination rather than another. In the 
case of war, the war itself with all its dimensions becomes part of the tourist product. 
Normally the state of war reduces the destination's level of attractiveness and, in 
some cases, tourist demand may even drop to zero. The war disrupts both sides of 
tourism, supply and demand. Teye (1988) described the following impacts of war on 
tourism: 
" Borders are closed for land, air and sea transport (although it could be only 
some portion of the borders); 
" Foreign authorities recommend that their citizens do not travel to War - 
stricken states for reasons of personal safety; 
" Maltreatment of tourists travelling to a state involved in war; 
" Adverse publicity through the international media; 
" "Blacklisting" by tour operators and travel agents. 
On the side of tourist supply, there are two types of impact: the one influencing 
tourism development and the other influencing the existing tourists supply. The 
related consequences are: 
" Development plans are reduced or cancelled (if any development plans exist); 
" Loss of investment capital from abroad; 
" Loss of tourism infrastructure; 
" Destruction of game parks due to excessive poaching; 
" Consequence on night life (curfews); 
" Military blackmail; 
" Emergence of a foreign-currency black market. 
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Vukonic (1993) also describes the problem of war refugees, which can destroy the 
demand for a certain destination. In war conditions, the population may flee from the 
conflict area and be relocated in tourist areas, but this has several consequences for 
tourism: 
" Letting rooms for refugees precludes letting them to tourists; 
" Long-term accommodation of refugees in hotels results in damage or loss of 
quality to hotel equipment and facilities; 
" After the hotels are vacated by the refugees, they have to be refurbished which 
involves additional capital spending and prevents their use for a further period; 
" The presence of refugees in tourist destinations has a negative impact and 
tourists may try to avoid them. 
Although the first Gulf (1991) War was limited in that it did not involve the whole 
world (Vukonic, 1993), it did have a strong negative impact on the growth and 
development of international tourism (Impact of the Gulf Crisis on International 
Tourism, 1991). According to the UNWTO, the number of tourists fell by 1.4% for 
the first time after a nine-year period of constant growth, and international traffic 
from Japan and United States was reduced by 2%. 
At the same time, the development of tourism was being influenced by another factor, 
economic recession was hitting most of the major tourist-generating countries. Archer 
(1994) suggests that this factor was even more significant than the effects of the war. 
Not only were the tourist flows to the Mediterranean, Europe and the Middle East 
reduced but the influence of the Gulf War and economic recession was even felt by 
the Australian tourist industry (Row, 1993), and even American domestic tourism 
such as Hawaii and Florida was affected (Goelner 1992; Anderson and 
Anderson, 1992). The Gulf War kept Americans from taking holidays. It affected both 
leisure and business travel (Jusko 1991), but the war itself had a short-term impact on 
international travel. During 1990, the threat of war and international terrorism caused 
a substantial decline in international tourism. However, when the war ended, tourists 
did not return immediately to the Middle East because they had already booked their 
holiday elsewhere. In a destination not only does it reduce the number of visitors to 
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the destination itself, but indirectly reduces the volume of transit tourism, and, in so 
doing, affects neighbouring countries. Tourist flows inside the region may be 
redirected from affected countries toward other competing countries such as the 
impact of War Balkan (Vukonic, 1993). 
However not all types of tourism destinations suffered equally from the decline in 
tourist demand. The magnitude of the effect may be determined by a host of factors, 
such as the stage of tourism development (where in the tourism area lifecycle the 
destination is located) such as that proposed by Butler (1980) and Plog (1983); and 
the motivation for travel, perhaps the type of tourism most sensitive to being 
influenced by war is leisure tourism. Such influences could be seen in the case of 
Slovenia. The decline in the total nights spent in Slovenia was 49 percent; whereas 
the volume of nights spent in health resorts declined by only 19 percent, the number 
of nights spent in sea resorts fell by 52 percent; the number of nights spent in 
mountain resorts fell by 36% and other tourist destinations by 45 percent. Clearly 
fears over personal safety affect the level of demand for particular tourism products 
(see Teye, 1988). However, the impact of war or conflict may leave sites that become 
an attraction later. When the war is over, the sites become part of historical memory 
for a certain destination; however, this aspect of the effects of incidents and events is 
outside the scope of this research. 
In conclusion, war undoubtedly brings with it negative effects on the level of tourism 
activity (Michlic 1996 in Pizam et al. (1996)). In most cases, it causes reorientation of 
tourist flows. The impact is not over after war has run its course and the particular 
destination may suffer well into the future due the negative image toward the 
destination. 
2.3.9.1.1 Terrorism: definition. patterns and causes 
Definitions of terrorism have not yet gained universal acceptance (Sonmez and 
Graefe(1998). The US Department of State has provided some definitions in terms 
that are generally used and applied when terrorism is discussed. For the US 
Department of State the term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or 
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clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience. The term international 
terrorism has been defined as terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than 
one country, and the term terrorism group as any group practising, or that has 
significant subgroups that practise, acts of international terrorism (1999 in Wahab et 
al. (2001)). Weinburg (2005) suggested: 
"Terrorism is a tactic rather than an ideology. It's a way of -- a largely theatrical way to 
influence the behaviour of a variety of different audiences... So terrorism can be used for 
purposes of freedom fighting, along with any number of other political objectives". 
According to Enders et al. (2001): 
"Terrorism is a premeditated use or threats of use of extra normal violence or brutality 
by sub-national groups to obtain a political, religious, or ideological through 
intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved with the policy making 
that the terrorist seek to influence". 
Key ingredients of the definition include underlying political motives, the general 
atmosphere of intimidation, and the targeting of those outside of the decision making 
process. Terrorists often choose their target in a way that appears to be random so that 
everyone feels at risk, when getting on a plane, entering a federal building, or strolling 
through a market square. Business people, military personnel, tourists, and everyday 
citizens, rather than politicians, are generally the target of terrorist attacks. 
Terrorism is not a new fact and has been used as a political weapon in virtually all 
parts of the globe. Sendero Luminoso(Peru), the IRA ( Northern Ireland), ETA( 
Basque Separatist Group-Spain), the Red Bridge (Italy), the Fundi (Algeria), the Abu 
Nidal organisation (Iraq), the Hizbollah (Lebanon), the Khemer Rouge (Cambodia) 
and the Al-Qaeda are just a few examples of some well-established terrorist 
organisations. 
Terrorism causes have been attributed to religious fanaticism, political instability, 
chronic economic problems, famine and disease, environmental problems, 
demography, lack of opportunities, lack of education, civil unrest, wars and guerrillas, 
and poverty among others. Nevertheless, there is little evidence to suggest that 
poverty, as well as lack of education or injustices are direct root causes of terrorism 
(Robenstain, 2002). According to Krueger and Malekova (2002), terrorists in the 
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Middle East have not only enjoyed a living standard above the poverty line, but 
normally had a secondary education. Von Hippie (2002) adds that the hijackers of 
9/11, who attacked the USA, were neither poor nor uneducated, acknowledging that 
they even qualified to take flight lessons and acquire the technical skills to accomplish 
their task. The finding of both Von Hipple (2002) and Krueger and Malekova (2002) 
confirm previous research results (such as that found by Pizam and Smith, 2002) 
which suggest that terrorist acts are often rooted in deep social, political and 
sometimes religious motives. Krueger and Malekova (2002) come to the conclusion 
that `terrorism (is) more accurately viewed as a response to political conditions and 
the long term standing feelings of indignity and frustration' (2002). 
According to Sanatana (2001) the globalization process, provides the right conditions 
and environment for terrorism to flourish and become more deadly. Globalization has 
excluded more nations than it has included in the ways of development and 
prosperity. This has led to unprecedented levels of unemployment and economic 
hardship in many parts of the world and a sense of discontent and resentment towards 
some nations and peoples. 
The terrorist groups are not generally viewed internationally as a single group but 
according to US Department of State, in 1988 seven countries were identified as 
sponsors, in different ways, of terrorism activities: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 
Korea, Sudan and Syria (US Department of State 1999). The US Department of State 
made it clear that the majority of the most violent terrorist attacks would not have 
been possible without such state sponsorship. State sponsorship mainly provides safe 
haven facilities, financial support, weapon, training, logistic support and the use of 
diplomatic facilities. 
Ritcher and Waugh (1986, p238) have recognized that the relationship between 
terrorism and tourism is important not just because the problem is new, but also 
because the political and economic ramifications are huge and likely to grow larger. 
Because of its international visibility, tourism is a ready-made target for terrorist 
groups who are seeking to gain publicity for their objectives. Acts of terrorism are 
immediate, sudden events, which invariably involve a great number of agents in 
responding to the incidents and large media coverage and inspections. Frey et al 
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. (2004) suggest that it remains an open question whether tourists' reaction to the 
threat of terrorism is rational. 
2.3.9.2 Tourism as the indirect victim of political instabili 
Tourism is extremely vulnerable to what tourists perceive to be political instability or 
a lack of personal safety. Examples are the student protests in Beijing's Tianamen 
Square 1989 or the wars in Bosnia- Herzegovina Although the duration of political 
violence may have been short lived, the long -term implications for tourism can last 
for many years, affecting the confidence not only of tourists but also potential 
investors in the tourism industry (Hall, 1994). 
2.3.9.3 Tourists as a target: tourism as the direct victim of political instability 
Tourists have become a frequent target of terrorist acts in recent years generating high 
levels of profile in the media (Frey et al. 2004). Most of the violence has played on 
tourism motivations, generating fear and insecurity among travellers and creating a 
major barrier to travel and thus a limitation on the growth of the industry. In addition 
to the openly stated fear of personal harm, there is often a lack of interest in travel, 
which can mask an underlying fear. In these circumstances, the possibility of 
terrorism, however remote, will significantly affect tourism demand (Buckley and 
Klemm, 1993. p 191 in Pizam et al. (1996); Santana 2001). From a general point of 
view, terrorist activity may only cause a slight decline in the volume of tourist activity 
provided that tourists are not explicitly defined as the target. This situation changes 
suddenly, however, if the terrorist acts leads to tourist casualties (Wilkinson 1993; 
Sonmez, 1998a). Different circumstances can be distinguished either where the 
tourists are identified as a symbol of the originating state, or as a part of the economic 
system of the destination. Whilst, in the first situation, the group of endangered people 
can be clearly defined, this is more difficult in the second case, where almost every 
tourist can be the target of an attack (Glaesser 2003). 
Sonmez and Graefe (1998) found that many terrorist incidents are primarily focused 
on the tourism industry. In this context newspapers suggested that after the Bali 
bombings the question was whether tourists were `scapegoats' and soft targets 
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(Korneliues, 2002) or whether the tourism industry itself is provocative and 
provocative enough to lead to violent responses including, in extreme cases, terrorist 
acts (Faz, 2002). 
According to Sanata (2001) in the case of terrorism, tourists may be the very target of 
terrorist actions. With increasing numbers travelling, terrorist groups, political 
guerrilla groups etc., have seen in the tourism industry the opportunity they need for 
directing the attention of the international community to their causes. Blowing up 
aircraft full of passengers, hostage taking, kidnapping, gunning down tourists, and 
targeting tourism facilities, are just a few examples of criminal acts directed at the 
industry in recent years. This is not, however, the sole privilege of developing or third 
world countries' or regions. Within the main developed blocs in the world, these 
kinds of activities involving tourists are still happening and in some cases intensifying 
(9/11/01 New York and Washington, Madrid bombings 11/03/04, London Bombings 
07/07/05. 
Frey et al. (2004) argue there is a simple rationale for these attacks. Individuals 
planning their holidays are less likely to choose a destination with higher threats of 
terrorist attacks. Host countries providing tourism services, which can be easily 
substituted, are, therefore, negatively affected by terrorist attacks to a substantial 
extent. The expected response of tourists as a result of bombing, shooting and 
kidnapping is for tourists to stay away thereby inflicting severe economic damage to 
the state. The nature of the threat posed to tourists, then, is quite different from that of 
political instability. Domestic tensions rarely involve tourists and tourist involvement 
is usually by coincidence rather than by design. Therefore one would expect there to 
be differences in the level of risk averseness with respect to acts of terrorism and 
more general political instability. 
Some academics argue that terrorism could be a reaction to irresponsible tourism 
development (Aziz 1995, p. 93, for Egypt). Hall (1994a) believes that attacks on 
tourists or tourist facilities can be used by terrorist to achieve a range of tactical, 
strategic and ideological objectives. One of the most common reasons for terrorist 
attack is to gain publicity. When a tourist. is kidnapped or killed, the situation is 
instantaneously dramatized by the media, which also helps the political conflict 
39 
between the terrorists and the establishment. Terrorists achieve the exposures they 
crave (Richter 1983) and the media increases its circulation or ratings and of course, 
the losers include society as well as those destinations which suffer as a result of the 
negative images such coverage spawns. 
Santana (2001) argues that terrorist attacks on the tourism industry are often justified 
on the basis that the tourists or tourist facilities represent a threat to their culture, 
value system, religious convictions or because they represent capitalism. Egypt, with 
respect to attacks on tourists, is an example of how tourists and tourists' facilities can 
be targeted by terrorist organizations in an attempt to achieve ideological objectives 
and to strengthen their claims to political legitimacy by making the incumbent 
government yield to their demands (discussed more fully in chapter 3). 
Terrorist groups aim their actions at ordinary people, although their ultimate target 
remains the political authorities that they hope to force into meeting their demands 
(Long 1990, Wardlaw 1982 in Norris et al. 2003). Fear or perceived risk plays an 
important role in this process. `Terrorists hope to sow the seeds of public disaffection 
with government, weaken public support for tough antiterrorism policies, and disrupt 
social ties through the creation of fear and anxiety `(Wardlow 1982). Wardlow added: 
"While the primary effect of terrorism is to create fear and alarm, the objectives may be to 
gain concessions, obtain maximum publicity, provoke repression, break down social order, 
build morale in the movement". 
In Eastern Turkey in 1993, members of the Kurdestan Worker's party seeking the 
establishment of a separate Kurdish state kidnapped a number of tourists. Australian, 
French and British tourists were abducted and held hostage in order to raise the profile 
of the Kurdish separatists in the world media. More recently, in October 2002 attacks 
in a night club on Bali claimed the lives of more than 200 international tourists. 
Terrorist attacks on tourists can also be used to punish nationals of a country which 
supports the government which the terrorists are trying to overthrow or which is in 
opposition to their own activities. For example, Ritcher and Waugh (1986) note that 
attacks on American tourists may be viewed as a form of punishment of the United 
State government for its foreign-policy decisions and military actions. Whatever the 
aim the results are often indistinguishable. 
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According to Hall (1994a), tourism is affected by terrorism through two means. First, 
terrorist activities can damage a destination or country's tourist industry by creating 
an image of lack of safety. The deterrent effect of terrorism on tourists in a particular 
country may benefit the tourist industries in competing destinations. On the other 
hand, tourists may fear that terrorism could spill over into countries previously not 
involved and therefore abstain from visiting neighbouring countries. This is 
happening in the Middle East, (Frey et al, 2004). 
Secondly, tourists or tourists' facilities, such as airport terminals (Sri Lanka airport or 
aircraft, attacks on 9/11), may themselves be subject to attack (Luxor, Egypt 1997). 
Tourist facilities are logical targets of terrorist violence because they afford 
opportunity and relative safety for terrorists to act (Ritcher and Waugh, 1986, p233). 
Estimated impacts of terrorism on tourism vary considerably, because the structure of 
the tourism industry and terror campaign differs, not only from country to country, 
but also over time (Frey et al. 2004). The trends analysis also suggests that there is 
persistence in each of the incident series, high and low levels of terrorism tend to 
come in wave or cycles. The shock to a system because of an incident is not 
permanent, so that there its impact is one of being a declining trend toward a long- 
term mean. Enders and Sandler (1999) and Enders, Parise, and Sandler (1992) argue 
that logistically composite events such as skyjacking, large suicide car bombings, and 
assassinations will have longer cycles than less sophisticated events. Drakos and 
Kutan (2003) argue that the estimated impacts of terrorism vary considerably, because 
the structure of the tourism industry and terror campaigns differ from destination to 
destination or within a destination over time 
This makes it difficult to construct a unified framework within which one can study 
the impacts. Instead, it emphasizes the importance of differentiating between 
different types of attacks. The location of an attack whether it takes place in an urban 
or rural area, the number of casualties and the market structure (Drakos and Kutan 
2003). Invariably, the net result is that the industry's profitability is affected due to 
both travellers' responses to the event and the enormous amount of effort the industry 
has to exercise to lure tourists back. The following are examples of the nature of the 
impacts: 
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" Employment in destination countries and businesses in generating countries may 
be hurt (tour operators, travel agents, hoteliers, ... ); 
" Neighbouring countries may also lose inbound tourists; 
" Airlines suffer from low demand and when they are involved there may be legal 
disputes over compensation or damage claims from victims of incidents, or 
awards for loss of life; 
9 Due to its economic significance, tourism is immensely important politically for 
both developed and developing nations. Whenever international terrorism occurs, 
its impacts are seldom localized and it has repercussions on the whole country, or 
region, as well as on political relations between countries. 
Although short-term impacts of terrorist attacks are relatively easy to predict, the 
long-term effects depend on a large array of issues and are more difficult to anticipate. 
There follow some examples of long-term influences (Cooper 1991; Glaesser, 2001): 
" How events are perceived by the public and tourism trade; 
" The stage of development ( see Figure 2-6); 
" The strength of the industry ( see Figure 2-6); 
" The kind of product (how easily it can be substituted, Pyramids in Egypt , Eiffel 
Tower in Paris or pilgrimage destination like the events of Haj in Maka ); 
The level of government commitment to the industry; 
" The determination of law enforcement agencies to contain and/or eliminate 
threats; 
" Type and intensity of incident. 
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Figure 2-6 The approach to studying socio - cultural impact of tourism 
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Source: from Butler and Plog in Cooper et al. (2005). 
According to Plog (2001) most destinations follow a predictable, but uncontrolled 
development pattern from birth to maturity and finally to old age and decline. At each 
stage the destination appeals to a different psychographic group of travellers, who 
determine the destination's character and success. According by Plog (2001) 
destinations can be placed on the psychographic curve based on the types of people 
who visit. 
McKercher (2005) however, "argues that destinations serve many markets 
simultaneously. Each market evolves through its own life cycle at different rates, with 
some in the new stage while other may be in the expanding, stable or tired stages". 
Therefore, he suggested that if a destination can exist simultaneously at multiple 
points along its life cycle continuum, depending on the perspective of different 
markets visiting it, then it cannot be said any destination is at a definite life cycle 
stage. 
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Depending upon which school of thought one accepts, it could be argued that shocks 
to a destination's tourism industry (natural or man-made) could be associated with 
different magnitudes of impact and varying recovery periods. For instance, if a 
terrorist attack occurred during the early (allocentric) stages of Plog's Model would 
the rapid growth being experienced provide a momentum that would carry tourism 
back onto a rapid road to recovery? On the other hand, could it be that the tourism 
destination at this stage is so infant and precarious that the effects of the event would 
magnify its impact? Does the maturity of the destination necessarily imply 
robustness? The recovery period associated with such attacks is examined later on in 
this thesis when case studies are used to consider the recovery period following 
terrorist attacks in different types of destinations. 
Aktas et al. in Theobold (2005) argues that the distinction between different types of 
crisis is not always clear cut. The 9/11 attacks on the United States, for example, were 
extraordinary in the country's recent history and can be considered as a one-time 
event. But the impacts on tourism industry were considerable. When the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks happened, tourism growth had already experienced a slow down. The 
magnitude of the decrease in tourism activity was partly because of the deterioration 
in economic conditions affecting chief North American, European and Asian 
economies at the same time with worldwide economic growth dropping to 2.5 per 
cent in 2001, down from 4.7 per cent in 2000, with some economies even slipping 
into an economic slump for part of the year. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 severely 
provoked the situation and as a result, for the first time since 1982 (the time of the 
second oil crisis, martial law in Poland, the Falklands war and the conflict between 
Israel and Lebanon) the worldwide number of international tourist arrivals showed an 
absolute decrease ( UNWTO, 2002). However, the later terrorist attacks on Madrid on 
11.4.2004 or London attacks (2005) had less of an impact on the market. 
Conclusion 
The primary focus of this chapter was first, to introduce the tourism system, and 
secondly to examine the impact of political impediments on tourism motivation and to 
start to draw attention to the factors that influence perceived travel risk. The emerging 
global economy and communications networks, of which the internationalization of 
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tourism is an integral part, make tourism increasingly vulnerable to the effects of 
political instability and political violence. When tourism ceases to be agreeable due 
to real or perceived risks, tourists implement their freedom and power to avoid risky 
situations or destinations (Hall, 1994; Wahab, 1996; Wall, 1996, p145; Wahab et al. 
(1996); Pizam 1999, Sonmez 1999; Sonmez et al. (1999); Cooper, 2001; Aktas et al. 
in Theobold 2005). 
Some believe that while natural disasters can obstruct the flow of tourism, terrorism 
risk tends to frighten the travelling public more severely. Violent protest, social 
unrest, civil war, terrorist actions, the perceived violations of human rights, or even 
the mere threat of these activities can all serve to cause tourists to alter their travel 
behaviours Hall(1994). 
Protection from the ramifications of terrorism can occur at different levels. As a form 
of protective' behaviour, travellers can alter their destination choices; modify their 
travel behaviour; or if they decide to continue with their travel plans, acquire 
information on terrorism, political turmoil, heavy crime, and health risks (Norton 
1987; Reeves 1987; Chandler 1991; Englander 1991; Fedarko 1993; Fletcher 1993; 
Hagerty 1993; Pelton and Aral 1995). Those who decide to travel despite risks are 
advised by various sources (i. e., travel magazines, government advisories, Internet) to 
avoid displays of wealth, to keep a low profile, to vary daily routines during lengthy 
business trips, and to fly economy class-since hijackers are known to prefer first class 
to establish their temporary headquarters (D'Amore and Anuza 1986). If the potential 
costs of travel appear to be more important than the benefits, the traveller can decide 
to stay home. Unfortunately, for destinations overwhelmed with terrorism or political 
disorder the solution is far more complex. Attacks on tourists and actual or perceived 
political instability could create negative tourist images of a destination, which may 
take years to overcome, and as such this provides a different landscape of risk to that 
associated with natural disasters. 
However, the repercussions of a tourism crisis are likely to damage all destinations, 
the period of recovery can vary for each and the impact is dependent on many factors. 
This is very important, particularly in developing countries, where the lack of capital 
and infrastructure makes it more difficult to cope with difficulties. Although it seems 
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that potential tourists have a relatively short memory, the implications for investment 
in the industry may be a different matter. 
The next two chapters investigate the impact of acts of terrorism in recent years. 
Examining cases studies both from developing and developed countries in detail 
mainly to identify the impact on tourism arrivals and revenue as result of such attacks 
and the recovery periods and the response that has been taken by destinations to 
restore tourism confidence. 
In terms of the effect of travel-related risk on Leiper's system of tourism, Figure 2-7 
reproduces Leiper's diagram with a fracture that separates the originating country 
from the destination. The fracture can be seen as a hurdle or threshold limit imposed 
by travel-related risks. The greater the level of risk, the greater the barrier to travel 
and at some level of risk travellers will find it simply too high to scale and they will 
seek alternative destinations where the passage is less risky. The precise level at 
which the threshold level of risk will stop travel will depend upon the region and its 
image, the country and its image, the level of risk averseness of the traveller (which 
may also in part be determined by the culture/country from which they originate) and 
the nature of the risks. These are all aspects that will be explored in the following 
chapters. 
Figure 2-7 Leiper's Tourism System with Risk introduced. 
travellers 
RISK 
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When tourists make their travel decisions one aspect of that decision will focus on 
travel risk. In some tourists this may be considered to be a positive aspect but for the 
majority the exposure to risk will be considered a negative element. There are many 
types of risks to which tourists may be exposed. Some may be product related in the 
sense that often for first- time visitors the purchase is made on a bit of knowledge and 
a lot of faith and it may transpire that they do not enjoy the result of their decision. 
There are risks in relation to finance in that the traveller may find that the cost of their 
travel far exceeds their original estimates. There are also travel risks relating to 
physical harm, through ill-health, natural disasters, crime or political unrest and 
terrorism. Travellers will be informed of various risks through media exposure or 
from travel advisories issued by their governments. Such information is, again, 
partial in that often only the more spectacular or major incidents are brought to the 
media's attention. 
This research examines a variety of these risks, although it does focus in a large part 
on the risks associated with acts of terrorism or political unrest. Map 2-1 shows the 
travel risks around the world as seen through the analyses of Merchant International 
Group Ltd. The map is based upon an analysis of a variety of risks relating to 
political unrest, terrorist acts, natural disasters, contagion and violent crime. 
Although it represents only a subset of the areas examined in this research, it does 
demonstrate the enormity of travel risk on a global scale from a geographical point of 
view. 
47 
Map 2-1 Global Risk Indicator 
N 
ýý 
Source adapted from: Merchant International Group Ltd available 
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However, if one looks at the level of travel risk from the point of view of tourism 
flows, it paints a very different picture. Graph 2-1 shows the volume of tourism 
activity, in terms of arrivals and expenditure in relation to the level of travel risk. It 
can be seen that more than 80% of arrivals are in countries where the travel risk is 
relatively low, scoring either I or 2 and that 85% of tourism expenditure is similarly 
distributed. Those countries that are subject to high levels of travel risk (4 or 5) have 
little in the way of tourism flows from a global perspective. To some extent this may 
be expected since areas that are considered to be risky are unlikely to attract large 
numbers of visitors and their associated spend. On the other hand, it is difficult for 
countries with this perceived level of risk to carry tourism through its development 
inertia which is worrying, particularly if the perceptions are misplaced. 
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This research will examine the literature, implement and analyse a survey of travellers 
and confirm the findings of that primary research using a Delphi Panel of tourism 
experts. It can be seen from Graph 2-1 that much of the Middle East, Africa and 
South America is considered to be subject to high or very high travel risks and an 
attempt is made here, using selected case studies, to determine the effects of risk on 
tourism flows and how governments respond. 
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Chapter 3 
Case studies (Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya) 
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Introduction 
The previous chapter explored the place of risk in the tourism system and in 
particular, the risk associated with political unrest and terrorism. This chapter takes 
the issue forward to look at the effect of political and terrorist incidents on tourism 
activity in some selected developing countries. In this way it will be possible to look 
at the variety of forms that such acts have taken and the impacts of events on the 
countries that are subjected to these events. The following chapter examines three 
case study countries from high income countries (USA, UK and Spain) in order to 
examine the effects of terrorist attacks and recovery times in those countries. 
3.1 The case study selection 
A variety of approaches were considered to find the most appropriate countries to be 
included as case studies. Countries were categorised by GDP levels, then by the 
proportion of GDP attributable to tourism receipts and finally by whether or not they 
had experienced terrorist attacks or political upheavals over recent times. None of 
these filters worked perfectly to provide a good distribution of case study countries, 
causing the researcher to consider exception rules for each filter. However, after 
much deliberation it was decided to take a cruder but, hopefully, more informative 
selection of countries from the developing world. The case study countries chosen are 
Egypt, Indonesia and Kenya. The reason for the inclusion of these three countries is 
that they all fall into the category of low to lower-middle income countries, all of 
them receive significant tourism receipts in relation to GDP and all of them have been 
subjected to terrorist attacks of varying magnitude. Additionally, there is one country 
from Africa, one from the Middle East and from South Asia Pacific region. This 
provides a good geographical and cultural spread with respect to developing 
countries. 
Indonesia was subject to a series of incidents, which included one of the deadliest 
attacks directed at tourists in modem history (Beirman, 2003). Furthermore, Bali is 
Indonesia's principal tourist destination and although tourism only accounts for 3.5 
percent of GDP in Indonesia, it is a major provider for the local economy of Bali. 
Egypt has been chosen because, for five consecutive years in the 1990s, it struggled 
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with al-Gema al-Islamiya, a terrorist group that targeted and killed many tourists. 
Egypt has also been selected as a case study because of the uniqueness and therefore 
the attraction pull of its heritage (Essner and Laurance, 2003). From the Pyramids of 
Giza to the Aswan Dam, Egypt is a well-known beneficiary of international tourism. 
Furthermore, Egypt is an Arab country that has had difficulties in managing a 
fundamental Islamic undercurrent that uses terrorism as a tool to intimidate the state 
to further a cause. Kenya has been selected as a case study because although the target 
of terrorist activities was deliberately tourists, the acts were aimed at a narrow 
spectrum of tourists, namely the Jewish tourism super infrastructure and Israeli 
tourists. 
3.2 Terrorism and DeveloninLy Countries 
According to the World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO), tourism is the main source 
of income for almost 40% of the world's countries (Quinn, 2003). It is most important 
in the developing world where economic growth is most complicated and necessary 
(Sinclair and Tsegaye, 1991). It is also apparent that in many areas, where the 
traditional economic base is barely capable of satisfying basic life, tourism could 
bring new opportunities of income and economic diversification (Wilson, 1994). 
However, often the lack of political stability i. e. War, terrorism and other man-made 
issues prevent tourism from fulfilling its potential. 
Terrorism as a tactic for attempting to influence political issues and demands seems 
unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future (Weinberg, 2005). A series of terrorist 
attacks in recent years have left no doubt that terrorism has become an ever-increasing 
threat and that the terror threat is not confined to one area, it is global in nature 
(Cameron, 2005). The depressing effect of terrorism on economic growth and on the 
tourism industry in particular, appears to be most significant for developing countries, 
where the lack of diversity in their economic activities and planning compounds the 
problems created. 
In the previous chapter, the literature was reviewed in an attempt to understand better 
the impact of political tension, war and terrorism on the tourism industry and tourist 
behaviour. This chapter analyses the interface of destinations' coping mechanisms 
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and tourism, with a particular focus on the process within developing countries. The 
case study countries are compared with respect to their stage of tourism development, 
the implications of the crisis and the responses that were made to it. 
There are 208 (World Bank, 2006) countries in the world, nearly all of which benefit 
to some extent from tourism. However, not all of the countries benefit equally. Two 
of the case study selections were from a sample of countries whose receipts from 
tourism were in excess of one billion US dollars in 2004 (Egypt and Indonesia) which 
according to definition of UNWTO indicator is expenditures of international inbound 
visitors including payments made to national carriers for international transport. This 
indicator also includes any other prepayments made for goods/services received in the 
destination country (Essner, 2003). The final developing country used as a case study, 
Kenya, fell marginally short of this threshold (with tourism receipts amounting to 0.8 
US$ m). Table 3-1 puts these three countries into context, showing tourism activity, in 
terms of receipts, for 50 countries. It can be seen that these 50 countries, in terms of 
tourism receipts, are a disparate group from the point of view of the magnitude of the 
receipts (ranging from 66.5 US $m to 1.9 US $m but extended to 0.8 US $m to 
include Kenya). 
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Table 3-1 Top 50 destinations plus Kenya (USS million) 
Rank Countries 2002 2003 2004 Rank Countries 2002 2003 2004 
1 USA 82.4 71.9 66.5 26 Egypt 3.7 4.5 6.1 
2 Spain 31.7 39.6 45.2 27 Poland 4.2 4.0 5.8 
3 France 32.3 36.5 40.8 28 Denmark 4.7 4.2 5.6 
4 Italy 26.6 31.2 35.6 29 R. O. Korea 5.9 5.3 5.6 
5 Germany 19.2 23.1 27.6 30 South Africa 2.9 5.1 5.6 
6 UK 20.3 22.6 27.2 31 Russia 4.1 4.5 5.2 
7 China 20.3 17.4 25.7 32 Singapore 4.4 3.7 5.0 
8 Turkey 11.9 13.2 15.8 33 New Zealand 3.0 3.9 4.9 
9 Austria 11.2 13.9 15.3 34 Indonesia 5.2 4.0 4.7 
10 Australia 8.5 10.3 12.9 35 India 2.9 3.5 4.7 
11 Greece 9.7 10.7 12.8 36 Ireland 3.0 3.8 4.2 
12 Japan 3.4 8.8 1l2 37 Czech republic 2.9 3.5 4.1 
13 Switzerland 7.8 9.1 10.4 38 Taiwan 4.5 2.9 4.0 
14 Netherlands 7.7 9.1 10.2 39 Hungary 3.7 4.0 4.0 
15 Thailand 7.9 7.8 10.0 40 Morocco 2.6 3.2 3.9 
16 Canada 10.8 10.8 9.7 41 Egypt 4.3 3.8 3.7 
17 Hong kong 7.5 7.1 9.0 42 Luxemburg 2.4 2.9 3.6 
18 Belgium 6.9 8.1 9.1 43 Norway 2.1 2.6 3.0 
19 Mexico 8.3 8.4 8.9 44 Israel 2/0 2.0 2.3 
20 Malaysia 7.1 5.9 8.1 45 Syria 1.4 1.4 2.2 
21 Portugal 5.7 6.5 7.7 46 Bulgaria 1.1 1.6 2.1 
22 Macao 4.2 5.1 7.4 47 Cyprus 1.8 1.9 2.0 
23 Croatia 3.8 6.3 7.0 48 Philippine 1.5 1.5 2.0 
24 Saudi Arabia 5.7 5.6 6.5 49 Finland 1.5 1.8 2.0 
25 Sweden 4.0 5.2 6.1 50 Tunisia 1.5 1.5 1.9 
51 Kenya 0.51 0.61 0.80 
Source: Adapted from UNWTO (2006) 
However, to set tourism activity further into context, it is not only the volume of 
tourism receipts that needs to be examined, it is the proportion of GDP attributable to 
those receipts as this gives a crude indication of the significance of tourism to those 
countries. By looking at those countries that are highly dependent to those that are 
not highly dependent upon tourism receipts (using a percentage of GDP of 3.0 % as a 
threshold) the list of 50 countries shown in Table 3-1 can be reduced to only 28 (see 
table 3-2). 
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Table 3-2 List of countries in which international tourism receipts account for 3 percent 
or greater of GDP 
Rank country % Rank country % 
1 Macao 40.2 15 Thailand 5.5 
2 Bahamas 33.2 16 Spain 5.4 
3 Cyprus 20.3 17 Morocco 5.3 
4 Jamaica 17.0 18 Hong Kong 4.5 
5 Dom. Rep 14.6 19 Malaysia 4.5 
6 Croatia 12.5 20 Portugal 4.5 
7 Syria 8.6 21 Egypt 7.0 
8 Tunisia 7.1 22 Kenya 3.2 
9 Singapore 7.3 24 Poland 3.9 
10 Greece 7.3 25 new Zealand 3.7 
11 Hungary 7.1 26 Porto Rico 3.7 
12 Costa Rica 6.3 26 Ireland 3.6 
13 Austria 6.0 27 Indonesia 3.5 
14 Czech Rep. 5.5 28 Philippines 3.3 
Source: adapted from UNWTO and World Bank (2007) 
Table 3-2 shows that the case study countries fall into last 8 in terms of their ranking with 
respect to receipts as a percentage of GDP. 
Finally, since, in part, the purpose of this study is to examine the impact and 
responses of destinations with respect to acts of terrorism, the selection also has to 
consider those countries that were subject to terrorist attacks. This criterion reduces 
the number of developing countries in the framework down to a list of just seven that 
could be eligible for inclusion in this study (see table 3-3). While each case contains 
unique characteristics, there are a number of common elements that apply. All of the 
events resulted in a significant downturn in tourism numbers to the destination and 
created a climate of fear and concern about its overall safety and viability (Biermann, 
2003). In all cases, a marketing strategy was required to restore confidence in the 
destination. 
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Table 3-3 The case studies candidates. 
Country Year Terrorism attacks 
Egypt 1992-1 197 Several terrorist attacks against tourists including that at Luxor 
Philippine 2000 Explosions in Manila targeting a train, a bus, the airport, a park 
near the U. S. Embassy and a gas station, killing 22 people 
Tunisia 2002 The bombing of an historic Tunisian synagogue on the resort 
island of Djerba with a gas truck, kills 21 people, mostly 
German tourists. 
Indonesia 2002-2004 Three deadly bomb attack including the Bali bombings (2002) 
J. W. Marriott (2003) and the Jakarta embassy bombing (2004) 
Morocco 2003 Suicide bomb attack in Morocco's largest city, Casablanca, 
targeted a Jewish Community Centre, a Spanish restaurant and 
social club, a hotel and the Belgian consulate which killed at 
least 41 people and injured a further 100. 
Kenya 2002 Suicide attack in Paradises Hotel in Mombassa which Killed 15 
people 
Turkey 2003 Bomb attacks on the British consulate and the HSBC bank 
headquarters in Istanbul on 20.11.03, which left at least 27 dead 
and up to 400 injured. The explosions followed the suicide 
bomb attacks against two synagogues in Istanbul that killed 25 
people 5 days earlier. 
Source: adapted from fox news and BBC news 
One of the main economic criterions for classifying a country is Gross Domestic 
Product. Each economy is classified as low income, middle income (subdivided into 
lower and upper middle), or high income. Other measures based on geographic 
region, exports and levels of external debt are used (see table 3-4). Economies 
meeting a certain threshold (either low-income or middle income) are generally 
referred to as developing countries (Essner and Laurance, 2003). Adejuwon (2000) 
defined a developing country as a country with a growing economy whose general 
development is not yet mature. It is neither a potential industrialized country nor a 
classified manufacturing country. According to the definition of the World Bank, 
developing countries are low and middle-income countries in which most people have 
a lower standard of living with access to fewer goods and services than do most 
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people in high-income countries. However, this is not an exact science and there are 
many exceptions to the rule, including, for example, the oil-exporting countries where 
the level of GDP per capita may be extraordinarily high but the level of economic 
development is very narrow and limited. 
Table 3-4 Case studies data profile 
Years Kenya Egypt Indonesia 
2004 16. lb 78.8 b 5.1b 
GDP 2005 18.00b 89.3 b 5.6b 
Exports 2004 26.2 28.9b 31.3b 
2005 24.7 31.7b 37.7b 
situation I L. I 
Source: Adapted World Bank (2007) 
* Lower middle income, less indebted. 
**Lower middle income, severely indebted. 
According to research conducted by the WTTC (2004) the variables that are used to 
define or characterise a crisis event include: 
" Consumer confidence - in respect to international arrivals, personal travel and 
tourism, and business travel; 
" Timing - in respect to tourism seasonally; 
" Shock factor - in respect to intensity/duration of the event; 
" Geographic Spread - localised, national, regional or global; 
" Infrastructure needs - in respect to damage and pace of rebuilding 
" Government Response - with respect to recovery programmes, marketing and 
promotion. 
3.3 Egypt: brief background 
Egypt, although often considered to be Middle East, is located in Northern Africa, 
bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Libya and the Gaza Strip, and the Red Sea 
north of Sudan, and includes the Asian Sinai Peninsula (CIA 2005, see map 3-1). 
Egypt is part of the Mediterranean basin, the world's top destination area, which 
attracts one out of every three tourists travelling in the world (UNWTO , 
2005). 
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Map 3-1 Egypt. 
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Source: adapted from http: //www. factmonster. com/atlas/country/egypt. html 
Tourism is the country's second biggest source of income after the revenue received 
from the Suez Canal (BBC, 23.07.05) and accounted for 7% of total GDP in 2004. 
Egypt is the second most popular destination in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia. 
However, in terms of leisure tourism it ranks first. Even globally Egypt is a significant 
tourism destination, ranking 26 out of 190 countries in the world for tourism receipts 
in 2004 (see table 3-1). The main attraction for tourists to Egypt are the site of ancient 
Egypt, Cairo and its environs, Luxor, Karnak, Abu Simbel, temples and tombs along 
the Nile River and the Mediterranean port city of Alexandria. However, the Egyptian 
tourism industry has actively promoted other destinations within Egypt, including 
Hurghada on the Red Sea, the Sinai Peninsula and parts of the western desert. The 
completion of Israel's removal from Sinai in 1982 led to considerable private and 
government tourist investment, which facilitated the development and establishment 
of several high-quality tourism resorts in the Sinai, which are popular among tourists 
from Europe and neighbouring Israel (Beirman, 2003). Egypt also has started to 
combine a series of proposals aimed at the water sports and "sun and sea" markets, 
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based on its rich and diverse natural heritage, which is ideal, for such kind of products 
(UNWTO, 2005). 
The 1979 Camp David Peace Agreement between Egypt and Israel presented many 
economic benefits to Egypt. These include self-sufficiency with respect to oil since 
most of Egypt's oil production comes from wells in the Sinai and a reduction in 
military expenditure. Peace also guaranteed income from transit fees charged for the 
use of the Suez Canal (transportation hub), which was closed from 1967 to 1975. The 
Egyptian expanded the rudimentary tourism infrastructure established by Israel during 
its occupation of the Sinai from 1967-82. 
The tourism industry in Egypt has been relatively free from the impacts of 
international conflict. Egypt's return to Sinai has provided many economic benefits 
for Egypt, opening new, large inbound markets of curious Israelis followed by a 
substantial growth in European tourism (Beirmann, 2003), while at the same time 
Egypt has started to receive funds from the United States. 
These policies were broadly unpopular with Egyptians (Middle East Desk, 2007) and 
many Arab countries, which opposed the Egyptian-Israel accord, subjected Egypt to 
political isolation. Consequently, tourism from the Arab world slumped during this 
period. However, following the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in October 
1981 and his replacement by the more politically cautious Hosni Mobarak, Egypt was, 
again, gradually accepted within the Arab world. Domestically, the CDPA between 
Egypt and Israel remained a traditional source of opposition for many regimes both 
within and outside Egypt. The Muslim brotherhood, which had long believed Egypt to 
be a state that observed Islamic law, began to reassert itself following the agreement. 
According to Essner (2003) in the late 1970s the al-gema `a al-islamiya began inciting 
revolution and intimidating the state into adopting shari'a law, a fundamentalist form 
of Islam. Al-gema'a al-islamiya targeted government officials, Coptic Christians, 
policemen, officers from the State Security Intelligence and tourists. Beirman (2003) 
argues that a significant portion of its funding has come from foreign governments, 
including Iran. The researcher believes however, if the Beirmann (2003) assumption 
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is right it had to be after the revolution (1979) and considering that the Al gema'a al- 
islamiya was established years before the Iranian revolution (1970) this seems 
unlikely. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the subsequent Gulf War in January 
and February of 1991 had a negative impact on tourism for all countries in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and Middle East. Egypt who had long supported the Iraqi government 
during the war between Iran and Iraq, committed a substantial military force in 
support of the U. S. A led coalition, which expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait. It was 
the largest Arab force in the coalition, which included Syria, the Gulf States, Saudi 
Arabia and Morocco. However, there was some vocal Islamic opposition to Egypt's 
Gulf War involvement (Beirmann, 2003). 
Twenty-first century Egypt has made considerable progress in marketing a more 
diverse image of the destination. The Egyptian Tourist Authority, while recognising 
the overriding attraction of `Ancient Egypt', has sought to market alternative Egypt in 
an attempt to appeal to niche markets, including conferences and conventions, eco- 
tourists, war veterans and their descendants, among others. The decentralisation of 
infrastructure and tourist attractions spreads the economic benefit of tourism 
throughout the country. 
3.3.1 Attacks against tourists 1992-1997 
Egypt, for five consecutive years in the 1990s, struggled with al-Gema al-Islamiya, a 
terrorist group that targeted tourists in order to decimate the tourism industry and 
cripple the country's economy (See Table 3-5). According to Essner (2003), the group 
demanded that the Egyptian government introduce Sharia law, sever diplomatic 
relations with Israel, convince the U. S to free spiritual leader Sheikh Omar Abd al 
Rahman, free other Islamist leaders and end the trials by military courts. 
60 
Table 3-5 The number of attacks against tourists 1992-1997 
Attacks by al-Gema `al -islamiya against tourist from 1992 to 1997 
October 1992 British nurse killed in bus attack near Cairo 
February 1992 Two tourists killed outside a Cairo hotel (one French, one US) 
October 1993 One US and one French tourists killed outside a Cairo hotel 
March 1994 One German tourist killed on a Nile boat 
September 1995 Two Germans and two Egyptians killed in Red Sea resort city of 
Hurghada 
October 1995 One British killed and one wounded with one Egyptian killed and 
five wounded in an attack on a tourist mini-van in the Nile Valley 
April 1996 Eighteen Greek tourists killed and sixteen wounded in an attack on a 
tourist Coach near the Pyramids at Gaza. (it is believed the Greeks 
were incorrectly assumed by their attackers to have been Israelis) 
September 1997 Ten German tourists killed in an attack outside the Egyptian 
Museum in Cairo 
November 1997 Fifty-eight tourists massacred in the area of the Luxor Temple. 
Victims included: French, Swiss, British and Japanese nationals 
Source: adapted from Beirman (2003) 
Beirman (2003) believes many Islamists resented what they saw as the culturally 
intrusive influence of mass tourism on Egypt's society in general, and on Islamic 
goodness and performance in particular. The Islamists were aware that tourism 
represented a major source of foreign exchange earnings for Egypt and for the 
Egyptian government. Thus, undermining the tourism industry would lead to a decline 
in Egypt's existing low standard of living, and fuel social and political discontent, 
which might lead to the overthrow of the Egyptian political leadership. Finally, 
members of al-islamiyya and Jihad believed that the economic benefits which tourism 
brought to Egypt were monopolised by a small Egyptian elite and did not filter down 
to the average person. 
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3.3.2 Impact of the attacks 
The Luxor massacre was the last major Islamic attack against tourists in Egypt during 
the twentieth century and resulted in the death of 58 international tourists - Egypt's 
most deadliest attacks. The numbers of people killed exceeded those who died during 
the whole two-decade history of al-Gema `al -islamiya (Essner, 2003). The attacks 
achieved a great deal of notoriety through the extensive media coverage that was 
afforded it. However, the attacks were also subject to worldwide condemnation, even 
from Islamic States like Iran, while the thousands of Egyptian people who were 
dependent on tourism for their livelihoods (especially in Luxor) were deprived of their 
incomes. Graph 3-1 shows the inverse relationship between the number of attacks 
and the number of resulting deaths during the 1990s. 
Source: adapted from Essner 2003 
The impact of the attacks, however, seems to be have been proportionately less in 
1997 compared with the effect in 1992 albeit with a much higher base line. Graph 3-2 
shows a decline of about 22% in 1993 over the 1992 values whereas the drop in 1998 
over the 1997 figures was 12.8%. Furthermore, tourism expenditure decreased by 
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29.41% on 1993 over the 1992 attack where it was slightly lower at 26% in 1998 over 
the previous year. 
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The attack that killed 18 Greek citizens in April 1996 appears to have had little effect 
on the growth of tourism with just a slow down in the growth of expenditure and a 
flattening off in the growth rate of arrivals (see Graph 3-2). It is believed that the 
Greek tourists were incorrectly assumed by their attackers to have been Israelis who 
were targeted in retaliation for Israel's recent invasion of Southern Lebanon (Essner, 
2003; Beirman 2003). 
After the attacks in 1992 the number of arrivals did not recapture the volume that had 
existed prior to the attacks for 4 years. However, following the much more dramatic 
attack at Luxor in 1997, the industry seemed to rebound more quickly such that by 
1999 real tourism receipts had increased 40% over the previous year and tourism 
receipts reached historical highs of $3.9 billion in 1999 and $4.3 billion in 2000. It is 
interesting to explore why such differences in the speed of recovery were 
experienced. 
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3.3.3 The response to the Luxor crisis 
After the Luxor massacres, tourism recovery to Egypt was aided by a combination of 
factors: 
" Employing Burson-Marsteller, a consultancy company (that was originally 
appointed in 1993 as a principal adviser to the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism and 
Civil Aviation) to restore travel industry and consumer confidence in Egypt 
" Increasing security (it was not increased following the 1992 and 1994 incidents) 
and an intensive marketing campaign by the Egyptian Tourist Authority, which 
portrayed Egypt as a core millennial destination 
" The Egyptian Tourist Authority and Egypt Air worked very closely with the 
private sector to entice tourists from major markets to return to Egypt. Major 
international tour operators, for instance, Insight Vacations, Trafalgar Tours and 
others, offered heavily discount packages to Egypt. 
" The government, which has extensive control of the industry in Egypt, reduced the 
prices to induce tourists to return. 
A factor that contributed to the high death toll of the Luxor massacre in November 
1997 was the fact that a lone elderly guard was assigned to protect one of Egypt's 
most visited tourists' sites. After Luxor, the Egyptian government massively increased 
security details assigned to all major tourist sites and this was accompanied by a 
relentless crackdown on Islamic groups. However, in October 2004 there was another 
attack against the tourists in Egypt, at the resort of Taba, which is popular with 
Israelis (BBC, 08,09,04). This left more than 35 people dead, and this was 
subsequently followed a year later by the worst atrocity against tourists to date at the 
heart of the Egyptian tourism industry which resulted in the deaths of 83 people. The 
Red Sea resort of Sharm el-sheikh is popular among tourists and had been claimed to 
be the most secure place in Egypt. The attack did not seem to discriminate between 
tourists of different nationalities. 
Many western countries issued travel advisories warning their citizens of the dangers 
associated with travel to Egypt and the possibility of further attacks. In most cases, 
these advisories were quickly cancelled once the Egyptian government could 
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demonstrate that remedial measures had been taken. After the Luxor attacks, the 
Egyptian tourism authorities treated the advisories very seriously and were anxious to 
encourage their early revocation. The Egyptian Tourist authority went to considerable 
lengths to invite foreign diplomats to inspect the upgraded security regime in tourist 
centres, which included enlarged police contingents and electronic surveillance at 
entry points. These actions went some way towards alleviating the high risk 
perceptions that had been instilled as a result of the attacks. 
In long-haul tourist originating countries, such as the USA, Canada, Japan and 
Australia, Egypt began to experiment in joint marketing exercises in 1995 and has 
continued the joint marketing of Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian authority which is a 
feature of marketing Egypt to the travel industry in the USA and Canada and Japan. 
According to Beirman (2003), one marketing factor which hastened the recovery of 
the Egyptian tourism industry after the Luxor massacre (1997), which was not a 
possibility after the 1992 and 1994 incidents, was the prospect of a millennial tourism 
influx. Egypt was able to promote tourism on two levels. First, it had a legitimate 
stake in promoting itself as a pilgrimage destination to Christians commemorating 
Christianity's bi-millennium based on belief that Jesus and his family spent three 
years in Egypt. Secondly, there was the immense attractive power of the Great 
Pyramids. 
As for the behaviour of tourists following major events such as those at Luxor, it 
should be noted that there seems to be a difference according to nationality (UNWTO, 
2005). This is an aspect that is explored later in this research. According to an 
Egyptian tourism official interviewed by Beirmann (2003) and supported by UNWTO 
figures used in Graph 3-8, the tourism industry had fully recovered from the impact of 
the Luxor massacre by 2000. However, the only significant source market which had 
not been restored was Japan, largely due to the fact that a substantial portion of the 
casualties at Luxor were Japanese and there was lingering reluctance to return. The 
reluctance of Japanese tourists to return to Egypt may also have been a result of 
cultural differences where some cultures may be more risk-averse than others 
(Hofstede, 2001). Again this is an area that is explored later in this thesis. 
Egypt, like most other emerging destinations in the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East, has experienced robust growth over the recent years. The strategy incorporated 
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two significant prongs; the consolidation of security and a major PR and marketing 
campaign to appeal to potential tourists and to restore international confidence in 
Egypt as a major destination. The utilisation of Burson-Maesteller's consulting 
services enabled the Egyptian tourism industry and the Egyptian tourist authority to 
implement highly professional and structured marketing responses and recovery 
strategies following the terrorist activities. 
3.4 A brief history of tourism in Indonesia since 1970 
Indonesia is a vast and beautifully diverse country of more than 17,000 islands spread 
across some 5,000 kilometres of tropical Ocean (see map 3-2). Spanning the seas 
between Asia and Australia, Indonesia is the largest archipelago. The major Islands of 
Indonesia are Sumatra, Bali, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Irian Jaya. 
Tourism has been one of the leading sectors in Indonesia's non-oil exports for many 
years (World Bank 2002) and accounts for more than 3.5 % of GDP. In 2004, more 
than 5,000,000 tourists visited Indonesia contributing 4.7 US$ billion to Indonesia's 
balance of payments, about 16% of total exports. 
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Since the mid-1970s onwards, large amounts of foreign and domestic investment 
funds were channelled into the hotel and tourism sector. However, the increase in 
tourist arrivals fell below expectations, with only 592,000 visitors recorded in 1982. 
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The prospect of declining export revenue from oil prompted a comprehensive review 
of the sector. In April 1983 visa requirements were lifted for tourists from most West 
European countries, all Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member 
countries and many countries of the Pacific area, including the US and Canada. 
Further efforts to promote tourism were launched in subsequent years, and the period 
from 1993 to 2003 was designated Visit Indonesia Decade by the culture and tourism 
department. Thus, the industry got off to a slow start. 
From 1986 onwards the growth of the industry accelerated sharply, with the number 
of tourists visiting Indonesia increasing by an annual average of 19.7%, from 825,000 
in 1986 to an estimated 5 million by 1995. In the same period tourist spending 
increased by 25% a year, from US$644m to US$5229m. In the following two years 
earnings continued to rise, but the number of tourist arrivals stabilised at around five 
million a year. 
In the summer of 1997, Indonesia suffered a major economic setback, along with 
most other Asian economies. Tourist visits started to drop, falling to just 3.8m people 
in 1998,3.9m in 1999 and 4.15m in 2000 as a result of rising civil unrest and political 
instability combined with the financial crises that was affecting the Tiger economies 
(www. factmonster. com). Since 1997 Indonesia has been beset by crises: terrorism, the 
Asian financial crisis, political instability, rioting and violence (Aceh, Ambon, 
Borneo, Irian Jaya and East Timor) and natural disasters. The impact of these 
heightened risk factors on a tourism industry in its relative infancy, particularly after 
its rather reluctant start, could easily cripple the industry beyond repair. 
The combination of the bombings, SARS, the Iraq War, bird flu and tsunami certainly 
brought about an acute decline in tourism activity in Indonesia. Current issues 
include: alleviating widespread poverty specially as a result of the Tsunami in Ache 
which brought deeper poverty for affected people in the area, preventing terrorism, 
continuing the transition to popularly-elected governments after four decades of 
authoritarianism, implementing reforms of the banking sector, addressing charges of 
cronyism and corruption, holding the military and police accountable for human rights 
violations, and resolving armed separatist movements in Aceh and Papua (CIA 2005). 
None of these ingredients are desirable if travel-related risk to Indonesia is to be 
mitigated. 
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3.4.1 The Bali bombings 
Bali is the largest holiday destination in Indonesia for both international and domestic 
tourists (see map 3-3). Tourism is the major economic activity on Bali, employing 
60,000 people in restaurants and hotels alone and estimates suggest that tourism 
represents around 50% of the island's economy Cooper et al. ( 2005). One of the 
most attractive features of the destination is its low prices (particularly for restaurants 
and personal services) where they are about half the price of similar services in typical 
North American or European establishments. 
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Tourism in Bali appears to be dominated by international visitors, with domestic 
visitors playing a more limited role. Total reported stay-overs at hotels in Bali were 
5.7m in 2000. Over three quarters of these were foreign (4.3 million). Foreign tourists 
tend to stay in more upmarket hotels than those occupied by domestic tourists. 
Moreover, foreign visitors tend to spend only about a third of their total budget on 
hotels and restaurants. The remainder is spent on a host of other goods and services 
that impact on all sectors of the local and regional economy. 
Not all visitors to Bali arrive directly on the island (Ngurah Rai airport), but the 
figures do provide an insight into the nationality composition. The top three 
nationalities in 2001 were Japanese (24%), Australian (19%), and Taiwanese (12%). 
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Many visitors to other major Indonesian tourist destination such as Lombok, Yogya in 
Central Java and Toraja in South Sulawesi also go to Bali. 
Although Indonesia has suffered at least 40 bomb attacks since 1998, the Bali strike at 
the heart of the tourist industry was the first tragedy that killed Western tourists. The 
Bali bombings of 12 October, 2002, which happened in Paddy's Bar and the Sari Club 
(in Kuta, see map 3-3) resulted in over 200 deaths and 300 wounded (Harymurti, 
2002). Most victims were young tourists from Australia, New Zealand, Europe, 
South- East Asia and North America. 
The Bali bombings followed a period of events in Indonesia that had already placed 
the island's tourism industry and economy in a fragile state. The political upheavals of 
May 1998 and the East Timor crisis of August 1999 hit Indonesia's international 
image. Nevertheless, Bali's tourist industry proved largely resilient, helped 
considerably by an off-setting depreciation of the Rupiah after 1997. Many a visitor 
was indeed surprised that Bali was part of Indonesia (World Bank, 2002). 
3.4.2 Impact of the Bali bombings 
Bali experienced a severe downturn in tourism after the Bali bombings and this had a 
marked impact on the Island's economy and threatened to disrupted inter-communal 
relations. It was followed by government travel advisories advising against travel to 
Bali, which lasted 18 months (BBC 24 NEWS 01.10.05). Indeed, until the bombing, 
Bali was routinely excluded from travel advisories that applied to the rest of Indonesia 
Cooper et al. (2005). As a result of bombings international arrivals as measured by 
immigration at Ngurah Rai airport declined sharply in 2003 and were running at 
around 20% less the previous year and 26% down on the 2001 figures (see graph 3-4). 
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Graph 3-3 Bali International arrivals(000) 
Source: adapted from Bali discovery. net 
Monthly visitor arrivals in November 2002 were 31,497 (see graph3-5) compared 
with 72,806 for the same month in 2001 and 110,145 for November in 2000 (the 
decline in number for 2001 when compared with 2000 is perhaps as result of the 9/11 
event). 
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Graph 3-4 Direct tourist arrivals to Bali by month 
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Hotel occupancy, which often only ran at around 80% in the high season, has rarely 
risen above 40% in most hotels since the onset of the crises and has been as low as 
10% in some particularly badly areas such as Nusa Dua in November. According to 
figures released by the Governor's Command Post, overall occupancies on the island 
stood at an average 18% on October 26,2002, down from a level just over 70% in the 
days just prior to the tragedy (Bali discovery 2002). The first post-bombing signs of 
recovery were evident in October 2003 when the arrivals number passed the previous 
number in 2001 a year before the attack took place. This, of course, does not 
represent full recovery as one would need to not only restore tourism activity to where 
it would have been had it continued to grow at the pre-event rate, but also retrieve lost 
revenue during the impacted period. By 2004 the situation had improved markedly 
with foreign arrivals returning, and even exceeding, the pre-bombing figures (see 
Graph 3-4). Interestingly, the impact of the Tsunami in comparison is not associated 
with a decrease in visitor numbers, but instead experiences an increase in the number 
71 
of visitors. For example, visitor arrivals in February 2005 were around 20% greater 
than those for the same month the previous year and 50% greater than the number 
recorded in February 2003. 
Despite the recovery, in the short term, most hotels and tourism- related business were 
forced to either lay off employees or reduce their hours. The Grand Mirage Hotel in 
Tanjung Benoa (Nusa Dua), the Sobek Rafting (Sanur), the Water Bom Park(Kuta), 
and the Shahid Bali Hotel (Kuta) were just a few of the major hotels that had to 
reduce their workforce. The early prediction made by Jacob Nuwa Wea was that 50% 
of Balinese workers employed in the tourism sector would lose their jobs in the 
tourism industry if it failed to recover within the year (Bali discovery. com). 
It is difficult to be precise about the true impact of the bombings and the relatively 
quick recovery path may obscure a more severe level of disruption because figures 
were under-reported. Incentives for people to retire early were made and, because 
these redundancies were technically voluntary, there was no compulsion to report 
them to the Department of Employment. They were therefore not officially recorded 
as having lost their jobs due to the crisis and such job losses were not regarded by the 
labour unions as being an infringement of employment laws (Hitchcock, 2005). 
According to the Bali Post, 2003 in East Bali, particularly in the Candidasa (see map 
3-3) beach area, one of the popular tourist destinations with middle and low budget 
hotels, many hotels and bungalows were put up for sale. 
In terms of air traffic flows and disruption there was a similar impact. Air Paradise, a 
new air carrier owned by Bali businessman Kadek Wiranatha (the owner of paddy's 
Bar) was another casualty of the bombing. Scheduled to commence service between 
the cities of Perth and Melbourne in Australia and the island of Bali on October 27, 
2002, a decision was made to delay the airline's launch until further notice as a result 
of the Bali bomb (www. balidiscovery. com). Qantas (QF), down from four return 
services operated prior to the October 12th tragedy, operate only one weekly return 
Boeing 737 Perth-Denpasar service flight each week from December, increasing to 
two services a week in January; and cancelled the weekly Melbourne-Denpasar 
service. Cathay Pacific Airways Cathay Pacific (CX) cut 3 of their normal 10 weekly 
flights between Hong Kong and Bali. Garuda Indonesia (GA) reported drops in 
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passenger uplifts from both Europe and Australia of as much as 60-70 % following 
the bombing (Bali discovery. com, 2002). In a related development, both Garuda 
Indonesia and Qantas, the other air carriers flying to Bali from Australia, promised to 
refund all holiday flights without penalty for passengers wishing to defer or cancel 
their Bali holidays (Balidiscovery. com, 2002). 
According to Hitchcock (2005) economic activities were generally or much reduced 
following the onset of the crisis, and those affected included not only people who 
work directly in tourism, but also those who work in related supporting sectors such 
as local transport, shops and garages. 
By mid 2003 business activities in the tourism sector had started to pick up, though 
the rate of increase was still well below the level of the pre-bombing era. Increasing 
confidence among tourists to visit and stay in Kuta led to the re-opening of many bars 
and restaurants, which had been closed since the bombing. Among those re-opening 
was Paddy's Bar, which had been made famous by the bombing (Chulov, 2003 in 
Hitchcock 2005). With the re-opening of Paddy's almost all of the 120 staff of the old 
Paddy's Bar, none of whom were killed in the blast, came back to work. Unlike the 
Sari Club workers who have remained unemployed. However, wages in Bali's 
tourism industry were much reduced simply because of the downscaling of business 
and workers received fewer and smaller gratuities from tourists. 
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Graph 3-5 Indonesia arrivals and expenditure 
12000 
10000 
8000 - 
6000 
4000 
2000 
0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
-ý Expenditure(US$m) 4975 5000 5285 4037 4798 
ý- Arrivals(000's) 5054 5153 5033 4467 5321 
Source: adapted from UNWTO 2007 
3.4.3 The Indonesian response to the crisis 
The Bali bombings caused Indonesia to respond and react quickly and appropriately. 
According to Indonesia's Minister of Culture and Tourism, I Gede Ardika (2002) the 
goal of the perpetrators was economic disruption, the Minister suggested that one of 
the means to fight the threat of terrorism was to support his efforts to rebuild tourism 
in the wake of the attack. I Gede Ardika (2002) furthermore said: 
"We ask for the understanding and assistance of the world to come to the aid of the Balinese 
people who love and cherish peace. It makes no sense to isolate them (the people of Bali). If 
we compare, when the WTC (World Trade Centre) was attacked no one issued a travel ban on 
the U. S. A., did they? " 
Due to the horrible nature of this terrorist attack and its international dimension, the 
world community responded quickly by offering various kinds of assistance to the 
Indonesian government, including assistance in the investigation of events, something 
that was recommended by the Pacific Asia Travel Association according to Cooper et 
al (2005). A partnership of 52 countries requested or supported the United Nations 
terrorist designation of Jemaah lslamiya. More than 150 jurisdictions agreed to block 
the assets of JI related targets. This designation represented the broadest and most 
conspicuous alliance against a terror group since the designation of al-Qaeda and the 
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Taliban after the 9/11 attacks. U. N. members were mandated to freeze and capture 
assets linked to JI (State Department electronic journal, 2004). Countries such as the 
U. S. A, Germany, Australia, Japan, and the UK helped Indonesia in a number of ways, 
including: 
" Leading a multilateral effort to provide law-enforcement training and bolster 
Indonesia's ability to combat terrorist financing; 
" Identify victims; 
" Investigating and capturing the terrorists responsible for the attack. 
A Travel advisory is always a big obstacle to a tourism destination when it is 
attempting to recover from a major incident and this was no exception in the case of 
Indonesia. Amrozi bin Nurhasyim and Imam Samudra, members of Jemaah 
Islamiyah, an Islamic terrorist group linked with al-Qaeda, were sentenced to death 
for their roles in the bombing. But the radical Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, 
believed to be the head of Jemaah Islamiyah, was only given a light three-year 
sentence on lesser charges, causing parts of the international community to question 
Indonesia's commitment to fighting terrorism. Authorities arrested Bashir in April 
2004-on the same day he was set to be released from prison-claiming they had new 
evidence that proved he was in fact the leader of Jemaah Islamiyah and that he 
approved the Bali bombing. In March 2005, Abu Bakar Bashir was found not guilty 
of terrorism charges in the bombings of Jakarta's Marriott Hotel in 2003 and a Bali 
nightclub in 2002. He was, however, convicted of a lesser charge than was expected. 
The new government (2004) had taken a positive step in positioning tourism as a 
strategic sector in the country, its status upgraded from a state ministry to a ministry. 
The Indonesian Culture and Tourism Promotion Body (16.12.2002) announced that 
RP. 10 billion (approximately 1.1 US$ million) had been used to pay for the 
establishment of a crisis centre, for advertising campaigns carried on CNN and 
CNBC, and for a promotional road show to traditional source markets in the Asia 
Pacific region. 
The possibility of an anti-Muslim backlash also seemed to have stiffened the resolve 
of Bali's opinion leaders and provincial officials to avoid inter-religious and inter- 
ethnic conflict at all costs. Bali's and Indonesia's leaders were well aware that even 
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small clashes could lead to a long-term deterioration in relations that would not only 
prolong the time taken for tourism to recover, but might kill off the industry 
altogether. 
Following the arrest of the bombing suspects it emerged that they were all Muslims, 
consequently there were fears amongst Indonesian officials that this information 
might fuel further inter-religious unrest in the manner of Ambon (Hitchcock, 2005). 
Although Indonesia is a country which has the highest proportion of Muslims (88%) 
in the world, Hindus account for 92% of the population of Bali. According to 
Hitchcock 2005 the troubled Moluccan Island (Ambon) had experienced severe 
Muslim and Christian clashes since the late 1990s and the government was keen to 
avoid a similar conflict between Muslims and Hindus. In an attempt to defuse the 
situation, all Islamic groups in Indonesia including Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) 
showed their support and called for the sternest possible punishments to be meted out 
to those found guilty of the October 12`h bombing. In a public statement issued on 
October 27h, the General Secretary of the MUI, Din Syamsudin, said (Bali Discovery, 
2002): 
"We ask that the bombers receive the harshest possible punishment because they have caused 
the deaths of others. " 
The measures adapted to avoid conflict were not unlike those used in the post-Suharto 
(Indonesia's president 1967-1996) period when signs were posted throughout the 
island that said "Bali is safe, the tourists come". The programme and the slogan were 
widely rejected in Bali largely because the Balinese saw them as having been devised 
in Jakarta, the national capital, and were thus out of touch with local perspectives. 
One of the reasons for the ambivalence on the part of Balinese stakeholders in tourism 
was that the recovery programme appeared to benefit Jakarta (Aridus, 2002; 
Wedakarna, 2002). 
Furthermore, Bali's borders have, unusually for an Indonesian province, coincided 
with those of the island and there are fears that devolution to the regency level could 
disrupt Bali's coherence. This is not only cultural and ethnic issue, but it is also an 
important consideration in tourism management since many leisure activities cross 
regency boundaries. Therefore, when considering the response to incidents such as 
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terrorist acts, it is important that due account should be taken between the various 
segments (political as well as religious) of society as they can all add to the 
complexity of finding an appropriate response. 
Security and the informal sector were other issues that needed to be taken into 
consideration. The tourism authorities have long regarded the activities of the 
unlicensed hawkers and vendors of the informal sector with some apprehension. The 
prevailing view among government officials was that anarchic behaviour of over 
exuberant traders contributes to a sense of unease among visitors at the best of times 
but would be far more troublesome once the heightened risk perceptions of tourists 
were involved (Hitchcock, 2005), ( see Table 3-6). 
Table 3-61World Bank index of political stability and control of corruption 
(selected countries) 
Country Political stability Control of corruption 
Indonesia -1.38 -0.9 
Egypt -0.72 -0.21 
Kenya -0.96 -0.89 
U. S. A 0.47 1.83 
Spain 0.54 1.46 
UK 0.77 2.06 
Iceland* 1.77 2.43 
Somalia ** -2.39 -1.58 
Source: adapted from World Bank 2004 
*The most politically stable country 
**The least politically stable country 
Since the bombing, security has been given much higher priority and, as a result of 
that, anything that suggests that Bali is anything other than a safe haven is viewed 
with circumspection. The tourism authorities have long wanted more user-friendly 
uniforms and even specific tourism training for police officers. However, before the 
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crisis, hotels and shopping centres in particular were unwilling to see uniformed 
police protecting their premises because they felt that it heightened tourists' sense of 
insecurity. The number of intelligence officers was tripled at all points of entry, partly 
because of renewed fears about fall-out from unrest in Ache and increasing awareness 
of Jema'ah Islamiah's network. 
The second outcome was the inauguration of beach policing (tourist police) on Kuta 
Beach (Map 3-3) in the `Baywatch' style associated with USA and Australia, perhaps 
to make visitors from those countries feel more secure. Advisors from Japan and 
Australia were also brought in to help upgrade the island's security (State Department 
electronic journal, 2004). The new security measure eventually led to a system of 
accreditation for hotels run by police, which included improved mapping of hotels 
and resorts. Street traders were among the first to feel this change of emphasis in 
policy and instead of waiting to be registered, many chose to leave the island, 
presumably to return from whence they came. 
In addition to the largely practical measures discussed above, the Balinese adopted a 
number of local measures that contributed, albeit controversially in some cases, to the 
alleviation of the crisis. First, there was an elaborate purification ritual involving huge 
processions of traditionally clad islanders bearing offerings which were published 
widely in the international media, often with little interpretation. In essence the 
bombing ended up beginning construed by the islanders as an expression of the anger 
of God as a consequence of the bad Karma suffered by Bally for having ... always 
impurity to hold sway of the land (Coutiea, 2003). Two authors have also discussed 
the use of Balinese culture as a weapon to counter the crisis, a strategy that has its 
origins in the first century AD according to local performing artists (Jenkins & 
Nyoman Carta, 2003 in Hitchcock, 2005). 
There were concerns that Islamic radicals would disrupt the trial of the bombing 
suspects and the police, fearing that they might be over-stretched, sought assistance 
from the pecalang and inaugurated capacity-building measures to boost their ability to 
make the trial secure. Such was the growing confidence of the regular police in the 
pecalang that these auxiliaries were deployed during the visit of President George W 
Bush (Hitchkock, 2005). 
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As can be seen from the above, the government's response to the atrocities was a 
mixture of practical security measure and cultural strategies, designed to stave off 
inter-communal strife. Hitchcock (2005) suggested that a Balinese model of crisis 
management, a wide desire for peace, joint prayers, media restraint, and involvement 
of opinion leaders, may have wider applications in coping with the impacts of 
terrorism and conflict resolution within the context of tourism. Generally, the world 
felt that the Indonesian Government had behaved rapidly, responsibly and 
professionally in order to prevent an ethnic clash and embrace international help, 
particularly from westerners including U. S. A (super power) Australia and Japan, 
together with marketing campaigns and action against terrorism to restore confidence 
in Bali as a destination. 
3.5 A brief overview of tourism in Kenya 
Kenya lies along the East coast of Africa; bordering Ethiopia, Uganda, Somalia and 
Tanzania and the Indian Ocean (see map 3-4). Tourism in Kenya dates back to pre- 
independence days and history has it recorded that as early as the 1930's, inbound 
tourism and explorers started coming to Kenya mostly for big-game hunting 
expeditions while others came in search of solitude. These expeditions were locally 
referred to by the Swahili word "Safari" thus, bequeathing to the travel world 
literature a new entry to the vocabulary. Among the early visitors were Statesmen, 
Royalties and celebrities such as Theodore Rosevelt, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, 
and Ernest Hemingway. htta: //www. un. org/esa/agenda2l/natlinfo/niau/kenvanp. htm 
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Map 3-4 Kenya 
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Tourism, largely based on natural attractions, including wildlife in its natural habitats 
as well as calm beaches, is the portfolio of Kenya. Tourism is currently the second 
largest provider to the economy after agriculture. The sector is a major employer, 
employing over half a million, some 11% of the total workforce (BBC. 28.1 1.02). Of 
these people, 300,000 work directly in the industry, while 200,000 work in other 
sectors that support it. According to the Kenya Tourism Federation, in National 
Geographic (17.06.03), tourism accounts for approximately 4% of the country's GDP 
and is crucial to the economy, bringing in U. S. $500 million in foreign exchange. 
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Kenya ranks 6`h in Africa, in terms of the number of international visitors, after South 
Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Zimbabwe. However, when it comes to tourism 
receipts its ranking falls to 8`h, falling behind Botswana and Mauritius, in addition to 
former countries. The major western markets for Kenya are Germany and the UK 
followed by USA, Italy, France and Switzerland (see Graph 3-7). 
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Graph 3-7 Kenya's 5 top industial countires market 
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3.5.1 The bombing in Mombassa 
In November 2002, three Suicide bombers launched an attack on an Israeli-owned 
hotel on the Kenyan coast that was traditionally used by Israelis. An SUV, thought to 
be loaded with explosives smashed through the entrance, setting off a huge blast 
where only shortly before a group of Israeli tourists had arrived in the lobby at the 
start of their holiday. Local Kenyans, most of them dancers, who were welcoming the 
Israeli guests, bore the brunt of the blast. At least 15 people died at hotel; three suicide 
bombers were killed, along with nine Kenyans and three Israelis, two of whom were 
children. About 80 people, most of them Kenyans, were injured in the attack and 
many treated for bums. Moreover, a large part of the Paradise Hotel was reduced to 
rubble while the rest was an on fire; the Israeli-owned hotel was well-liked with 
tourists keen to escape the violence at home (BBC, 28.11.28). 
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Map 3-5 Map of attack 
About 20 minutes earlier, two surface-to-air missiles were fired at an Arkia Boeing 
757 airliner carrying 271 people, mostly Israelis, narrowly missing the aircraft, which 
was taking off from nearby Moi International Airport. The plane was able to land 
safely in Tel Aviv. 
In Lebanon, a previously unknown group called the Army of Palestine said it carried 
out the attacks. Al-Manar television in Lebanon later reported a short statement from 
a group called the Army of Palestine claiming responsibility for the attacks 
(BBC. 2002). But Kenyan and Israeli officials speculated that Osama Bin Laden's al- 
Qaeda network might have been responsible. The Kenyan Ambassador to Israel, John 
Sawe, said in Tel Aviv: "There is no doubt in my mind that al-Quaeda is behind this 
attack, because we have no domestic problems, no terrorism in our country, and we 
have no problem with our neighbours, no problem whatsoever"(Alafrica. com 
28.11.02). 
The US and Israeli officials suspected that a Somali Group linked to al-Qaeda was 
responsible for the bombing and speculated that the suspects had smuggled the 
missiles into Kenya from Somalia (The New York Times, November 30,2002). 
Twelve people were arrested in connection with the hotel bombing, including six 
Pakistanis and four Somalis, as well as an American and her Spanish husband, both of 
whom were later released. 
On February 2004 four Kenyan men charged with killing 15 people by car-bombing 
an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombassa and planning the attack with the backing of 
Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network. According to the prosecution, the attacks were 
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Source BBC (2002) 
masterminded by Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, one of the FBI's most wanted men 
(FiarfaxDigital, 04.02.04). 
3.5.2 The response to the attacks 
In August 1998, terrorists targeted the US embassies in Kenya and neighbouring 
Tanzania in nearly simultaneous car bomb attacks that killed 219 people and 12 
people respectively. The hotel bombing in 2002 was the first that directly targeted 
tourists and tourism superstructure. 
Following the. attack, the Kenyan president, Daniel arap Moi, condemned the attacks 
and said that "Kenya will fight those behind terrorist attack on Mombassa".... "Kenya 
will do everything in its means to stop such acts with or without the assistance of her 
counterparts in the war against terrorism". 
Although the majority of the victims were Kenyan nationals, the fact that the attack 
took place in an Israeli owned hotel where the guests are almost exclusively Israelis, 
means that it can be assumed that the intended victims were not supposed to be 
Kenyans. The Guardian newspaper called the attack on the Israeli airplane an attack 
on `mankind's freedom of movement'. The daily telegraph suggested, `Western 
tourism is an obvious target for radicals who believe it spearheads the advance of 
decadent secularism into the Islamic world'(Gurdian Unlimited 29.11.02). 
Following the attacks, several Western countries urged their citizens not to travel here 
because of the risk of terrorist attacks. The U. S. State Department immediately 
warned Americans against non-essential travel to Kenya. More importantly, the 
British Department of Transport banned all British-registered aircraft from flying to 
Kenya, citing threats of shoulder-fired missile attacks on aircraft. Britain is Kenya's 
second most important tourism market, accounting for 20 percent of all Kenya's 
visitors (National Geographic, 2002). Adding to this environment of fear was the fact 
that the British High Commission in Kenya was closed on 4th December for an 
indefinite period after receiving a "specific threat" less than a week after the 
Mombassa attacks, but there were no strong issues against UK nationals living in 
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Kenya or planning to visit (The Guardian, Dec. 05.2002). Prior to the attack, Australia 
began issuing warnings, urging Australians to avoid Mombassa unless they had 
essential business, and on 12th November they issued a new warning saying there was 
evidence of threats against "western interests in Mombassa". The Australian 
warnings were followed the next day by similar appeals for caution from the German 
government (CNN 30.11.02). 
Jake Grieves-Cook, chairman of the Kenya Tourism Federation, however, complained 
that the travel warnings placed on Kenya by European countries were unfair and 
added: 
"We are all aware of the risks of global terrorism in most countries in the world, but there is 
no greater risk here than in the United Kingdom. For tourists on safari in Kenya's parks, the 
risk of a terrorist attack must be much lower than in British cities. " 
Kenyan Government officials increased security, especially at Kenya's international 
airports. A team of British anti-terrorist experts carried out thorough inspections of 
the airport and its perimeter. Four years after the attacks there is no sign of any further 
attacks against any target in Kenya. 
The EC (European Commission) responded to the attacks (following an urgent 
request from the Kenyan government) by jointly funding an Emergency Tourism 
Market Recovery Programme, marketing the country in the main European source 
markets. This support came to an end in March 2004. 
The Director of Kenya's Tourism Board (KTB), Achieng Ong'ong'a, said 
diversification from the conventional safari and beach tourism and extensive 
marketing has led to an increase in the number of visitors that has resulted in 
significant number arrivals to Kenya and significant recovery from the impact of 
terrorism attacks in Nairobi and Mombassa in 1998 and 2002, to boom. 
Thus Kenya relied upon extensive marketing campaigns in its main supplying 
markets, demonstrable increases in the level of security and some product 
diversification to reduce tourists' perceptions of risk and thereby offset the reduction 
in tourism caused by the atrocities. 
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3.5.3 The impact of the attacks 
The inbound tourism arrivals and expenditure were shown earlier, in Graph 3-6. 
While expenditure increased in 2001 over the 2000 expenditure level, the number of 
arrivals decreased. The slow down in visitor numbers continued through the following 
year (2002) where the decline in arrivals was accompanied by a fall in receipts. The 
slump experienced in 2001 was perhaps the result of a global decrease in tourism 
flows, following the 9/11 attacks in USA. The Mombassa attack did not cause a 
decline in tourism activity until 2002. The impact on leisure visitors continued to be 
felt in 2003 because of the timing of the attack in Kenya, which was at the very end of 
year 2002 (28.11.02). Recovery was reasonably quick with both the number of 
arrivals and the level of expenditure increasing by 10% and 22%, respectively, and 
the recovery also continued in 2004. 
Graph 3-8 Arrivals by purpose of visit(000) 
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The first sign of recovery for leisure travellers was evident in 2004 where the numbers 
grew by 29% from 684000 to 886000. However, the trend for business and other 
visitors (that remained fairly stable during the immediate post attack period) remained 
relatively flat showing an increase of only 13000. The average expenditure per person 
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increased by approximately 12% during 2003, but one can assume that this increase 
can be largely explained by business travel that continued to increase and therefore 
account for a larger proportion of total visitors during that period. The average 
expenditure per person is shown in Graph 3-9. 
Source: adapted from UNWTO e library (2006) 
The impact of the attacks on overnight stays was significant. Graph 3-10 shows that 
the number of overnight stays fell from 2766000 to 1890000, a fall of 31 % in 2003. 
This drop in guest nights sold was also evident in occupancy rates which fell from a 
barely sustainable 42% to a probably economically unviable 33.60 %. Using an 
imperfect and crude measure, if one takes the decrease in overnight stays, which is 
876000, and assumes that they were staying in double rooms (leisure travellers) and 
apply an average room rate of $40 then approximate direct loss could be equal to 
17US$m 
. 
This figure does not include other expenditure and may only reflect 30- 
40% of total spending lost, yielding a total loss that could be in excess of 56 US$m 
without taking into account the secondary impacts of that expenditure. To set this in 
context it should be remembered that total tourism receipts in 2003 were around 611 
USSm in 2003. 
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Graph 3-9 Tourism expenditure per person in 
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Following the attacks in Mombassa in 2002, Kenya's foreign minister, Kalonzo 
Musyoka wrote an open letter to the British government: 
"Britain and the United States have seen their tourism figures badly affected by the natural 
fears of a nervous travelling public yet the pain for those economies is sustainable. For 
us, it is not. " 
The importance of tourism in terms of Kenya's economy is clear where tourism 
accounts for around 4% of Kenya's Gross Domestic Product and is the most 
important source of foreign exchange. The short-term impact of the attack and 
following travel advisory were significant to the Kenya's economy, particularly in 
terms of tourism employment and agriculture. The casualties and the attacks 
relatively were not of a major scale. The attack in Mombassa was perceived to be 
against tourism, mostly Westerners, particularly Israelis. Nevertheless, the support of 
the government and the deployment of extensive marketing strategies, helped by the 
European Commission, repositioned Kenya as a destination where the tourism 
numbers could once again increase after a period of around 14 months. 
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3.6 A brief comparison and conclusion 
If one looked at Plog's Allocentric-Psychocentric model of destinations then all three 
destinations would justifiably fall into the near-adventure psychographic position 
(Plog, 2001). The attacks, although reducing inbound tourist arrivals for more than a 
year (see Graph 3-11), were followed by periods of recovery and in all cases this 
recovery achieved at least parity with the pre-attack situations. However, when 
attempting to estimate the impact of the attacks it is not sufficient to simply estimate 
the loss of activity from the moment of the attack to the moment that the pre-attack 
level of activity is regained. To be accurate it is necessary to look at what the level of 
tourism activity would have been during the recovery period and after, if there had 
been no attack at all. Egypt and the Indonesia experienced very similar recovery 
patterns whereas Kenya, albeit with tourism activity running at a lower level, 
experienced a much shorter recovery period. There are differences between the 
destinations, one of the most striking being that Kenya is the only non-Muslim 
country and this may affect both motivations with respect to the attacks and the 
required response. Indeed, the attack in Kenya was not aimed at tourists and tourism 
superstructure in general, it was intended to harm visitors of a specific nationality. 
Also the business and other visitor categories of tourists were able to maintain more 
buoyancy in the arrival figures in Kenya than was possible in the other two countries. 
Using Plog's view of tourism destinations it is likely that, in terms of the leisure 
visitor component, all three destinations are likely to attract people of a particular 
psychometric grouping and these people, one might assume, may be less risk averse 
than those visitors who travel to, say, Atlanta in the USA (Plog, 2001). 
Running counter to Plog's model one can see that different destinations may appeal to 
different psychometric groupings depending upon their location in relation to the 
visitor originating countries. For instance, St. Lucia in the Caribbean is a relatively 
expensive and exotic location to European visitors and attracts visitors from the upper 
socio-economic groupings (SEGs). However, to the USA, St. Lucia is a Majorca type 
destination and attracts mainly people from lower SEGs. The same situation can be 
observed for destinations like Fiji and Bali. To the Australian visitor these are 
relatively cheap vacation destinations (mid-Centric) located in their Pacific backyard, 
but to Europeans and USA visitors they are long-haul relatively expensive 
destinations. However, at the same time it could be argued that for instance 
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Australians would believe that Bali along with Fiji traditionally their most 
international resort, were midcentric destinations. Hence how a destination is 
classified to some extent depends on the perspective of the market doing the 
classification. In other words, perceived life cycle stage is market specific, rather than 
destination specific. Each market has a unique perception formed by geographical 
closeness, political orientation, and stage of economic development, similarities or 
differences in culture, language and shared histories and a host of other factors. Since 
destinations attract tourists from a variety of source markets, it could be argued that 
destinations can appear at multiple points simultaneously along Plog's scale. A 
destination may be psychocentric/dependable for some market, mid-centric for others 
and allocentric/venture for others still (McKercher, 2005). This may affect the levels 
of travel risk averseness of visitors going to particular destinations, if risk-averseness 
is in part determined by the characteristics associated with the psychometric model, 
income, age, education, etc. This is a matter that is further explored later in this 
thesis. 
Another issue worthy of mention is that, although the Sharm al Sheikh (23.07.05) 
attack has not been mentioned in the current study, it is a good example of how world 
reaction to the attacks, in particular with the US and UK was limited. According to 
US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice (2005): 
"At this difficult time of testing, the United States stands with our friend and ally Egypt. 
Together we will confront and defeat this scourge that knows no boundary and respects no 
creed. " 
And UK foreign secretary Jack Straw (2005) said: 
"I've spoken this morning to my colleague the Egyptian Foreign Minister to assure him of our 
full support and our full solidarity with the Egyptian people and the Egyptian government. 
Their fight is ours, our fight is theirs. ", 
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Graph 3-11 Arrivals where -1 is the year before the attack 0 
is the year of the attack and I is a year after the attack 
Source: adapted from Bali tourism discovery. net and UNWTO 2006. 
The following table shows the similarities and differences of attack, responses and 
impacts between Egypt and Indonesia and Kenya, which might help to answer the 
questions. 
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Table 3-7 the characteristics of attack, response, impact and countries 
Similarities Differences 
In all cases the attacks were directed at Levels of political stability (see table 3- 
international tourism 7) 
Attackers were Islamic groups Levels of corruption (see table 3-6) 
Both Indonesia and Egypt are countries Geographic location 
with a majority of population Muslim Kenya is not known as a country with the 
However, Kenya is not a country majority of Muslims 
known as Islamic 
Tourism is an important engine for the 
economy 
The attacks resulted in a major decline in 
Number of casualties 
Indonesia is not an Arab county, however 
visitor number and tourism receipts 
All three destinations are recognised as 
it is the most populated Muslim country 
in the world, but interestingly the 
Majority in Bali are not Muslim. 
Indonesia ranks higher in term of the 
lower middle income number of visitors and tourism receipts in 
The figures from all three cases suggests that although the tourism industry did suffer 
significantly from the attacks , 
international evidence shows that terrorist shocks on 
tourism are temporary rather than permanent and this is heartening (Aly, Hassan Y. 
and Mark C. Strazicih 2000, UNWTO 2005). 
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On a positive note, all three destinations found that tourism activity did recover and 
that the removal of advisory travel warnings and the implementation of extensive 
marketing campaigns to some extent explain that recovery. Terrorist attacks raise 
peoples' travel risk perceptions and these are an important component of the travel 
decision process. Later in this research the travel risk perceptions of travellers is 
explored in general and their attitudes towards the particular risk of terrorism is 
assessed in relation to risk overall. 
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Chapter 4 
Case studies (USA, Spain, UK) 
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Introduction 
The previous chapter explored the effects of terrorist attacks on selected developing 
countries in order to put travel-risk into context and to look at the responses made by 
developing countries together with their relative recovery periods. This chapter 
switches attention to the effects of such incidents on well-established industrialised 
countries, using the USA, UK and Spain as case study destinations. All three 
countries were subjected to major terrorist acts including the 9/11 attacks in the USA, 
the Madrid Train bombings and the London Transport attacks of 7/7. 
4.1 The case study selection 
In addition to the three developing country case studies this research focuses on three 
industrialised country case studies. The case studies were selected from those 
industrialised tourist destinations that have been subjected to terrorist activities in 
recent times. The USA was subjected to a horrific act of terrorist violence resulting in 
the greatest number of casualties to date. The UK and Spain were also subjected to 
major terrorist incidents that involved their transport systems (subways, buses and 
trains) in and around their major or capital cities. Although one could argue that these 
acts of terrorism were not specifically aimed at the tourism industry per se, they all 
did involve the vital component of the tourism industry. Furthermore, the attacks-in 
the USA, and the way in which they were carried out, have changed the air travel 
industry for the foreseeable future. Check-in times are now quite detailed, items that 
passengers can take with them are highly restricted, flight deck doors are now locked 
in flight and even the design of aircraft has been modified to mitigate the risks that 
were exposed as a result of the attacks. 
Table 4.1 shows the GDP, Tourism Receipts, the level of External Debt and the total 
Exports for the three selected case study areas. 
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Table 4.1 Case studies data profile 
2004 1 1.7 T 1.0 2.1 I 
GDP 2005 12.4T 1.1 2.2 T 
Tourism 2005 R 1680MUSS 47891 mUS$ 30669 mUS$ 
receipts 
Tourism 2005 0.006 0.043 0.013 
receipts/ GDP 
Present 2004 ----- ---- --- 
External Debt 2005 ----- ---- ---- 
Export 2004 N/A 25.7 24.7 T 
2005 N/A N/A 
Income Level High Income High Income High Income 
Source: Adapted World Bank (2007) 
In terms of developed countries dependent upon tourism and subjected to terrorist 
activities, there was not a wide range of examples to choose from. Table 3.7 in the 
previous chapter listed the World Bank indices of political stability and control of 
corruption for all six selected case study countries. It can be recalled that the three 
industrialised countries were considered to have much greater political stability and 
much lower levels of corruption than their developing country counterparts. In terms 
of terrorist attacks on industrialised countries, Table 4.2 outlines the major events of 
recent times. It can be seen that in addition to the three countries selected as case 
studies, only Finland and Greece were major targets of terrorists. However, in terms 
of the scale of attacks only the USA, UK and Spain were of such significance to be 
included in this study. 
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Table 4.2 Terrorist attacks resulting in casualties, developed countries, since 2000. 
Country Year Terrorism attacks 
Finland 2002 Myyrmanni bombing in shopping mall at Vantaa, Finland. 
Killing seven and injuring 50 
Greece 2000 a British Defense Attache, was assassinated by 
Revolutionary Organization 17 November in Athens 
USA 2001 killed 2,986 in a series of hijacked airliner crashes into two 
U. S. landmarks: the World Trade Center in New York 
City, New York, and The Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. 
A fourth plane, originally intended to hit an unknown, but 
likely prominent, Washington, D. C. target, crashes in 
Somerset County, Pennsylvania, after an apparent revolt 
against the hijackers by the plane's passengers; 
Spain 2004 Coordinated bombing of commuter trains in Madrid, 
Spain, kills 191 people and injures more than 1,500. 
UK 2005 Bombs explode on one double-decker bus and three 
London Underground trains, killing 56 people and injuring 
over 700 
Source: adapted from fox news and BBC news 
4.2 The United States of America 
The United States of America is located in North America, bordering both the North 
Atlantic Ocean and the North Pacific Ocean, between Canada and Mexico. Britain's 
American colonies broke with the mother country in 1776 and were recognized as the 
new nation of the United States of America (see Map 4-1) following the Treaty of 
Paris in 1783. During the 19th and 20th centuries, 37 new states were added to the 
original 13 as the nation expanded across the North American continent and acquired 
a number of overseas possessions. The two most traumatic experiences in the nation's 
history were the Civil War (1861-65) and the Great Depression of the 1930s. Buoyed 
by victories in World Wars I and II and the end of the Cold War in 1991, the US 
remains the world's most powerful nation state. The economy is marked by steady 
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growth, low unemployment and inflation, and rapid advances in technology (CIA, 
2005). 
Map 4-1 United States of America 
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The USA is one of the world's most popular long-haul tourism destinations. It ranked 
first in terms of tourism receipts and third after France and Spain with respect to the 
number of international visitors in 2003 (see Graph 4-1). Travel and tourism is a 1.3 
US$ trillion industry in the United States (2004) and one of America's largest 
employers (TIA. org). 
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Graph 4-1 USA Arrivals and Expenditure 
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To put the industry into context, in spite of the effects of 9/11, the tourism industry in 
the USA in 2004 received more than 599.2 US$ billion from domestic and 
international travellers (excluding international passenger fares). Although the 
industry is dominated by domestic tourism, some 94 US$ billion was generated by 
international travellers (see Graph 4-2) making tourism the second largest services 
export industry in the United States. The travel expenditures, in turn, directly 
generated more than 7.3 million jobs with 163.3 US$ billion in payroll income for 
Americans and resulted in 99.4 US$ billion tax revenue for federal, state and local 
governments (tia. org, 2005). 
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Graph 4-2 International and domestic tourism in USA 
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The USA had over 51 million international visitors in 2000 (see Graph 4-1), the 
visitor numbers decreased in 2001 to 46 million (a fall of just over 8%), but there was 
a slight increase in the first three quarters of 2001, with the major shortfall being 
generated in the last quarter following the attack. The number of visitors continued to 
decrease in 2002 with only 41 million visitors in 2003, which is around 20% less than 
year 2000. The decline in 2003 would not have been helped by the effects of SARS 
and the war in Iraq. Visitor numbers started to recover in 2004, increasing by around 
6 million but still 10% less than the 2000 figures. In 2005 visitor numbers had 
increased by a further 7% over the year resulting in 46.1 million, which is still below 
the figure of 51.2 million recorded in 2000. 
Visitor spending in the USA also fell by 12% in 2001 and was down by 19% in 2002. 
The downward trend continued into 2003, with a further drop of 3% over the year 
2002. Even 4 years after the attacks expenditure was still below the 2000 level. 
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4.2.1 The City of New York 
The City of New York is the most popular city in the United States, the most densely 
populated major city in North America, and, according to the FBI, the safest large city 
in the USA (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004 in NYC& Company, 2004, BBC, 
13.11.05). The city is at the centre of the country's international finance, politics, 
entertainment, and culture. The City of New York is also the destination in the USA 
most visited by international tourists. According to figures published by NYC & 
Company, the city's official tourism marketing organisation (see Graphs 4-3 & 4-4), 
tourism contributed 23 US$ billion in 2004 and support for around 250,000 jobs. In 
spite of the fact that international visitors made up only 15.5% of total visitors, they 
are responsible for more than 42% of total visitor spending. In ' other words the 
average international visitor spends 5 times more than their national counterparts in 
New York (2004). The top three visiting countries in 2003 were UK, Canada and 
Japan, and between them they accounted for approximately 40% of total inbound 
visitors to New York. It is important to understand the characteristics of tourism to a 
destination as this may help inform the expected response and result because of a 
major terrorist incident. 
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Graph 4-3 International and Domestic visitors to New York 
2000-2006 
Domestic 29.4 29.5 30.2 33.03 33.8 1 35.8 37 
  Internationa 6.8 5.7 5.1 4.8 6.2 1 6.8 7 
Source: adapted from nycvist. com 
Graph 4-4 Direct visitor spending in New York 2000-2005 
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4.2.2 The City of Washington 
The city of Washington is the United State's capital city. According to the 
Washington, DC Convention & Tourism Corporation (WCTC), Washington is a 
symbol of democracy and freedom and is home to more associations than any other 
US city (law, higher education, medicine/medical research; government-related 
research and publishing). The Washington DC Metropolitan Area is also the home to 
the world headquarters for corporations such as USA Airways, Marriott, Amtrak, 
Gannett News, Mobil Oil, MCT telecommunications and the International Monetary 
Fund. Washington DC's primary industry, after the federal government, is tourism. It 
ranked 8th in USA cities, in terms of the number of international visitor arrivals and its 
market share of total visitors was 4.8% in 2003. The city's tourism industry generates 
more than 10 US$ billion in direct spending each year and sustains 260,000 jobs 
(WCTC, 2006). 
4.2.3 The 9/11 attacks 
On September the 11th, the largest and most devastating suicide attack ever was 
launched on the USA. Nineteen men concurrently hijacked four domestic commercial 
airlines. Two were flown into the World Trade Center in Manhattan, New York City. 
An aircraft was flown into each of the two towers, at 18-minute intervals. The Twin 
Towers, where up to 50,000 people worked, collapsed within 90 minutes of the 
impacts of the planes (the 9/11 final Commission report). A third aircraft was flown 
into the US. Department of Defence Headquarters, the Pentagon, in Arlington County, 
Virginia. The fourth plane, although targeted elsewhere, crashed into a field in 
Somerset County, Pennsylvania, 80 miles (129 km) east of Pittsburgh, following 
passenger resistance (the 9/11 final Commission report, 2004). The official death toll 
was put at 2,986, including the alleged attackers. 
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Map 4-2 Locations of the attacks 
Shortly after the attacks, and following a brief period of confusion when it was 
thought that the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, may have been 
responsible, the USA Government declared that the Saudi dissident and Islamic 
militant Osama bin Laden - who is based in Afghanistan - may have been responsible 
(BBC, 9.11.01). In spite of denials in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, Osama 
bin Laden's implication in the events seemed to have been validated when U. S 
military sources (November 2001) recovered a vidotape from a destroyed house in 
Jalalabd, Afganistan which showed Osma bin- Laden admitting to planning the 
attacks. However there have been conspiracy and counter conspiracy theories in 
abundance since that time. 
In 2004, the U. S. Government Commission investigating the attacks officially 
concluded that the attacks were conceived and implemented by al-Qaeda operatives. 
According to the 9/11 Commission report in 2004, all 19 hijackers were Sunny 
Islamists terrorists and members of the al-Qaeda terrorist organization, based in 
Afghanistan, and led by Osama bin Laden. The commission's final report also offered 
new evidence of increased contact between Iran and al-Qaeda. The report contains 
information about how several of the 9/11 hijackers passed through Iran and indicates 
that officials in Iran did not place entry stamps in their passports. However, according 
to the report, there is no evidence that Iran was aware of the actual 9/11 plot. Iran has 
since implemented several widely publicized efforts to shutdown al-Qaeda cells 
operating within the country. 
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Source: BBC 
4.2.4 The impact of the attacks 
Apart from the immediate cost in lives and capital, a terrorist attack causes further 
losses, perhaps even greater, in terms of the fear and loss of business that terrorism 
instils. A number of researchers have examined the perceived risk of terrorism after 
9/11 , distinguishing between the political effects of the perceived terrorist risks to the 
nation and the perceived risks to oneself and one's family (Davis and Silver 2002; 
Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, and Provost 2002). These effects are in line with the central 
objective of terrorism, namely to induce fear and anxiety in people through focused 
acts of brutality and violence that gain broad publicity (Crenshaw 1986; Jacobson and 
Bar-Tal 1995; Long 1990; Wardlaw 1982). 
Furthermore, research conducted after 9/11 demonstrated that such a threat to society 
tends to enhance support for greater levels of security that potentially damages civil 
liberties (Huddym, Feldman, Capelos, and Provost 2002). Whereas the political 
effects of personal threat may be relatively weak or nonexistent, personal threat tends 
to change travel-risk perceptions towards risk for, say air travel. According to Norris 
et al. (2003), research suggested that Americans put aside their personal fears after 
9/11, and supported anti-terrorism measures to counteract the perceived threat of 
terrorism to the nation as a whole. 
Health researchers also found high levels of depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic 
stress syndrome among American adults and children after the attacks (Schuster et al. 
(2001); Galea et al. (2002); Silver et al. 2002). To answer the question to what extent 
were Americans psychologically affected by the attacks of 9/11, Norris et al. (2003) 
conducted a survey which encompassed four areas for fear and anxiety, and three on 
depression and related somatic symptoms. They contrasted the psychological 
reactions with the perceived risk of future terrorist attacks and found that there was a, 
marked change in the perception about the possibility of future attacks with around 
86% of participants reporting that they were very or somewhat concerned about 
another attack. They also found that proximity to the attacks is an important 
determinant of fear and anxiety, with respondents who knew a victim of the attacks 
displaying higher levels of fear. Individuals who lived in the Northeast of the USA 
were found to be more likely than other Americans to feel fear and report symptoms 
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of depression, but did not perceive any higher level of risk to the nation as whole 
Norris et al. (2003). 
The indirect costs associated with the 9/11 terrorist attacks varied across sectors, 
countries and time. Some sectors are more vulnerable to attacks than others and 
consequently suffer a higher burden of the costs. The attacks were associated with an 
enormous negative effect on tourism demand world wide, and a devastating impact on 
the tourism industry in the USA. A wide range of sectors, airlines, tour operators, 
theme parks and attractions, car rentals and hotel companies, to name just a few, all 
reported drastic cancellations of reservations and declines in forward bookings. At 
the time there were questions as to whether the industry could ever completely 
recover from such a massive blow and if so, how long would it take (Pizam and 
Fleischer 2001). However, much of the post 9/11 downturn had been brewing prior to 
the attacks. 
In late 2000, there was a downturn in the global economy in general and the US 
economy in particular. A mild recovery was underway in September 2001 when the 
9/11 attacks were launched (BBC, 18,10.02). The immediate, acute impact of the 
shock to the transportation system was significant and the airline industry in the USA 
suffered more than any other in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. Terror attacks in 
the USA specifically changed the demand for aviation (Darkos, 2004). Changed risk 
perceptions by consumers reduced demand for air travel and for complementary hotel 
accommodation. Although the impact of the attacks varied by airline (Carter and 
Simkins, 2002), the pressure on the sector as a whole increased significantly due to 
the attacks. 
According to a report by Hanbury (2004) `Washington and New York City were 
rocked to the economic core by the events of 9/11'. Although the loss of life and 
physical damage were more in New York, the attack had longer and deeper negative 
effects on the city of Washington (Hanburry in GWBusiness news). 
The airlines were hurt from two different directions. On the demand side there was a 
drastic reduction in the demand for seats whereas at the same time there was the 
additional costs as a result of the need to deploy enhanced levels of security. There 
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was some light relief, however, in the form of a reduction in fuel costs as the fall in 
demand for aviation fuel reduced price levels. In effect the 9/11 attacks turned what 
was going to be a bad year for the airline industry into a disastrous one, Gahan in 
BBC (18.10.02). According to Gaillard director of IATA (2002, in BBC 13.08.02) 
the airline lost after 9/11 as much as they had ever made since the Wright Brothers 
started flying in 1903'. Bisignani, general director of IATA, characterised the years 
2001 and 2002 as being like `a boxer who gets hit harder after every knockdown'. 
According to IATA the global air industry lost around $25 billion profit in 2000 and 
2001. 
On the surface the industry seemed to rebound in 2003, to reaching the January 2001 
levels of activity, but this long-awaited recovery, which was clouded by the crisis in 
Iraq, tended to mask several changing features of the airline industry (BBC, TIA. org, 
and IATA). Not least of which were the losses by scheduled airlines being offset by 
the rising success of low-cost airlines in particular Ryan Air, Easy Jet in Europe and 
JetBlue in the USA (Bisignani, 2002). 
Bruck and Wickstrom (2004) suggested that state responses to terror are not useful 
when terror induces significant and permanent changes in demand patterns. As a 
result of loss, airlines responded by cutting tens of thousands of jobs in the USA and 
around the world. American Airlines shed 20,000 jobs and cut 20 % of its scheduled 
flights, while United Airlines shed 20,000 jobs and cut 26% of its scheduled flights. 
By November 2001, within the United States alone, some 116,000 jobs had been lost 
in the airline industry (Beirmann, 2003). However, many commentators felt that the 
events of 9/11 were simply being used as an excuse to make the cost-saving cuts that 
they would have had to do anyway (BBC, 13.08.02). 
The 9/11 attacks were also associated with a drop in New York hotel occupancy rates 
which fell from 84.6% in 2000 to 73.4% in 2001 (see graph 4-5). However, the hotel 
industry seemed to be more buoyant than its airline counterpart and the pre-9/1 1 
occupancy rates were restored as early as 2003 and exceeded that level by 2005. 
Occupancy rates alone do not provide a full picture as hotels dropped their prices to 
keep occupancy levels up as far as possible. This was evident in the fall in the 
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average daily rate (see graph 4-6) from 237 US$ to 204 US$ in 2001. Further falls in 
the average daily rates were experienced in 2002 where the rate slumped to 198 US$ 
and only marginally recovered in 2003 to $199 (which was in fact a further real rate 
reductions). For New York City's hotel industry 2004 was a relatively a strong year. 
Hotel occupancy levels were back up to 83% and the average daily rate bounced back 
up to $216. 
Graph 4-5 Hotel occupancy rate in New York 2000-2005 
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Source: adapted from NYC& Company (2005) 
In 2005 both hotel occupancy rates and the average daily rates reached a record level 
compared with the three previous years, nevertheless it was not significantly higher 
than those levels enjoyed in 2000. 
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Graph 4-6 Hotel average daily price in New York 2000- 
2005 
(E_ý.. 
Source: adapted from NYC& Company (2007) 
According to figures released by NYC &Company, in 2000 New York City 
welcomed a record 6.8 million international travellers. In the wake of the attack in 
2001 the number of visitor to New York decreased by 16% in 2001 and 25% over the 
year 2000 and the arrivals continued to drop in 2003 where it was 29% less than the 
number of arrivals in 2001. The onslaught of the war in Iraq may well have 
contributed to this decline as well as the 9/11 attack. In 2005(4 years after the attacks) 
the arrivals reached the previous record total enjoyed in 2000 and the numbers have 
continued to grow in 2006. 
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Graph 4-7 International arrivals to New York 2000-2006 
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Source: adapted from NYC& Company (2007) 
There is no figure available to show the international visitor spending in New York. 
However, New York and Company provided figures for both domestic and 
international visitors (graph 4-4). Spending by visitor to New York took two years to 
reach and surpass the amount of spending experienced in 2000 and continued the 
growth. The shorter period for the recovery is perhaps a result of a switch to a greater 
proportion of domestic travellers and this may help explain some of the decline in 
average room rates where some domestic visitors seek lower quality accommodation 
than that associated with international travellers. 
Overall, New York City remained the number one destination in the USA for overseas 
visitors. The city's major international feeder markets showed strong and sustained 
rates of increase in 2004 including a 12% increase from the UK, a 15% increase from 
Germany, a 15% increase from France and an 18% increase from Italy. Interestingly, 
the recovery period in New York was quicker than in the USA overall ( see Graph 4- 
1,4-4 and 4-7). 
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In the city of Washington, visitor numbers decreased by 19% in 2001 over the year 
2000 and continued to decline to around 30% less than the 2000 level by 2002. The 
decline in international visitor numbers to Washington continued bottoming out at 
42% less than the 2000 level in 2003. In spite of signs of recovery in 2005 the 
number of arrivals is still 25% down on its 2000 level. It is difficult to isolate the 
effects of 9/11 on the travel figures to the USA because of the additional impacts of 
events such as SARS and the Iraq war. 
Graph 4-8 International arrivals to Washington 2000-2005 
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of Commerce. 
According to a survey by Yu and Stafford (2005) in the Washington, D. C. Metro 
Area, namely Washington D. C., the Northern Virginia and suburban hotel industry 
was hardest hit during the last four months of 2001 in Washington. 
When looking at the hotel industry it is more difficult to get a true picture of the 
impact of 9/11. As Graph 4-9 shows the average room price in 2001 was higher than 
2000. This might be as a result strong growth for the first 3 quarters of the year. The 
impact of 9/11 can be seen clearly in the 2002 and 2003 figures, where average rates 
dropped by 5% and 1.8%, respectively. However, both average daily rates and 
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occupancy levels have increased since then, recovering strongly in 2004 and 2005 
when in the latter year the average rate was up 25% on the 2000 rate. This is clearly a 
different picture to that of New York and may in part be a result of the different 
composition of visitors travelling to Washington with the latter experiencing a higher 
proportion of business visitors than the former. 
Graph 4-9 Hotel Occupancy and Average room rate 
Washington through June 2005 
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Graph 4-10 shows the year-on-year performance indicators for hotel performance. 
However, apart from the supply side that shows a steady decrease from 2001 to 2004 
and slight increase of %0.1 in 2005, the demand, ADR (average daily rate) and 
RevPAR (revenue per average room) all show a relative growth, and occupancy rate 
shows a stable growth while it increased in 2005. 
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Graph 4-10 Change over prior year (hotel performances) 
Source: Smith Travel Research 
4.2.5 The Response to the 9/11 attacks 
The immediate government responses to the September 11 attacks included law 
enforcement activity, disaster relief and security response (Blake and Sinclair, 2002). 
Until 9/11, acts of anti-government terrorism on US soil, whether politically, 
ideologically or religiously motivated, were a rarity (see table 4-3). Terrorism was 
perceived to pose greater threats for Americans when they were outside the USA 
rather than on home soil. 
113 
Table 4-3 Attacks against target since 1990 
02.1993 A group led by Ramzi Yousef tried to bring down the UNWTO with a truck 
bomb. They killed six and wounded a thousand. 
10.1993 Somali tribesmen shot down U. S helicopter, killing 18 and wounding 73 in an 
incident that came to be known as 2Black Hawk down. 
4.1995 The bombing of the federal government office in Oklahoma City by American 
citizen Timothy McVeigh that killed 193. 
11.1995 A car bomb exploded outsides the office of the US program manager for the 
Saudi National Guard in Riyadh, killing five Americans and two others. 
06.1996 A truck bomb demolished the Khobar towers apartment complex in Dhahran, 
Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U. S service members and wounding hundreds. 
08.1998 = Bin Ladin's group, al Qaeda, carried out near simultaneous truck bomb attacks on 
the U. S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The attacks 
killed 224 people, including 12 Americans and wounded thousands more. 
Qaeda in Aden, Yemen, used a motorboat filled with explosive to 10.2000 An n al team 
blow a hole in the side of a destroyer, the USS Cole, almost sinking the vessel and 
killing 17 American sailors. 
Source: http: //www. terrorism. com/modules. php'? op=modload&name=Attacks&file=index 
There was some pressure on relations within the USA and in spite of an appeal by 
President Bush that Americans should "pull together in the aftermath of the attacks" 
and that "we should not hold one who is a Muslim responsible for an act of terror" 
there were many instances of internal friction. In the seven days following 9/ 1 1, 
Arabs and South American citizens reported 645 "bias incident and hate crimes" to 
the Council on American-Islamic-Relation (CAIR). Six months after the event this 
figure totalled 1717. Cainkar (2004) argued that federal government policies, most of 
which were never subject to a congressional vote, targeted millions of people on the 
basis of religion, country of birth or ethnicity, in response to the action of a small 
number who shared their ascribed characteristics. Nevertheless, none of the 
perpetrators were home grown; they all visited the U. S. A with an agenda. 
When looking at the response to an attack on the scale of 9/11, it is worthwhile 
looking at the response made by the government to ensure that similar events will not 
happen and to try and mitigate some of the damage done to risk perceptions of 
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travellers. Following that it is worthwhile examining the industry response to see how 
they might be able to recover some of the lost ground in the market place. 
Immediately following the 9/11 attack the following security measures were brought 
into action (BBC, 11.09.01): 
" All government buildings in the country were evacuated, including the White 
House and Congress 
" Lower Manhattan was evacuated and the National Guard brought in 
" All commercial flights to and from the US were suspended until noon on 
Wednesday (1600 GMT) 
" Air force fighters were ordered to attack any suspicious aircraft flying in US 
airspace 
" Seven US warships sailed towards New York, two aircraft- carriers to help in 
rescue efforts. 
In the week after the 9/11, the focal point of the United States led coalition military 
response was Afghanistan in pursuit of al-Qaeda forces and to topple the Taliban 
Government for harbouring the terrorist organization. The US administration sought 
to enlist a broad coalition to strike at international terrorism, obtaining varying 
degrees of international support. The UK, continental Europe, Russia, Australia and 
Canada were fullsome in their support. In addition the USA sought support from Arab 
and non-Arab Islamic states as a means of demostrating that retaliation was not 
directed at Islam; besides, the Coalition needed the bases from which to attack the 
Talban (Beirmann, 2003). It is questionable whether this military stance reassures 
travellers or heightens their fear that this stance will ensure the USA will become 
subject to further attacks. 
Further to the military action taken by the USA and its allies in trying to hunt down 
the alleged 9/11 perpetrators, many countries introduced tough anti-terrorism 
legislation and took action to cut off terrorist finances, including the freezing of bank 
accounts suspected of being used to fund terrorism. Again it is hard to determine 
whether such widescale action has a positive or negative effect, overall, on travellers' 
risk perceptions. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies stepped up cooperation 
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to arrest terrorist suspects and break up suspected terrorist cells around the world. 
However, the subsequent terrorist attacks (Bali Bombings, Madrid Attacks) showed 
that the action taken by the governments was insufficient. Burke (2004) suggests that 
"Of course war on terror should have a military component. It is easy to underestimate the 
sheer efficacy of military power in achieving specific immediate goals. But if we are to win 
the battle against terrorism our strategy must be made broader and more sophisticated. We 
must eliminate our enemies without creating new ones. Military power must be only one tool 
among many, and a tool that is only rarely, and reluctantly, used. Currently military power is 
the default, the weapon of choice. In fact the greatest weapon available in the war on 
terrorism is the courage, decency, humor and integrity of the vast proportion of the word's 1.3 
billion Muslims. It is this that, as Islamic terrorism grows more and more fragmented, we 
need most. There is indeed a battle between the West and men like bin Laden. But it is not a 
battle for global supremacy. It is a battle for hearts and minds". 
From the perspective of a marketing response, the USA immediately embarked upon 
a new way of life, or, as the media described it, a new "new normality" (Chura, 2002; 
Stark, 2002). The terrorist attacks on the United States created a crisis in the tourism 
industry that proved challenging even to experienced managers of corporate 
communication. 
Since September 11 the New York City Tourism Authority, as well as NYC& 
Company, have benefited greatly from the actions of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in 
seeking to highlight tourism as a means of boosting the moral and economic viability 
of New York City. The Mayor's plea 5 days after the event to American and 
international visitors to show their support for New York by visiting, staying and 
spending was an effective call for solidarity. Giuliani's speech on 1S` October to the 
UN General Assembly was especially powerful as it identified the attack on New 
York as an attack on the entire international community. 
The NYC & Company, the official tourism marketing organization, has a membership 
of more than 1,800 businesses, including museums, hotels, restaurants, retail stores, 
theatres, tour organizations, and attractions. It has a current budget of $16 million, 
around half of which is contributed by the City of New York. 
The NYC &Company and the city administration of New York actively sought to 
address safety and security concerns raised by the public and the travel industry. 
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Tactically, they focused on the domestic market as a main priority and the 
international market as a secondary priority. The city of New York attracts a large 
number of visitors from within the United States (see graph 3-8) although spending by 
international visitors is far greater. Beirmann (2003) argues that this focus on 
domestic rather than international visitors was a correct one. This could be because 
people feel that they are at less risk when travelling within their own region or 
country (an aspect that is examined later) or that the call for national unity was a 
persuasive one for the Americans. 
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks the NYC & Company through its website included 
many promotions of restaurants, attractions, event and hotels. Paint the Town Red, 
White & Blue, and a new version of NYC & Company's popular Paint the Town Red 
winter celebration, began two months earlier in 2001 to add November and December 
to the usual months of January and February. For the first time, consumers were able 
to choose from "do it yourself' Paint the Town Red, White & Blue discounts at 
businesses throughout the city or they could opt for new, low-priced NYC Freedom 
Packages that combined hotel stays with Broadway shows, dining, cultural and 
sightseeing options as well as parking discounts. NYC& Company aimed to send an 
important message to people from across the nation and around the world that New 
York City was open for business and ready to welcome visitors back. Furthermore, 
Paint the Town Red; White & Blue included more than 350 special offers, exclusively 
for American Express Card members, which provided visitors with the option to 
create their own vacation experiences. Special offers and discounts included: 
" Hotels, rate discounts and complimentary breakfast at more than 100 New 
York hotels from The Algonquin to the Waldorf-Astoria with rates starting as 
low as $69 per night 
" Restaurants, Up to 20% discounts on lunch and/or dinner at city restaurants 
with cuisine ranging from classic American to Italian, Japanese, Brazilian, 
Mediterranean, South-western and Continental 
" Retail stores (15% discounts and gills with purchases) 
" Theatre, discounts of up to 40% for Broadway and Off-Broadway shows 
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" 2-for-1 admission for New York residents to a host of museums, tours and 
visitor attractions when accompanied by a visitor. 
An enhanced business information system was launched that provided better real-time 
information (Newswire) that was available to 95% of the world's retail travel agents. 
In essence, the campaign was one based on reassurances of safety and appeal to 
solidarity, backed by discounts and value-added incentives. The approach to 
international travellers included a combination of reassurance and incentives, but it 
needed to adopt a more subtle and varied approach in terms of psychological 
motivation. The extraordinary publicity given to the attack accompanying losses 
produced the kind of risk perceptions that people are likely carry with them into the 
future*Viscusi et al. (2003). 
For the city of Washington, DC the Convention & Tourism Corporation (WCTC) 
serves as the lead organization to manage and market Washington, DC as a premier 
global convention, tourism and special events destination. It was established just prior 
to the attacks, in April 2001 by merging the Washington, DC Convention and visitors 
Association and DC committee to promote Washington. 
According to Hanbury (2004), the media constantly showed the powerful image of a 
burning Pentagon. At any turn it looked as if the US capital was under constant attack 
and a place of on-going international crisis. The series of terrorism warnings allowed 
the media to continue showing the image of 9/11 in Washington thereby underscoring 
the increased risk perceptions that were evident from the downturn in traffic. 
To restore domestic traveller confidence, the marketing campaign "come, be 
inspired" targeted Americans. The WTCT did not have access to large public funding 
resource, but they tried to raise financial and in-kind resource from a wide range of 
public and private sources. The marketing campaign had two phases. The first was 
called `Be a tourist in your home town' and was focused at the local level. Since the 
airport was closed and more importantly people had not resumed air travel, they 
attempted to attract people from more immediate local markets. The programme 
began in early October and lasted through December 2001. Furthermore, the 
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Washington restaurant week `an idea borrowed from New York City, had more than 
70 restaurants participating, providing substantial discounts. 
There was criticism about the local response due to the lack of immediate action as 
their strategy was to wait until "rhetoric from federal officials was toned down and the 
American public became receptive to an invitation to visit Washington". The 
campaign launched late February was mostly in the form of TV service 
announcements but it also included a full range of marketing activities, newspaper, 
internet, direct mail, public relations, niche marketing and promotional support. `The 
campaign's primary message was to remind American citizens and international 
visitors that Washington's artistic, cultural and historic institutions were open for 
business. The messages also carried with them a hook of defiance by suggesting that 
people could best show their patriotism and love for democracy by visiting the 
Capital, Hanbury (2004). 
This was also combined with an aggressive public relations programme launched by 
the hotel industry in Washington (Fall and Massey 2005). 
The sudden decline of hotel business forced hotel owners and managers to make hard 
decisions to conserve cash by reducing operation costs. The hardest decision was to 
reduce/lay off a significant number of the 75,000 hotel employees, (Schneider, 2001; 
Sheridan, 2001). On the issue of staff reduction, 72 (7%) of the Washington D. C. 
hotels were very actively involved in reducing staffing levels. Clearly, the terrorist 
attack had a particularly significant impact on hospitality employment in the capital 
city. To add to the lay-offs, the majority of hotels encouraged employees to make 
flexible use and/or mandated use of vacation time, personal leave, and sick leave. 
The recovery strategies pursued collectively by the Washington D. C. tourism yielded 
positive results. The study by Yu et al. (2005) shows that recovery strategies clearly 
work (see Table 4-4). This is in spite of different hotel ownerships, affiliations, sizes 
and locations to stabilize business operations, amidst a series of subsequent bio- 
terrorism events, a weak economy, the Sniper rampage, SARS fears, a hurricane, one 
of the worst snowstorms of the century, the war on terrorism and the frequently 
heightened terror alert in 2002 and 2003. 
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Table 4-4 Stages of the crisis applied to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on Washington, 
2001. 
Crisis stages 9/11 terrorist attacks on Washington, D. C 
Pre-crisis stage Pre9/11.2001 
Warning signs: Al-Qaeda operative learning to fly 
commercial jets in the US; chatter increased by Al-Qaeda 
sleeping cells; FBI lost track of suspected terrorist 
operatives. 
Acute crisis stage September 11- October, 2001 
Terrorist attack on the pentagon; making sure that that 
guests, employees and properties were safe; rescue and 
relief efforts to assist the injured and victim families, 
reassuring the public that D. C was open to business, 
making crucial decision to conserve cash and reallocate 
human resources. 
Chronic crisis stage November 2001-April 2002 
Recovery marketing initiative: gradually targeting the local, 
regional, national and international markets; hotel 
occupancy returning to pre-crisis level. 
Crisis resolution stage Tourist business returning to normalcy since April, 2002. 
Source: adapted from Yu et al. (2005) 
The marketing response by the U. S. A, however, faced a relatively harder task in 
implanting a fully coordinated destination crisis marketing approach because it is one 
of the few countries in the world which lacks a centralised national tourism marketing 
authority. One of the key premises of having a strong and centralised national tourist 
marketing authority is to promote destination awareness. In a normal condition, 
destination-marketing procedures used by Visit USA and other marketing middle 
range source markets are normally highly effective. However, this effectiveness is 
largely based on the assumption of continuing high demand, which means 
participating principals and operators are willing to spend money to promote a strong 
and growing market. Once the market is threatened and the private sector has reduced 
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financial and other marketing resources for promotional activity, then privatising 
destination marketing become less viable (Beirmann, 2003). 
The Travel Industry Association of America (TIA) is a non-profit association that 
represents and speaks for the common interests and concerns of the entire U. S. travel 
industry. In'response to numerous inquiries concerning the need for the marketing 
campaign it tried to implement a national tourism crisis management plan including 
the sponsoring impressive marketing campaigns (both domestic and international). 
The Marketing Outlook Forum scheduled for early October (1.10.2001 to 4.10.2001) 
in Atlanta went ahead with significant changes to bring immediate relevance to the 
9/11 events. TIA unveiled an innovative marketing partnership on October 2"d with 
the U. S. Postal Service centred around. a new series of stamps, "Greetings from 
America. " The stamps highlight attractions in each state. TIA launched a "See 
America Sweepstakes" with 50 grand prize vacations, one week for two in each state. 
The state tourism directors created the itineraries. The promotion took place from late 
March through June 2002. TV advertising campaigns took place in November to 
make consumers feel good about travel to and within the U. S. President George W 
Bush and travel industry workers such as pilots, hotel bellmen, restaurant servers and 
many others urged the public to travel. The campaign had more than $12.4 million in 
funding behind it, with a goal of $20 million. The primary target was U. S. travellers, 
but versions of the ad ran in Canada, the UK, Europe and Asia. 
4.2.6 The media, terrorism, and 9/11 
The media has the power to minimise or maximise the impact of events on the 
watching audience. In one sense, media campaigns can persuade potential travellers 
that the incident is history and business is back to normal, highlighting the good 
aspects of travel. On the other, they can take an event and make it global, drawing the 
spectacular out of the mediocre. In some circumstances there may be conflicting 
needs from the destination. For instance, a hurricane sweeps across a Caribbean 
island and creates a path of destruction. The government want to tell the world how 
devastating the event has been to maximise international aid, but the tourism industry 
may want to reassure travellers that it really is OK to come and enjoy the tourism 
product. 
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In some quarters there is the view that the media, either directly or indirectly, 
encourages further attacks of terrorism (Paletz and Schmid, 1992). The media's 
interpretation of incidents is clearly likely to influence the travel risk perceptions of 
potential visitors to an area that has recently gained media attention. Also the 
presence and reporting of the media can help achieve the terrorists' goals, extend or 
enhance the impact of incidents, hinder security operations and put inappropriate 
pressure on authorities to resolve incidents. The media can also become participants 
in events rather than mere observers (the current issue of the missing journalist, Alan 
Johnston) (Wardlaw, 1982, p. 77). 
In the past, media critics have documented and questioned the mass media's insatiable 
appetite for violence; they have explored the effects of this kind of media content on 
people who are gradually exposed to violence in the news and in entertainment ( 
Gerbner and Gross 1976, Nacos 1996b; Bok 1998; Wolfsfeld 2001). One writer, 
Hof-man (1998), goes so far as to equate the "birth of international terrorism" with 
the introduction of the first TV satellite in the late 1960. The media play an important 
agenda-setting role. Weinmann (1982) cites studies that find 
"that public rankings of the importance of various issues coincide... closely with 
media ranking" (p. 214). 
He suggests that the high attention paid to terrorism by the media 
"determines a consequent priority in the public's perception of priority of issues. " 
The importance of news coverage in modem democracies is discussed by Norris et al. 
(2003) who argue that citizens tend to be dependent on the media for information 
about events and the actions of governments. Even if most citizens learn about current 
affairs through conversations with others, mass mediated news is often the originating 
source. 
Nacos (2002) argues that the media play a central role and can magnify or minimize 
acts of violence and their perpetrators. Typically, the media focuses on major and 
even minor incidents and has the capacity to elevate them to the level of spectacular 
reality shows. This will clearly influence the travel risk perceptions of would-be 
122 
travellers, perhaps correctly, but sometimes incorrectly. A classic example of media 
coverage is that relating to the attack on the World Trade Center Towers where the 
image of the two planes crashing into the towers was put on a loop behind the news 
broadcasters for hour after hour, as they updated the audience on events. This must 
surely have been an image that was etched on most air travellers' eyes and altered 
their perceptions, at least in the short term, of the risks of flying. 
While violence-as-crime and violence-as-terrorism tend to be grossly over-reported, 
the coverage of terrorist incidents that provide dramatic visuals is probably out in a 
league of its own in terms of media attention. Ordinary criminals tend not to commit 
their acts of crime in search of media attention but, for terrorists, publicity can often 
be seen as their lifeblood. The news media and coverage can be "considered modem 
tools of terrorist" (Picard 1993 in Norris et al. (2003) and they enjoy a symbiotic 
relationship (Wardlaw 1982; Wilkinson 1987). Given the violent nature of terrorist 
actions, "deviance" has often been used as the term to describe the confluence of 
impact, conflict, sensationalism and novelty that makes them newsworthy 
Shoemarker et al. (1987). The finding by Norris et al. (2003) suggests that television 
(in particular) shapes the psychological reactions to terrorist events. The media can 
also be a tool used to prolong the impact of terrorist acts, exemplified by bin Laden's 
ability to transmit his message via al Jazeera in the months following 9/11. 
Counter to this argument about the role of media expanding the image of acts of 
terrorism, some argue that for all the excesses in reporting, especially through 
electronic media, the news did not reflect the full horror of the 9-11 terrorism and the 
press tends to sanitize reality (Nacos, 2002). 
4.3 Tourism in Snain 
Spain is one of the largest countries in Europe, occupying four-fifths of the Iberian 
Peninsula shared with Portugal. Spain is located in Southwestern Europe, bordering 
the Bay of Biscay, Mediterranean Sea, North Atlantic Ocean, and Pyrenees 
Mountains, Southwest of France (see map 4-3). There are 19 autonomous 
communities including the Balearic Islands and Canary Islands, and three small 
Spanish possessions off the coast of Morocco - Islas Chafarinas, Penon de 
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Alhucemas, and Penon de Velez de la Gomera (CIA, 2005). Spain is a major tourism 
venue because of its good climate, coasts, historic site and natural features and its 
geographic location that is easily accessible by Europeans. 
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According to Frangialli (2004) the UNWTO general secretary, `Spanish tourism has 
changed dramatically in the last decade: it became much more diversified and is no 
longer only a 'sea, sun, sand' destination, but a player in the international market, with 
a developed meetings industry, culture, gastronomy, famous pilgrimages'. 
Spain remains the second largest tourist destination in the world just behind France 
with an estimated 55 millions tourists in 2005 and ranks second, globally, in terms of 
revenue after the USA. 
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Graph 4-11 Spain's arrivals and expenditure 
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The significance of tourism to Spain's economy is substantial (see Graph 4-11). 
Tourism accounts for 12% of GDP, supporting around half million jobs, which is 
12.2% of the active population and 20% of the service sector (Tourism Satellite 
Accounts 2004, Exceltur 2004, and BBC 02.05.04, UNWTO2005). The 55.6 million 
overseas visitors who came to Spain in 2005 spent 47,872 US$ million, an increase 
of 5% compared to year 2004. 
4.3.1 Madrid 
Madrid, the capital of Spain, is the largest city and home to the United Nations World 
Tourism Organization. Madrid has many attractions to offer visitors, it is probably as 
a consequence of centuries of centralism and because the city has been the official 
residence of the heads of the state; it has today a rich architectural, cultural and 
historical legacy. Madrid attracted 3.2 million foreign visitors in 2004, that is about 
6.6% of total visitor numbers to Spain, and supports 10% of total employment in the 
capital (Tourism Satellite Account, 2005). Madrid is the sixth main market for Spain 
after Cataluna, Canarias, Illes Belears, Andalucia and Valencia (see graph 4-12). 
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Graph 4-12 Veritcal percentage of destinations in Spain in 
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However, in spite of its many attractions and offerings, as can be seen from Graph 
412, the city is not a major receiving destination for Spain. 
http: //proquest. umi. com/pgdweb? index=7&did=665846791 &SrchMode=1 &sid=9&F 
mt= I O&VInst=PROD&VType=POD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1130754887& 
client ld=15517 
4.3.2 Madrid bombings 
The Madrid bombings took place on the 14`h March 2004 just before the general 
election was to take place. Like the attacks in the USA and London, the Madrid 
bombings used the transport network as a means to bring death and destruction to the 
capital. The attacks came in the form of synchronised bombings on the Madrid 
commuter train system, resulting in the death of 191 people and wounding a further 
1,460 (BBC, 02.05.2004). There were 10 bombs detonated on four trains in three 
stations during the busy morning rush hour (see map 4-3). 
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Map 4-4 bombings locations 
Source: from BBC (12.03.04) 
The 4/11 attacks were the most serious terrorist attack in Europe since the bombing of 
the Pan-Am plane over Lockerbie in 1988 and the worst terrorist assault in modern 
Spanish history. The number of victims in this attack far surpassed Spain's previous 
worst bombing incident at a Hipercor chain supermarket in Barcelona in 1987, which 
killed 21 and wounded 40; on that occasion, responsibility was claimed by the Basque 
armed terrorist group ETA. Following the bombings, there was widespread belief, 
aired through the media that ETA was also responsible for this attack, in spite of 
anomalies in terms of the way in which the attacks took place. There were also 
suggestions that the Islamist organization al-Qaeda was responsible. ETA has a 
history of mounting bomb attacks in Madrid, planting delayed-action bombs to kill 
rescue workers and using booby traps (such as explosives in wallets), as well as 
having attempted to attack trains. However, the 11 `h March attacks were on a scale far 
exceeding anything previously attempted by a European terrorist organization. ETA 
customarily issue warnings before its bomb attacks and there was no warning for this 
attack. This had led some to point out that the tactics used were more typical of 
Islamic militant extremist groups. 
According to Enders and Sandler (2000) the growth of religious terrorism worldwide 
appears to account for increased severity of terrorist attacks since 1991. For zealots, 
violence was established as the only means to overthrow a reviled secular government 
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and attain religious redemption (Hofmann, 1998) and Laqueur (1999 in Griset and 
Mahan 2003) argues that the new terrorism is different from the old, 
"Aiming not at clearly defined political demands but at the destruction of society and the 
elimination of large sections of the population. In its most extreme from, this new terrorism 
intends to liquidate all of what it deems to be" satanic force" which may include the majority 
of a country or of mankind, as a precondition for the growth of another, better , and 
in any 
case different breed of human. In its maddest, most extreme from it may aim at the 
destruction of all life on earth, as the ultimate punishment for mankind's crimes. (p. 81) 
There was intense speculation about the identity of the perpetrators of the Madrid 
bombings. A year after the attack it was believed that the attackswere carried out by 
a radical Islamist network based in Spain - mainly of North African origin. But even 
today there is still debate and argument as to whether the attack was by an Islamist 
group linked to Al-Qaeda or indeed an internal group such as ETA. From a travel risk 
perception there is an important distinction between the two groups. If it is the latter 
group then travellers in general may not have enhanced levels of risk providing they 
are not travelling to Spain. If, on the other hand, it was Al-Qaeda then there is the 
likelihood that this attack will provide cumulative effects on travellers risk 
perceptions wherever they are travelling. 
4.3.3 The impacts of the Madrid bombings on the tourism industry 
In spite of the severity of the Madrid bombings, the impact of the attacks on the 
arrivals and spending of visitors to Spain in general was not as significant as one 
might have expected. 
Exceltur (2004) carried out a survey of 1200 tourist businesses during the period 
between March and April 2004 and only 34.4% noted an effect on their sales during 
the days following the attack, while the remaining 65.6% did not notice any effects at 
all and carried on their activities as normal. Of the 34.4% who noticed a slight dip in 
activity, half of them said sales were down less than 5% while scarcely a quarter of 
them suffered losses of sales of more than 10%. From 34.4% of companies surveyed 
throughout Spain which indicated that they had been affected, 48.5% of these note 
that up until 08 April 04 their sales have recovered which shows only 17.7% of the 
total number of Spanish tourists operator surveyed were still affected after the first 
month. Furthermore, the result showed that the effects concentrated exclusively on the 
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city of Madrid (see Graph 4-13) and were only notional in destinations with a greater 
presence of long distance tourists, which were gradually restored in about 3 weeks. 
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Therefore, while in Madrid in the short term 82% of tourist operators suffered a fall 
in sales and in 30.1% of cases this was greater than 30%, in the two destinations 
which annually combine to capture about 40% ( see graph4-12 ; 4-13and 4-14)of the 
total international tourist market in Spain, namely the Balearic and Canaries, the 
short-term impact of March 11 on the tourist companies surveyed affected by 8.2% 
and 9.8% their respective sales in the initial days following the attack. 
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Furthermore, according to the same survey by Exceltur in 2004, an analysis by sub 
sector showed a greater initial impact on Spanish travel agencies and transport 
companies, which, however, are those that have most rapidly recovered their normal 
activity. Thus 54.6% of distribution companies noted a drop in sales but within a few 
days, 80.0% had returned to normality. Similarly, 40.7% of Spanish transport 
companies were affected by the events of March 11, but 70.0% of these had recovered 
fully in less than one month. 
The main impact mostly concentrated on the city of Madrid and immediately affected 
the capital's hotel industry (see graph 4-15) in particular because national visitors 
reduced their travel in the subsequent month (Aguilera, 2005, chief Operating Officer 
of NH Hotels). Moreover, a survey by Hotel Occupation (EOH) published by the 
National Institute of Statistics (INE) shows a growth during March, both in national 
and foreign demand in 5 and 4 star hotels, compared with the year before. However, 
in 2 and I star establishments the drop was found to be considerable for the same 
period (see graph 4-16). 
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According to Exceltur in WTTC(2005) the official information in respect of the 
volume of foreign tourists arriving in Madrid, and the amount of travellers and 
overnight stays in Madrid hotels during the month of March 2004 shows some growth 
(Graph 4-15 and 4-16). However, 2002, the year being used as the baseline, was not 
itself a good year as this was still suffering from the effects of 9/11 and subsequently 
the Iraq War. It can be seen that although inbound tourism increased by 7.1 % in 2004 
over 2003, it was still only around 3% more than the arrivals in Madrid hotels in 
2001. UNWTO general secretary (2005) argued that it is difficult to distinguish the 
effects of one factor from the others, since there were so many incidents, either 
manmade or natural, in recent years. 
Table 4-5 Hotel occupancv in Madrid hotels 200I-2005 
Year Number Year to year variation 
2001 507,428 
v 
2.6 
2002 461,597 -9.0 
2003 488,515 5.8 
2004 523,382 7.1 
2005 574,129 9.7 
Source: adapted from Frontur (2005) 
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Graph 4-17 Seasonal tourists arrival in Madrid 2003- 
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Table 4-6 Tourism arrivals to Madrid 2O01-2005 
Year Number Year to year variation 
2001 204,224 1.8 
2002 254,151 -3.8 
2003 196,892 -22.5 
2004 236,728 20.2 
2005 277,106 17.1 
Source: adapted from Frontur (2005) 
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0.1 
Feb Mar Apr May 1 Jun Jul Aug ý Sep 
D 2003(000's) 213 196 234 240 266 361 308 278 
0 2004(000's) 238 236 265 1 295 275,347 
1 294 1 272 
0 2005(000's) 229 277 ; 
293 319 296 396 308 333 
Source: adapted from Frontur (2005) 
Monthly arrivals show how marginal and short-lived the impact of the train bombings 
was on the number of arrivals to Spain. In 2005 tourism in Spain showed a stronger 
growth both in terms of arrivals and in terms of expenditure (see graph 4-1 1 and 4-19) 
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In the wake of the attacks, foreign governments did not advise travellers to avoid 
Spain although many repeated that visitors should be cautious. This seems to have 
had a marked effect on travellers' risk perceptions. The nature of the attack seemed to 
be a single isolated attack and not the beginning of large-scale attacks, a fact that 
again will not damage risk perceptions so much. The Madrid train bombings brought 
millions of mourners on to the streets of Spanish cities and provoked angry 
demonstrations, political rows and a change of government. The popular Party 
government of Jose Maria Anzar was unexpectedly defeated by the socialists in an 
election three days after the Madrid train bombings on March 11. The People's Party 
accused the Socialists of taking advantage of the blast for political gain. When it 
became clear that the new government was going to pull out of Iraq, it changed the 
atmosphere completely. This shift in attitude could again be responsible for securing 
the thought in potential travellers' minds that this attack was unlikely to be repeated 
and hence recovery was rapid. Some could argue that the terrorist attacks in Madrid 
were effective in several ways, as terrorists have been known to declare victory using 
the following area: 
" Acquiring global media and political attention; 
" Having an impact on a target audience; 
" Forcing concessions from an enemy interest; 
" Disrupting the normal routines of society; 
" Provoking the state to overreact. 
4.3.4 The responses to the attacks 
In view of the unprecedented scale of the attack in Spain, security rose not only in 
mainland Spain but also in France, and in Athens where security was tightened at 
train stations and the Spanish Embassy. Similar measures were adopted in Italy. All 
railway traffic to and from Madrid was stopped, including commuter, regional, and 
intercity trains as well as the high-speed AVE service to Seville. International rail 
traffic to and from Madrid was also interrupted due to security concerns. 
Most TV stations reported the attack during their regular morning news programmes, 
starting around 08: 00 and the public regional and national broadcasting companies 
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took commercial breaks off air. All TV stations replaced their logos with black 
ribbons overlaid on the Spanish flag at 18: 00, visible in the lower-right corner of the 
television screen. People across Spain flocked to hospitals and mobile blood donation 
units in such numbers that the need for blood for transfusions was more than satisfied 
as early as 10: 30, although continued donations were requested for the coming days. 
Soon after the bombings, the government issued a decree declaring three days of 
official mourning, and demonstrations were called for the evening after the bombing 
with the rallying cry "With the victims, with the constitution and for the defeat of 
terrorism". 
Sympathy poured in from governments worldwide immediately following the 
bombings, led by Spain's partners in the European Union. European Commission 
President Romano Prodi called the attack `ferocious and senseless'. UNWTO 
Secretary-General Francesco Frangialli (2004) said `It was an attack against Spanish 
democracy and the people living in Madrid, not against the Spanish tourism industry 
or foreign tourists'. 
In an attempt to prevent such atrocities happening again and to reassure the travelling 
public, the March 2004 bombings can be seen as a catalyst in the enhancement of 
European counter terrorism preparedness. The attack demonstrated just how 
vulnerable the European Union is, and seemed to mobilize European security forces 
and politicians into adopting a more co-ordinated and defined approach to security 
issues. According to a European Commission action paper (18.03.04) in response to 
the terrorist attack on Madrid, the terrorists responsible for the attack in Madrid have 
struck against the fundamental principles of all European states and on which the 
Union is built: `Respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights'. 
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4.3.5 Security response 
" 
Following 9/11, Spain has arrested more than 200-suspected terrorists, more than any 
other country in Europe. Spain has been fighting the Basque Fatherland and Liberty 
group (ETA), which seeks an in independent homeland in northern Spain and 
southern France, for four decades but according to Mannuel Navarete (2005), head of 
the counter terrorism for Spain civil guards, Spain was unprepared for the tactics of 
al-Qaeda. He furthermore stated in USATODAY. com(3.09.2005): 
"Unlike the Islamic cells, ETA has paramilitary structure, its members follow orders. 
They plan and they want to escape. In contrast, the Islamist terrorists who planned the 
bombs that took out four Madrid bound commuter trains made their move quickly and 
their plan was simple and cheap. They bought the explosive less than two weeks 
before the attack and spent about $7500 on the operation. There is no way to stop 
them in 10 days; we have no time to react". 
Navarete added that the fact that attackers are willing to die makes it more difficult to 
stop provide effective systems to stop the acts. Given the high proportion of Muslims 
resident in Spain and the country's proximity to Morocco, it is clearly a country that is 
open to infiltration by terrorist groups. 
After the 3/11 attacks, Spain tried to develop more specialized teams to fight against 
Islamic terrorism and deal with immigration, serious crime and illegal activities, 
mainly using the following options (usatoday. com 03.09.05): 
" The 46-member Civil Guard counter-terrorism unit was more than doubled by 
the end of. the 2005 
9 There was a 300% increase in the number of agents that the police hired to 
focus on Islamic terrorism 
9 22 suspects were brought into jail 
A Madrid-based terrorism-coordinating centre for the police, military and 
secret service opened in 2004 and security liaisons were dispatched to 
countries including Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Libya (all countries that were 
thought to be key links for the European network of al-Qaeda). 
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The Madrid attack prompted a special meeting of the European Council on 25 of the 
March 2004, which issued a Declaration on the combating of terrorism and identified 
that further work was required to be done. The fact that the London 7/7 attacks 
occurred only proved that these steps were uncoordinated and inadequate. See for 
example: http: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/1d200405/Idselect/ldeucom/53/5305. htm 
4.3.6 Marketing Response 
The Comprehensive Plan for Quality in Spanish Tourism (PICTE 2000) is the result 
of the many efforts to redirect Spanish Tourism made by both private and public 
sectors. The aim is to ensure that the concept of the "quality holiday" is a factor that 
makes Spain stand out from other destinations on the international markets. 
In the wake of the Madrid attacks, Antonio Nieto, General Director for Tourism for 
the region of Madrid in 2004 said: 
" the Terrorists' attack had a slight impact on the tourism industry and Madrid rebounded 
after only a few weeks and the number of international tourists visited Madrid in the month of 
March 2004, grew more than 7,4%. The information clearly demonstrated that, Madrid, as a 
tourists destination did not collapse and sends an optimistic message that the impact has been 
much lower than expected in the first few days-although we need to be cautious about next 
months" 
The Head of Finance, Economy and Tourism Development, Miguel Angel 
Villanueva, described Madrid after the attack as "an open-minded city, receptive to 
the outside world but which brings with it its own rich historical and cultural heritage 
- but with a mind to the future(WTTC, 2004). This new Madrid requires a new type of 
quality tourism, which can go hand in hand with culture, social activities or business 
if so required". 
Spain launched a marketing campaign, as a response to the bombings, in May 2004, 
allowing a brief period of mourning after the attacks. Europe accounts for 90% of 
international arrivals to Spain, with the UK, Germany and France generating more 
than 60% of all inbound visitors and this is where the marketing campaign was 
primarily focused. To give added strength to the message that Madrid was back to 
normal, on 22°d May 2004 the city hosted the Royal Wedding of H. R. H. Prince 
Felipe. This was an historic occasion and a similar event had not taken place in the 
city for 98 years. The 1500 VIP guests gathered for the wedding, which included 
members of Royal Households and Heads of State and Government from across the 
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globe. Madrid tried to show its capacity as an international stage, its pleasant nature 
and welcoming spirit that demonstrated in a very short time that it had managed to 
get back to complete normality (Villanueva, 2004). Madrid Mayor Alberto Ruiz 
Gallardon said the wedding was `just what Madrid needs following the worst 
suffering Madrid has experienced in decades' (BBC, 22.05.04). 
4.4 Tourism in the United Kingdom 
Tourism is one of the largest industries in the UK, ranked sixth in the international 
tourism (see graph 4-20) earnings league (2004) behind the USA, Spain, France, Italy 
and Germany. It accounts for 1.2% of the UK economy. According to Visit Britain 
(2007), over 2 million jobs are sustained by tourism activity in the UK, either directly 
or indirectly, although this figure is probably a gross under-estimate. London is the 
principal gateway to the United Kingdom and most international visitors arrive there. 
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Graph 4-20 LJK Arrivals and Expenditure 
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4.4.1 Tourism in London 
London is one of the world's most popular destinations, Europe's richest city and a 
key financial centre (Visit London, 2006). The tourism industry is critical to the 
economy of London in terms of its ability to generate income and job opportunities. A 
successful tourism industry builds a successful London (London Development 
Agency, 2005). London plays an important role in welcoming overseas visitors and 
creating a first impression and in providing opportunities to influence visitors. The 
number of passengers arriving at and departing from London's airports was over 120 
million in 2004. Heathrow handled 67m passengers, making the airport the busiest 
and best connected in the world (CAA, BAA in Visit London, 2005). Half of all 
overseas visitors spend time in London, with 3 out of 4 overseas visitors passing 
through London. Tourism underpins many aspects of life in London, and has the 
potential to continue growing; the Olympics in 2012 could speed up the growth. 
According to Visit London (2005) total spending in London amounts to around £15 
billion during the year and accounted for about 6-7% of London GVA (c 10%of GDP). 
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A 1% sustained increase in overseas visits to London corresponds to a 12.8% increase 
in London jobs. For domestic visits the equivalent figure is 0.34%. 
4.4.2 London attacks 
The London attacks happened at a time when the UK was distracted by a global 
summit meeting intended to look at solutions to world poverty and the euphoria of 
winning the bid to hold the 2012 Olympics which was announced just the day before 
the attacks. The bombings came two days after the beginning of the trial of 
fundamentalist cleric Abu Hamza, five days after the Live 8 concert, and shortly after 
Britain had assumed the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. 
Four suicide bombers struck in central London (see map 6-2) on Thursday 7 July. 56 
people were killed in the attack, including the bombers, and a further 700 injured. 
Three bombs went off at 0850 BST on underground trains just outside Liverpool 
Street and Edgware Road Stations, a further bomb was detonated on a train travelling 
between King's Cross and Russell Square. The final explosion was around an hour 
later on a double-decker bus in Tavistock Square, not far from King's Cross (BBC, 
2005). The bombings seriously disrupted the city's transport and mobile 
telecommunications infrastructure at a time when, according to a London 
Underground spokesman, over 200,000 passengers would have been travelling on 
over 500 trains (in BBC, 12 July). The incident was the deadliest single act of 
terrorism in the United Kingdom since the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 
(which killed 270), and the deadliest bombing in London since the Second World 
War. 
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Map 4-6 London attacks location 
Source: from http: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Imaize: 7 July London bombings locations. png 
Some have argued (Frey et al. (2004); Enders and Sandlers (2001)) that the media 
mostly pick up on those terrorist events that occur in the larger cities or the capital of 
the countries. However, it can be argued that the terrorists took advantage of the time 
and place of the attack in particular through the media coverage by staging their attack 
in London. 
On 21 July 2005, a second series of four explosions took place on the London 
Underground and a London bus. However, this time only the detonators of the bombs 
exploded, and all four bombs remained undetonated. There were no fatalities, the 
single injury reported at the time was later revealed to be a hospitalised asthma 
sufferer. A study by Piazam and Fleischer (2001) on the impact of terrorism on 
Israel's tourism industry 1991-2001 showed that tourist destinations could recover 
from even severe acts of terrorism, as long as the terrorist acts are not repeated. 
However, when acts of terrorism-whether of high or low severity-occur at high 
frequency and regular intervals, tourism demand will constantly decrease and 
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eventually the destination's tourism industry may come to a standstill. However, in 
the case of London, because the second attempt by terrorism was not successful, the 
impact was not as severe as it might have been. The attacks were followed by an 
announcement by Al-Qaida's second in line, Ayman al-Zawahri, who claimed 
responsibility for the attacks in a videotape aired on the Arab television network al 
Jazeera (BBC 02.09.05 and wikipidia. com). Al -Zawahri said: 
"I talk to you today about the blessed London battle which came as a slap to the face of the 
tyrannical, crusader British arrogance. It's a sip from the glass that the Muslims have been 
drinking from. " 
In the same tape, one of the suicide bombers Mohammed Sidique Khan, called 
himself a soldier of the war. 
4.4.3 The impact of the London attacks on the tourism industry in UK 
The 7/7 attacks on London were not aimed directly at tourists but instead were aimed 
at the very heart of Britain's economy, hitting the millions who travel into the capital 
every day to work, shop and eat (Stewart et al . (2005), the Guardian 10.09.05). The 
pattern of the attack also was similar to the Madrid attack, as it was a coordinated 
attack targeting transport systems in a capital during the peak season for inbound 
tourism. In terms of the scale of the attacks, however, it was smaller than the Madrid 
attacks. It could also be argued that the attack did not come as a shock but more as a 
surprise. Britain is not unaccustomed to terrorists attacks having come through the 
Northern Ireland conflict, but it was not used to these unannounced attacks that were 
designed to cause as many human casualties as possible (Poala Subacchi 2005 in 
Reilly et al . (2005)). 
The major difference between the attacks in Madrid and London, from the point of 
view of the tourism industry, is that Madrid is only a small part player in Spain's 
economy and a significant proportion of that is business tourism. London, however, is 
the major gateway for tourists coming into the UK. Furthermore, the London bombs 
came at a time when the economy was already slowing down (the Guardian Unlimited 
19.07.05) throughout the world as a result of the doubling of oil prices since 2004. 
142 
The experience from the Madrid bombing and 9/11 suggested that the negative impact 
of a one-off (the second attack in London had no casualties or major physical damage) 
incident is unlikely to have a significant long-term impact on the capital's economy. 
Furthermore, several economists believe that the lessons from September 11 and the 
Madrid bombings are that major economies can absorb such shocks, where traders 
had been expecting something like this for some time because of the world situation 
(Jeff Randall, BBC business editor 07.05.9; Gordon Brown in 24.9.05 BBC). Rand 
Morimoto argued that, after the bombing in the UK, many people's attitudes have 
hardened and become more resilient, since such attacks have become more familiar 
and the bombings do not change the risk of travel (eg. Rand Morimoto, 2005 
Frangialli, 2005). According to the national statistic data (see graphs 4-21 and 4-22) 
the year on year monthly arrivals and spending in 2006 were subject to steady growth. 
Graph 4-21 Montly visitor arrivals to the UK 2000-2006 
3,5 
I 
2,500 
° 2,000 o T/ 0 
1,500i' 
1.000 1 
500 1 
-ý- 2001 1,589 1,455 1,820 2,008 2,024 
2002 1,527 1,261 1,737 2,181 1,966 
2003 1,792 1,446 1,705 1,833 1,823 
2004 1,765 1,757 192712,270 2,347 
-31E-2005 2,132 1,850 2,189 
12,331 2,767 
247 2,546 2,589 1,965 1,631 1,582 1,381 
228 2,782 2,694 2,079 2,061 1,774 1,889 
417 2,588 2,766 2,180 2,17012,011 1,983 
406 2,934 3,162 2,404 2,26412,154 ý2,365 
ý 
770 3,117 3,205 2,537 2,447 12,388 ! 2,237 
http: //corporate. visitlondon. com/enis/images/1 monthlytrendssep2006. pdf 
143 
Graph 4-22 Monthly visitor spending UK 
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Terrorism in London attempted to cause maximum immediate damage and puncture 
the British economy by undermining the appeal of London as an economic investment 
opportunity and desirable destination. The London attacks were not as shocking as, 
say the 9/11 or Madrid bombing attacks, because, to some extent, people were 
expecting such an attack. 
Overall, the economic loss to the country emanating from the attack (particularly in 
terms of the tourism industry) was not significant. London is `unique' in many 
aspects, since it can not be easily substituted by any other destination. The figures 
proved that the impact was minor; however, the attack might have changed the 
cultural values and attitude of British and in particular Londoners. 
4.4.4 The response to the London attacks 
In the opinion of former Metropolitan Police Commissioner Lord Stevens of 
Kirkwhelpington, before the identity of the bombers became known, the bombers 
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were almost certainly born or based in Britain. The attacks would have required 
extensive preparation and prior reconnaissance , and a familiarity with bomb-making 
and the London transport network as well as access to significant amounts of bomb- 
making equipment and chemicals (BBC web 10.07.05). 
h": //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/Uk/4668675. stm 
On July 17`h bombing suspects were rounded up and it emerged that three of the four 
men blamed for the suicide bombings were British-born Muslims of Pakistani origin 
and the fourth was a Jamaican-born Briton who had converted to Islam. It brought 
fears of the possibility of an anti-Muslim backlash among the country's 1.6 million- 
strong Muslim community. According to Louise Bruguiere (Le sheriff) on 26 August 
2005 in the Financial Times in common with Spain and its large Moroccan 
population, the UK faces a particular problem because of its large Pakistani 
population. The importance of radical Pakistani-based organizations linked to al 
Qaeda and operating around the world, notably in Europe, is another remark that can 
be made; Louise Bruguiere added that " the UK is more affected by this problem than 
any other state". 
Efforts were made to get Muslim leaders to condemn the attacks, in part to mitigate 
any damage between Muslim and non-Muslim communities in the UK and in part to 
reassure people that there was a major groundswell of people against the attacks. 
According to Iqbal Sacranie, head of the Muslim Council of Britain (19.07.05), " a 
very, very small minority" of British Muslims espoused extremist views. This 
researcher suggests that it makes no difference as long as the small minority are 
capable of acts against the major community. Resulting from such acts there will be a 
negative perception of the public towards Islam and consequently to the Muslim 
community. According to Sacranie (19.07.05), 
"The evil people who planned and carried out this series of explosions want to demoralize us 
as a nation and divide us as a people. All of us must unite in helping the police to capture 
these murderers. We must remember the victims will have been people of all faiths, all races 
and many nationalities". 
The political response in the UK was consistent, with politicians from different 
political parties united in their condemnation of the attacks. The history of such terror 
attacks in the UK suggests that, in the short term at least, people are more likely to 
145 
unite behind the government (BBC web 07.07.05). The UK's Prime Minister Tony 
Blair described the attack as barbaric and added: 
"Our determination to defend our values and our way of life is greater than their 
determination to cause death and destruction to innocent people and their desire to impose 
extremism upon the world" 
The Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone called it a "cowardly attack" (07.07.05): 
"In the days that followed, look at our airports, look at our sea ports and look at our railway 
stations and, even after your cowardly attacks, you will see that people... will arrive in 
London... whatever you do, however many you kill, you will fail". 
The Conservative leader at the time, Michael Howard, and the then Liberal Democrat 
leader Charles Kennedy, united to insist that the terrorists would not succeed in their 
aim of demoralizing the nation (BBC web 07.07.05). Howard said: 
"What is important is to make it absolutely clear that this country is united as one in our 
determination to defeat terrorism and to deal with those who are responsible for the dreadful 
acts that have taken place in London". 
A poll published by the Guardian newspaper revealed that two-thirds of Britons 
believed the London bombings were linked to the UK's role in the war in Iraq (CNN 
20.07.05). If this is the case then clearly people's travel risk perceptions would be 
heightened so long as the Iraq conflict continued. Ken Livingstone, the mayor of 
London, suggested that decades of British and American intervention in the oil-rich 
Middle East had motivated the London bombers (H: \autum\taking the blame. htm. and 
BBC 20.07.05). Livingstone added: 
"I think the particular problem we have at the moment is that in the 1980s... the Americans 
recruited and trained Osama Bin Laden, taught him how to kill, to make bombs, and set him 
off to kill the Russians and drive them out of Afghanistan, they didn't give any thought to the 
fact that once he'd done that he might turn on his creators, " 
On 19`h July 2005 Blair used a press conference with Hamed Karzai, the Afghan 
president, to dismiss the suggestions that Britain's involvement in Iraq and 
Afghanistan had provoked the attacks, he said (CNN 19.07.05): 
"Of course these terrorists will use Iraq as an excuse but let's be clear: if it wasn't that, it 
would be something else and nothing, but nothing, justifies what they are doing. September 
11, of course, happened before both of those things and then the excuse was American policy, 
or Israel. " 
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4.4.5 Security resuonse 
The London attacks not only increased security in the UK, but also acted as a catalyst 
to introduce legislation that would toughen the country's antiterrorism measures. The 
UK's government believes people from any nationality staying in the UK have to 
abide by the rules and must not incite others to kill innocent people (BBC, 16.09.05). 
Blair believed that the rules have not been tough or effective enough, in sending a 
strong signal across the community that the British government is not going to 
tolerate people engaging in terrorism or propagating it. 
Several sources acknowledged that the authorities have not always been successful in 
providing effective security. Indeed, it can be acknowledged that problems associated 
with security are never 100% solvable (Hall, 2002). Pool Jr. (2001) noted that 
policymakers should admit that nobody yet has the answer for implementing more 
effective and affordable security. The greatest calls for action against terrorism come 
immediately after the attacks. 
One of the problems facing the authorities relates to the scope and variability of 
attacks. If the authorities tighten up in one security area, the terrorists will simply 
target another (Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley (1983); Enders et al. (1993)). Increased 
US embassy security led to a decrease in attacks, which usually resulted in no injuries 
but led to an increase in the number of assassinations of embassy personnel as they 
left secure grounds (Enders et al. 1993). Thus, it is essential for authorities to impose 
strategies that cause the terrorists to substitute less harmful modes of attack by 
limiting terrorist resources or through intelligence. 
According to Blair (2005), the possibility of terrorist attack from al-Qaeda was "real 
and serious". In March 2004, the then Metropolitan Police commissioner Sir John 
Stevens described an attack as "inevitable", and said police had intercepted several 
attempted plots (BBC 07.07.05). Spending on security rose from an annual £950m 
($1.7bn) before 2001, according to Chancellor Gordon Brown, to £1.5bn in 2004-05 
to reach £2. lbn by 2007-08. So far, £56m has been spent on mass decontamination 
units for use in chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attacks. Such 
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measures may help provide support for when an attack occurs but the fact that they 
are put into place can have negative effects on the travel risk perceptions of tourists. 
Following the 7/7 attacks the Metropolitan police commissioner Sir Ian 'Blair said it 
was a situation "for which we have planned and prepared". However, a two-year 
study by eight leading academics in February 2005 found that there were holes in 
security in the UK's transport sector, emergency services were under-funded, the 
private sector was largely under prepared and that regions outside London were 
falling behind in preparing for an attack. 
Some of the new plans proposed by Charles Clark (UK, Home Secretary) to the 
government included: 
9 Hold terror suspects for up to three months without charge; 
" Powers to ban organizations which glorify terrorism and to prosecute 
"extremist" bookshops which sell terrorist propaganda or handbooks; 
9 ID card plan (however, some critics accuse the government of using the 
threats to push through unpopular measures such as control orders and ID 
cards) 
" Change in immigration rules meaning that anybody applying for British 
citizenship would have to be "of good character" 
" The idea of a "supergrass" system to allow terror suspects to give information 
to police and security services was also considered. 
4.4.6 Emergency response 
Civil protection in the UK is based on the concept of integrated emergency 
management. Under integrated emergency management, both preparation for and 
response to emergencies focus on the effects of events rather than causes (emergency 
response and recovery by HM Government 2005). The impact of terrorist events on 
public confidence, and the possibility of further attacks, makes the provision of 
warnings, advice and information to the public particularly important. 
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Because of the complex nature of the 7/7 attacks, security measures increased sharply 
and Cabinet Office Briefing Room `A' was "activated" within minutes of the first 
reports of explosion, and remained open around the clock for over a week. 
Following 9/11, an inter-agency team, London Resilience, was set up. This agency 
had prepared for attacks of this nature over the intervening years with 6 large-scale 
exercises and 32 table-top exercises. This emergency planning proved crucial in the 
response to the London bombings on July 7 and the second, failed attempts a fortnight 
later. Liberal Democrat leader Charles Kennedy said (News. scottman. com 07.07.05): 
"As ever, the emergency services have performed magnificently in difficult and dangerous 
circumstances. We owe them an overwhelming debt of gratitude. " 
The emergency services were widely praised - by the Queen and the Prime Minister, 
among others. The response made, almost everyone agreed, was swift and effective 
(Guardian Unlimited 10.08.05). 
Overall, the evidence shows that the emergency and security services were well 
prepared for such an attack both in terms of training and resources (spending on 
security was raised from £950m to £1.5bn in 2004-05). However, the 7/7 attacks in 
the UK showed that a well-prepared plan could minimise the negative impact 
although it demands huge investment, which is not easy for many countries. 
4.4.7 Marketing response 
The attack on the London transport system had little immediate effect on tourism (see 
graph 20-21 and 20-22), but the longer-term economic impacts depend on Britain's 
ability to attract visitors, especially the "more risk averse" Americans (Sinclair, 2005). 
American tourists have a reputation for being more risk averse with respect to terrorist 
incidents. American tourists also tend to be high-spending tourists, so they have a 
disproportionate effect on the destination economy and as a result London could 
suffer. According to the late Thea Sinclair, University of Nottingham, London is 
dependent on American Tourists (see graph 4-23). Whereas the 70% of visitors from 
Europe account for around 50% of spending, the 13% of visitors from the USA 
account for 18% of total spend. This mean that the average American visitor 
contributes about twice as much as the average European visitor. Furthermore, the 
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income levels that make for this difference means that the high spending tourists can 
seek alternative lower risk destinations more easily. 
Graph 4-23 Top three countries visits to the UK 
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Because of the importance of American tourists to the tourism industry in the UK, 
Visit Britain and Visit London launched a multi-million pound marketing campaign 
across the USA on 13 September following the attacks, using radio, print, online and 
outdoor media, as well as live "US" radio broadcasts from London. Visit Britain with 
American Airlines and Thistle Hotels offered price-driven London packages between 
October and March. 
A similar campaign was launched in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and Spain and ran into March 2006, while activities still continue in Japan, Russia 
and China. Visit Britain as part of marketing England internationally promotes 30 key 
English cities in France, Germany and the Netherlands. 
Visit Britain took advice from its counterparts in New York and Madrid, both cities 
having suffered from terrorism. 
"Both New York and Madrid tourism said [to] do nothing at first, let people come to terms 
with what's happened before going into the marketplace and saying, 'Right, London's ready to 
get on'. " 
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Internationally, Visit Britain conducted marketing campaigns in many different 
generating markets as follows: 
"A new Cities Campaign - including London - launches in the UK and all main 
international markets from September 2005: 
" Luxury: the So British campaign targets visits from the US, UAE and Russia 
from November 2005; 
" Gay & Lesbian: launched in the US from October 2005; 
Conclusion 
All three industrialised countries were subjected to significant terrorist attacks. None 
of them were aimed purposely at the tourism industry and yet all three attacks used 
the very lifeblood of tourism, the transport networks. In the USA, where the transport 
system was used actively as missiles, there was significant damage done to property, 
loss of human life and loss of standing for the world's greatest economic and military 
power. The transport systems in Spain and the UK were used passively, in that they 
were the targets of the attacks and the loss of human life was significantly less. 
These attacks, in spite of not being targeted at tourism, increased people's risk 
perceptions of travelling. In fact the airline industry was altered significantly by the 
nature of the 9/11 attacks and the changes to check-in, luggage and aircraft systems 
are all a direct result of that. It is more difficult (from a practical point of view) to 
increase the security on the trains and buses that were the locations for the Madrid and 
London bombings. To try and offer the same security levels as that offered by airlines 
would bring the transport systems to a grinding halt. Therefore, if anything, the real 
risk to travellers on trains and buses is perhaps greater than that experienced by airline 
passengers in this post 9/11 world. Table 4-7 examines the similarities and differences 
between the bombings in London and Madrid. 
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Table 4-7 Comparison between London bombings and Madrid bombings 
Major Similarities Main difference 
Target urban transport More casualties in Spain (4 times) 
than UK 
The rush hour The attack surprised Spain, it was less 
of a surprise in the UK 
Innocent people from a range of Timing was much worse ! br Spain 
countries 
Both in Europe and developing countries 
Both countries had terrorist attack in their 
history (ETA, JRA) 
Madrid is not the main destination in 
Spain, London works as an engine for 
UK's tourism industry 
London bombings provoked instant 
domestic political unity in IJK; in 
Madrid have had the opposite effect. 
The relatively slowness with which 
the London police have identified the 
victims and published their names, in 
Madrid they were issued within an 
hour. 
Public response (Calm dignity and 
resilient of British) and much 
different picture in Spain 
The number of previous terrorism 
casualty is far more in UK (4000) 
than Spain (800) 
The bombed London trains were 
all underground and invisible. 
All six countries made extensive marketing campaigns in their traditional markets and 
enhanced security to restore visitor confidence, but they all had to cut prices to entice 
visitors back - these visitors may not be the same as the original ones and may have 
lower spending patterns. 
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Some have suggested that the economic loss to the USA was in the range of $80 to 
$90 billion (including economic loss of wages, compensation and reduced commerce) 
(Kunretuther, Michel-Kerjan, and Porter 2003). Although a significant sum, the 
cumulative cost of terrorism from 9/11 is small in relation to US GDP, which exceeds 
10 US$ trillion (Sandlers and Enders, 2005). The effects of terrorism , 
in smaller 
economies where tourism is the major driver of the economy can be expected to be 
larger. Terrorism could reduce GDP and limit the growth by increasing the risk of 
travel and so reducing tourism arrivals (see graph 4-24). 
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Although some have argued that the size of an economy (GDP) has got much to do 
with the ability of a country to resist terrorist attacks (Sandlers and Enders, 2005), the 
evidence from the case studies outlined in this and the previous chapter is not 
conclusive. Countries such as Kenya, Spain and the UK all recovered their pre-attack 
positions quickly, whereas Egypt, Indonesia and the USA did not. 
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Chapter 5 
the Middle East and fran 
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Introduction 
The previous two chapters have drawn upon case study countries from both the 
developed and the less developed world. The chapters have illustrated the way that 
events can affect the flow of tourism through changes in travel risk perceptions. In all 
six case study countries, the occurrence of terrorist acts caused travel and tourism to 
suffer. Some countries were affected more over longer periods of time than others, 
but all were affected. One could find similar effects on travel and tourism flows 
through natural disasters such as hurricanes or Tsunamis or when there are outbreaks 
of disease that could endanger travellers (such as SARS). All of these events will 
enter into the travellers' decision making process and, either consciously or sub- 
consciously, they will affect the perceived level of travel-related risk. 
When looking at the various regions of the world, there are some regions where there 
are perceived to be greater risks of a specific nature and others where such risks may 
not even enter into the mind of the tourist. For instance, there are probably not many 
tourists who become concerned about the risk of hurricanes when booking their trip in 
Europe. However, there may be some concerns about such natural phenomena if they 
are considering booking a vacation between June and November in the Caribbean. 
Similarly, one might expect that if people are travelling within their own region of the 
world, they may have lower travel-risk perceptions than if they are travelling to a 
different region with greater unknowns and less familiarity. This is because the 
assessment of travel risk may be considered relative, with people judging the risk of a 
potential destination based on their own sense of norm. 
Stereotypically, regions can be assumed to be subject to higher travel-risk perceptions 
with respect to particular issues. For instance, Africa may give cause for concern 
because of the risk of disease, particularly AIDS. South America may give cause for 
concern about the level of crime. Finally, the Middle East may give rise to enhanced 
travel-risk perceptions because of political unrest and terrorism. These stereotypes 
may have some substance in reality or they may not, but the stereotype alone is 
enough to affect travel-risk perceptions. This chapter examines the factors that may 
give rise to enhanced travel-risk perceptions in the Middle East in general and to Iran 
in particular. 
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5.1 The Middle East 
The image of the Arab world as gleaned through the eyes of Western media is largely 
negative (Aaziz (2001) in Harrison, 2001). Islamic society tends to be painted from a 
palette consisting mostly of stereotypes of patriarchal oppression, harsh environments, 
religious fundamentalism, political unrest, cultural intolerance and irrational violence. 
Not surprisingly, these views have done little to encourage the growth of tourism to 
the Middle East. Even within the Middle East there are differences in terms of the 
way that the authorities react to this poor growth in tourism activity. To some of the 
Middle East the low volume of tourism coming from outside the region is a source of 
economic disappointment, whereas to others it is seen as a blessing, such as the case 
of Iran where there may be fear that Western tourists will have a detrimental impact 
on the traditional Islamic culture (Harrison, 2001). 
Unlike most other regions of the globe, the Middle East (see map 5-1) is characterized 
by a Hobbesian state of nature where war and conflicts seem to be inevitable and 
endemic. However, the Arab-Israeli dispute has been the most dominant enduring 
feature of the post-World War II Middle East. Nevertheless, conflict in the region has 
been multi-faceted. It is not only about state-to-state war, but also about internal 
including tensions , political violence, 
low intensity conflict, political failure, high 
level and continual propaganda, political and economic sanctions, disputes over 
resources, resistance to occupation and an ingrained culture of antagonism (Milton- 
Edwards and Hincheliffe, 2001). Dobson and Marsh (2001) describe the Middle East 
as "a theatre of violent competition and high stakes". Policies in the region have 
struggled to keep pace with USA economic expansionism, containment, fears of over- 
extension and oil supplies, discordant allies, decolonisation, nationalism, Zionism and 
Islamic fundamentalism. It is the region in which the limits of unity and diplomacy 
are put to the test and often found wanting. 
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Map 5-1 Middle East 
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The countries that make up the region of the Middle East sometimes depend upon the 
purpose of describing the region. As a geographical area it is a land that has witnessed 
much of the history of the human race. It includes countries such as Libya, Egypt, 
Israel, Lebanon and Iran. When one visit Perspolis in Iran, Petra in Jordan, the 
Pyramids in Egypt, Tadmore in Syria, or Bethlehem in the Israel, `one lives the 
history' (Alavi and Yasin, 2000). In reality, the Middle East offers a vast collection of 
unique tourist sites and can justifiably be referred to as one of the world's original and 
most significant tourist attractions. Blach, Roblit, Levine, and McConnel (1996) 
reported: 
"Many people rank the region's attractions among the most important places to visit in the 
world. The opportunities for expansion of cultural tourism, given the region's concentration 
of religious and historic sites, can hardly be overestimated. At the same time, there are 
tremendous opportunities in leisure tourism development that capitalize on the region's 
suburb climate and other natural gifts (pp. 5-6)" 
In addition to the heritage offered by the region, the climate is also conducive to a 
wide range of tourism activities for a large part of the year. 
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In spite of the hindrances to tourism development, the Middle East has recorded quite 
strong growth rates in recent times, ranking equal second fastest growing, along with 
Asia and the Pacific (2004-5). However, it should be remembered that this strong 
growth rate is being applied to quite a small tourism base and the actual growth in 
numbers (less than 3 million) is relatively small (see Graphs 5-1 and 5-2). 
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Graph 5-2 Middle East international arrivals 
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Source: adapted from UNWTO (2007) 
Table 5-1 shows tourist arrivals in the main destination countries of the Middle East. 
Most of the countries in the Middle East are dependent upon intra-regional tourists 
and have limited traffic from outside the region. Evidence from the literature and the 
surveys undertaken in this research suggest that the perceived levels of travel-related 
risk increases if the destination is outside the region of the traveller's normal place of 
residence. Take this factor and add to it the specific concerns regarding travel to the 
Middle East and this provides some explanation for the region's relatively poor inter- 
regional tourism traffic. The exceptions to this being Egypt, which has an abundance 
of unique attractions and has had a more favourable political situation for western 
visitors than many of its neighbours, and the Emirates that have continued to increase 
their share of tourism from Europe (See Table 5-1; Graph 5-3 and 5-4). 
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Table 5-1 Tourism in the Middle East and some selected countries 
Rank Country 2003 2004 2005 Political Control of 
stability corruption 
000's 
1 Turkey 13341 16826 20273 
-0.60 -0.23 
2 Saudi Arabia* 7332 8599 9100 
-1.63 . 15 
3 U. A. E 5871 ------ 0.91 1.23 
4 Egypt 5746 7795 8244 
-0.72 -0.21 
5 Bahrain 2955 3514 3914 0.06 0.76 
6 Syria 2788 3032 3368 
-0.66 -0.74 
7 Jordan 2353 2853 2987 
-0.12 0.35 
8 Iran 1546 1659 
-0.91 -0.59 
9 Israel 1063 1506 1903 
-1.01 0.79 
10 Oman 1039 1195 ---- 0.76 0.78 
11 Lebanon 1016 1278 1140 
-0.83 -0.51 
12 Qatar 557 732 ---- 0.92 0.55 
13 Yemen 155 274 336 
-1.48 -0.84 
14 Libya 142 149 
-0.02 -0.91 
15 Kuwait 94.00 91.00 0.29 0.71 
17 Palestine 37 56 88 
-1.33 -0.60 
16 Iraq --- --- --- -2.87 -1.45 
Source: adapted from UNWTO 2006 and adapted from World Bank (2006) 
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Graph 5-3 Comparision between total arrivals and regional 
arrivals 
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Graph 5-4 Total and regional arrivals 2004-2005 
2000 
V 
Saudi 
Egypt Syria Bahrain Jordan 
Arabia 
0 Total arrivals 2004 8599 7795 3032 3514 2853 
  Inira regional arrivals 2004 4752 1318 2691 2548 1785 
Q Total arrivals 2005 8037 8244 3368 3914 2987 
o Intra regional arrivals 2005 5067 1511 2492 2896 1822 
Source: adapted from UNWTO 2007 
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Egypt was considered as one of the case study countries and needs little in the way of 
further analysis here. However, Iran is worthy of further consideration because it has 
the natural and cultural heritage that should make it a major tourism destination in the 
Middle East/South Asia region and yet it has not managed to capture a significant 
share of tourists coming to the region from outside. It is suggested here that much of 
this failure to attract large numbers of visitors stems from the level of travel-risk 
perceptions associated with Iran. The following sections examine briefly the history 
of Iran and the factors that may be at work to influence potential travellers' risk 
perceptions associated with Iran. 
5.2 Introduction to Iran 
The country of Iran, known as Persia until 1935, is located in the Middle East (in 
South Asia according to UNWTO, bordering the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf and 
the Caspian Sea. It shares borders with Iraq, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, 
Armenia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan (See map 5-2). Persia, as it was, had been one of 
the greatest empires of the ancient world, and one of the first countries to be occupied 
by the early Islamic armies, coming out of Arabia in the 7'h century. In spite of this 
occupation, Iran has managed to hold on to a distinctive culture even though 
subsequently invaded by Arabs and others such as Seljuk, Turks, and Mongols. To 
some extent this ability to preserve its culture can be put down to the fact that it has 
retained its own language and adhered to the Shia interpretation of Islam (U. S 
Department of State, 2005 & BBC, 2006). More recently, in 1979, the country was 
subject to a revolution, which overthrew the ruling monarchy and replaced it with a 
republican state. 
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Map 5-2 Iran 
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One of the hindrances to tourism development can be seen in the establishment of the 
conservative clerical forces' theocratic system of government, providing ultimate 
political authority which has been nominally vested in a learned religious scholar. The 
Government of Iran today is dominated by Shia Muslim clergy. (See chart 5-1) 
(CIA, 2006). 
Chart 5-1 Iran's complex political system 
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Source: BBC (03,08,2005) 
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The period since the revolution has not been one that has been conducive to fostering 
tourism development. Difficulties in relationships between the US, including the 
seizure and holding of the US Embassy in Tehran for 15 months and a calamitous war 
with Iraq from 1980 through to 1988 , did much to overshadow the early 20th Century 
image of Persia as an attractive destination for Western visitors. Iran has even been 
given special designation by the US for its state sponsorship of terrorism in Lebanon 
and elsewhere in the world and, consequently, remains subject to US economic 
sanctions and export controls because of its continued involvement. 
Iran's economy relies heavily on oil export revenues, which accounted for around 80- 
90 percent of total export earnings and 40-50 percent of the government's budget. Iran 
ranks as the second largest supplier of natural gas in the world after Russia and 
presently ranks fourth in the world in terms of proven oil reserves (BBC 08.03.06). It 
has the second largest population (after Egypt) in the Middle East and North Africa 
region and most of its 65.5 million people are young (World Bank, 2006 
bttp: //www. atiehbahar. com/Resources/0il&Gas. htM). 
Following the revolution, Iran's image has been tainted by a significant amount of 
negative publicity, mainly as a result of its confrontations with the USA, which has 
consistently branded the country as one of the world's top trouble spots and part of an 
"axis of evil" which has done little to lower travel-risk perceptions of potential 
western visitors. 
The 8 year war with Iraq was expensive not only in terms of casualties, but also in 
terms of the impact on its resources and image, the accusations of human rights 
violations, the internal political struggles and the label of being a state that sponsors 
terrorism. All of these factors have added to the difficulty of attracting tourists. 
5.2.1 Tourism industry in Iran 
"It is generally said that Iran's backward tourist sector is the product of ill-advised and 
harmful attitude of some local officials and the propaganda campaign launched against the 
country by hostile powers. Seeing the state of affairs, one is bound to think that officials in 
charge of this industry do not know what they are in for, nor do our policy-makers realize 
how helpful tourism can and should be in attaining higher growth and create jobs". (Iran 
Daily newspaper, 30,09.04). 
Iran has attracted tourists ever since the days of Marco Polo and its position as a land 
bridge between Asia Minor and Asia proper has made it an essential point of transit 
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for thousands of world travellers for purposes of trade, religion or leisure. The 
country's environmental assets, and exotic culture, combined with a climate and 
heritage assets, provide it with an ideal platform from which to develop diverse and 
unique tourism products. 
However, this potential development has never been fully realised. Iran lags behind 
many countries in launching its tourism industry onto a significant growth path. It 
certainly has the assets that could make it one of the most important tourism 
destinations in the region. The political situation in Iran seems to have obscured the 
tourism vision and potential. Following the political changes in 1979, there was an 
abrupt drop in the level of tourism activity as tourists, particularly those from outside 
the region, that chose to go elsewhere. In spite of the fact that Iran ranked in the top 
ten countries with respect to its ancient and historical sites (UNESCO), experts 
believe that its pilgrimage sites, costal areas, mountains, deserts and rivers have 
remained untapped because the state has either ignored or given too little attention to 
the tourism industry. 
To give some idea of Iran's past performance with respect to tourism, Sahraeian, a 
senior economist (2005), argued that ' Iran was the Middle East's top tourist site 
during 1967-1977, when Egypt, which has one of the world's Seven Wonders, was 
(only) ranked 14th in the region'. In 1977 the country attracted more than 70,000 
USA visitors, compared with only 800 in 1995 (Alavi and Yasin, 2000, p. 13). Over 
the past 25 years, concurrent with the organized expansion of tourism in countries 
such as Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and some Persian Gulf Arab states, 
Iran has only received 5% of the $80 billion Islamic tourism market (Iran Daily, 
2004). However, the arrivals show more than a million arrivals which is also behind 
the arrival numbers of countries such as Syria and Jordan. It can also be argued that 
most of these visits are either VFR or business travel but this is hard to substantiate 
from the figures available (See Table 5-2 and Graph 5-5). 
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Graph 5-5 Arrivals and Expenditure in 
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Source: adapted from UNWTO-e library 2006 
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Table 5-2 International tourism receipts US$ (million) 2002-2004 
Source: adapted from UNWTO (2006) 
Since the revolution there have been a number of political events that have detracted 
from the image of the country as a tourist destination. To add to these problems there 
has also been a lack of efficient planning and management for the future of tourism. 
Tourism has not yet been considered as a major economic priority, even though there 
have been signs of development potential (UN ESCAP, New York, 2001). Many 
officials in the country have argued that tourism in Iran is a key to development 
(Iran's Tourism Master Plan, 2002 Maldives I lth-13`h February 2002) but others have 
argued that the plan cannot be effective. AbuTaleb, who is a member of the Cultural 
Commission in the Iranian parliament, called for the adoption of a National Policy on 
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tourism, noting that foreign models should be avoided, and criticized the "luxuries 
approach" used elsewhere to attract high spending tourists (Iran Daily, August 15, 
2005). 
According to Ghadery (2005), the prospect of the tourism master plan seems bleak 
since the plan that was devised has not been implemented and no tourist specialists 
have been given access to the plan, only a computer expert and an English translator. 
Ghadery (2005), furthermore, points to the lack of professional and experienced 
human resources in the tourism industry, resulting in less than 10 tourism specialists 
in the country and few well-trained members of the labour force in the industry. 
Ghadery (2006 in Iran Daily) added: 
"Until when should the government spend on the tourism sector and be satisfied with the low 
number of tourists coming in from regional countries, adding that the industry will not 
improve as long as its status in the national economy remains unclear". 
According to statistics that were released by the Oil Ministry, it requires $70 billion 
worth of investment in order to export five million barrels of oil per annum. 
Rahimipour, an official within the Iran Cultural Heritage and Tourism Organization, 
noted that injecting this $70 billion into the tourism sector could revolutionize the 
whole industry, and added that just 1% of the funds allocated to other industries flows 
into tourism (Iran Daily, 25 may 2005). 
There are many factors that can affect the level and growth of tourism demand for a 
destination. The main focus of this study is to look at the factors that influence 
potential travellers' travel risk perceptions. The following section examines briefly 
the main events that have taken place in Iran since the 1979 revolution and are likely 
to have influenced those travel-related risk perceptions. 
5.2.2 Iran and terrorism 
The problems with respect to tourism development in Iran are neither new nor simply 
related to the government's nuclear programme. Both before the Shah and after, Iran's 
strategic positioning (neighbouring Russia, its coastline along the full length of the 
Persian Gulf) gave it unrivalled power with respect to shipping in the Gulf. Its 
potential role in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East has made the country an 
ongoing preoccupation of the United States (Kanter, 2003 in Hiro 2005). Hiro (2005) 
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argues that even if the Iranian revolutionaries had stopped, once they had overthrown 
the Shah, Washington would still have found it difficult to live with Tehran. However, 
the revolutionaries went much further than this. The campaign of expelling USA 
influence from their society and calling for Islamic self-reliance and self-sufficiency 
in the region did not create a formula for stable relationships. The USA being the 
major force in the region, saw these policies as a direct provocation. This started a 
conflict between the world's largest superpower and an oil-rich rising regional power 
that has persevered for more than a quarter century. Even though, 25 years later, the 
ideology of Islamic revolution is crumbling and turning secular, (Tellier 2006) the 
conflict remains. 
The United States has kept in place various sanctions (there were 19 of them until 
2006) against Iran since the revolution, following the seizure of the U. S embassy in 
Tehran on 4th November. As a consequence of this seizure, Iran held the US 
diplomats for 444 days. Enders and Sandler (2000) noted that the takeover of the U. S 
embassy in Tehran marked a change in the nature of terrorism with increased severity 
of attacks from that time onwards. Norris et al . (2003) and Aburish 
(1997) link the 
stereotyping of Muslims and Arabs as the instigators of terrorism and violence to the 
taking of the US hostages and the lengthy process involved in securing their release 
(1979-81). Said (1981 in Norris et al. (2003)) noted further that the failure of US 
media and officials to understand and explain the Arab and Muslim world created a 
bigger gap between the West and the Iran. In particular, Said argued that "Muslims 
and Arabs are essentially covered, discussed, apprehended either as suppliers of oil or 
as potential terrorists". 
However, some argue (Hiro, 1985, Simpson 2006 in BBC) that the American 
sanctions, as extensive as they were, have been ineffective. One of the main problems 
with economic sanctions is that they often have undesirable effects on the poorer 
segments of the population in the countries which are subjected to them. Some 
countries were able to take advantage of the difficulties that Iran faced and profit from 
them, such as the Emirates (Hiro, 1985) and Turkey (BBC, 21.09.05). According to 
Simpson (2006), sanctions rarely hurt a country's leaders, instead hurting the poor and 
unprotected. Sometimes they even help the economy, since more things have to be 
manufactured at home, increasing economic linkages. However, it may be that 
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Simpson missed the bigger picture in Iran, seen by the fact that even though the 
manufacturing industry started to improve, the high levels of corruption (table 7-3) 
meant that lucrative businesses are at the government's disposal. Some argue that a 
handful of religious extremists are holding the entire population of Iran in thrall, even 
though others, such as Simpson (2006 in BBC), believes that there is some kind of 
democracy, although within narrow limits. 
As a result of the USA sanctions the Iranian Rial dramatically fell in value from 
where 1 US$ = 70 Iranian Rial (IR), to around 1 US$ = 10,000 IR. Iran found it 
difficult to obtain spare parts for its ageing fleet of Boeing aircraft purchased before 
the 1979 Islamic revolution (BBC, 12,02.02) and all of the internationally branded 
hotels in Iran such as the Hilton and the Hyatt were closed. 
5.2.3 The sanctions 
The deep hostility between the USA and Iran is typified by the fact that in 1984 
Washington added Iran to its list of `terrorist nations'. This meant that Iran was now 
subject to rigid US export controls. Furthermore, Iran has been accused of being a 
sponsor of Islamist groups, including the Lebanese Shiite militants of Hezbollah 
(which Iran helped found in the 1980s) and such Palestinian terrorist groups as Hamas 
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It has been considered by the State Department to be 
the most active state sponsor of terrorism in providing funding, a safe haven, training, 
and weapons for Lebanon-based Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups Hamas, 
Islamic Jihad, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine-General Command since 1998. In 2005, the U. S president G. W Bush 
(2000-2004 and 2004 to 2008) said (03.02.05 CNN): 
"Iran remains the world's primary state sponsor of terror -- pursuing nuclear weapons while 
depriving its people of the freedom they seek and deserve". 
This does little to market Iran as a "must go to" tourism destination! It increases 
people's awareness of the political conflicts and increases their perceptions of travel- 
related risk to Iran and to the region. 
Iran's image was further damaged by the British Prime Minister of the time, Tony 
Blair, stating that there is "no doubt" that Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism, and he 
urged the Islamic Republic not to obstruct the path to peace in the Middle East (CNN, 
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Feb. 08.2005). Iran is a very vocal supporter of Hamas, (the military group that has 
been branded a terrorist organisation by Israel, the US and the EU) which won the 
first Palestinian parliamentary elections for 10 years in 2006. However, the clerical 
regime denies allegations that it finances these groups (Aljezeera, 26.01.06, BBC, 
26.01.06). Finally, the issue of travel warnings against Iran has been on and off since 
the revolution in 1979, not only by the U. S Department of State but also by many 
Western countries such as the UK and Canada. 
5.2.4 Conflict in the region 
The Iran Iraq war, or the Imposed War in Iran, was a war between the armed forces 
of Iran and Iraq lasting from September 1980 to August 1988 along a front of some 
400 miles. In most discussions of the Iran-Iraq War, it has become commonplace to 
view the conflict as the latest manifestation of the millenarian Arab-Persian struggle 
for domination of the Gulf and the Fertile Crescent. Some historians have traced its 
origins to the pre-Islamic rivalry between the Achaemenid and the Babylonian 
empires, others to the 7th-century Arab-Muslim destruction of the Sassanid Empire 
and the subsequent conversion of most Persian to Islam. Still others viewed the war as 
the extension of the historic struggle for power and control between Sunni and Shi'ite 
Islam (Karsh, 2002). Marsh and Dobson (2001), however, draw a bigger picture in 
terms of the involvement of the US in the Middle East post Cold-War. Its concern was 
mainly related to the oil supplies. The USA's approach to securing geo-strategic 
stability has been the dual containment of Iran and Iraq that helped the US to promote 
Saudi Arabia and the more vulnerable states of the Persian Gulf to draw closer to the 
US. Furthermore, fear of Iran's Shiite revolution caused Americans to favour Iraq in 
the war against Iran. 
The conflict was rooted in regional rivalry whereby Iraq was supported by many Arab 
states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt, (Karsh, 2002) and where Syria and 
Libya supported Iran. Iraq believed that Iran was in turmoil and that their forces could 
achieve a quick victory. It was a monumental mistake (BBC, 22.09.05). After the 
Kuwait invasion by Iraq in 1991, Arab countries (despite supporting Iraq for the 8 
years war both directly and indirectly) joined the US led coalition perhaps because 
they felt it prudent to back the winning side. The war which started with the 
bombing of several Iranian air and military supply bases, including Tehran's 
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international airport (the most important international airport that is both for military 
and civil use), was disastrous for both countries, stalling economic development and 
disrupting oil exports and spending much of both countries' budgets to buy arms . It 
has been called "the longest conventional warfare of the 20th century" with more than 
1 million casualties and the cost of around US$ 1.19 Trillion. (BBC, 22,09.05, and 
Hiro, 1991). The war clearly did nothing to help Iran's tourism industry and only 
enhanced the travel-risk perceptions of the country. 
5.2.5 Human rights 
One of the main objectives of the Islamist Regime after the political change in 1979 
was to purify society, which it felt had been corrupted by alien influences over the 
previous centuries, and to Islamize it. "Corrupt behavior and customs" had to be 
ended. Alcohol and gambling were banned and so were night clubs, pornographic 
films and mixed bathing, society needed to be Islamized in a positive sense. 
Therefore, Friday noon prayer and sermons became the focal point of the week. The 
sermons were used to inform and educate the faithful. Furthermore, those who 
resisted the Islamic government were to be punished along the lines set out in the 
Sharia. Such Islamic crimes as raising arms against the Islamic state or spreading 
corruption in society were to be subject to capital punishment. This was the 
ideological framework, which Khomeini laid out, and within which he operated 
during this phase of the revolution, and many years after the revolution (Hiro, 1985). 
Afshari (2000) investigated how Islamic culture and Iranian politics since the fall of 
the Shah affected human rights policy in that state. Afshari (2000) suggested that Iran 
has committed human rights violations since the revolution, and that the country has 
behaved in a manner similar to other authoritarian governments with respect to its 
human rights abuses. Infringements of human rights, real or implied, do little to 
bolster people's travel-risk perceptions of a country and this has clearly been an issue 
for tourism development in Iran. Although some authors, such as Afshari (2000), have 
argued that human rights violations in Iran have been motivated more by political and 
economic factors rather than striving to maintain or restore some sense of cultural 
authenticity, from the tourists' perspective this is irrelevant as the immediate 
perceived danger to their person is the most important aspect. 
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According to the US State Department (1997), the Iranian government's human rights 
record has remained poor, although there have been efforts within society to make the 
Government accountable. Intense political struggles continue between a broad popular 
movement that favours greater liberalization of government policies, particularly in 
the area of human rights, and some hard-line elements in the government and society, 
which view such reforms as a threat to the survival of the Islamic republic. In many 
cases, this struggle is played out within the Government itself, with reformists and 
hardliners facing each other in divisive internal debates. 
Human rights laws attempt to address the kind of repression, abuse, deprivation, and 
discrimination from which many people are suffering in a wide range of countries 
including those deemed to be Muslim. Certain segments of the population such as 
women, and children are particularly vulnerable under such regimes. Even countries 
that have moved farthest in the direction of accommodating human rights for women, 
such as Turkey and Tunisia, still have problematic human rights records. Turkey, 
although to a large extent democratic, has a poor human rights record in many 
respects. Among other things, the Kurdish minority is harshly repressed, and 
supporters of the Islamist movement find themselves targets of prosecution. Similarly, 
Tunisia has been branded a repressive police state, where torture and imprisonment of 
opponents or critics of the regime are common. Islamist groups are especially targeted 
nevertheless; in neither country can Islamic law be blamed for the human rights 
violations, but human right abuse are happening in Muslim countries (Mayer, 1998). 
The sex slave industry is purported to be rife in Iran (Hughes, ) with more than 80,000 
prostitutes working either in the streets or in the 250 brothels reputed to be in Tehran. 
Although the sex industry can be seen by some countries as a positive aspect for 
tourism development (tourism development in places like Thailand, Indonesia and a 
number of East and Central European countries owe a significant amount to the 
popularity of sex tourism) the cultural divide between Iran and the West does not 
make this a viable, even if undesirable option. Besides, prostitution in Iran is illegal 
and many of the prostitutes are sent to Dubai to ply their trade. 
If one adds to the human right violation issues the tension between the USA and Iran 
over its nuclear programme, there are significant grounds for suggesting that the 
political situation is detrimental to tourism development. The natural and man-made 
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tourism assets that are so abundant in Iran are redundant if potential tourists are 
concerned for their own safety or see the culture in Iran as alien, whether this is true 
or not. The greater the conflict between Iran and the USA, the more these issues are 
reported and misreported in the media and the more aware potential travellers are of 
the issues in Iran. 
According to a poll by the Pew Research Centre (1-5 February, 2006), Americans 
believe that Iran poses the greatest danger to the USA, more so than countries like 
China, North Korea and Iraq. Moreover, around 82% of US citizens believe that if 
Iran developed nuclear weapons, it might provide them to terrorist organisations. 
However, Norris et al. (2003) have argued that American perceptions changed 
drastically after 9/11 and that their perceptions of the threat of world terrorism is far 
greater than the actual reality. Systematic evidence provided by the US State 
Department indicates that the actual dangers from international terrorism have fallen 
substantially around the world, and indeed have fallen during the last decade. Yet post 
9/11, American fears of the risk of terrorism have sharply risen, and the severity of 
the potential perceived attacks are far greater than before (Enders and Sanders, 2003). 
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January 2006 
It is not surprising that Iran's image is viewed negatively by many countries around 
the world (see graph 5-6 and 5-7). Furthermore, 24 of the 33 countries polled felt that 
Iran is a negative influence in the world. In five other countries a relative majority felt 
that Iran is a positive influence, but in three of these the proportion who say this is 
less than a third. Furthermore, countries in Europe and North America have the 
largest majorities expressing a negative view of Iran. It is worth drawing attention to 
the fact that the latter are the world top tourists spenders (UNWTO, 2006), while the 
Europeans are the second most important source of tourists (7,163,000) to the Middle 
East after the Middle Eastern tourists (13,188,000). 
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Snow (channel 4 news, UK, 2006) expresses: 
`Iranians feel threatened by Pakistan's and Israel's nuclear bomb and by Afghanistan. They 
are surrounded by trouble - war in Iraq, unstable regime in Saudi Arabia, Israel, Pakistan. It is 
quite a beleaguered feeling and, remember, they are Persians, not Arabs'. 
Conclusion 
In the context of political impediments to the development of tourism, the purpose of 
this chapter was to examine the political problems and tourism in the Middle East in 
general, and Iran in particular. The main problems the Middle East faces, and in 
particular Iran, is that, as a destination, it has had an abundance of negative political 
events that create an image of being a risky destination to travellers, in particular for 
visitors from western countries. According to figures released by Aziz (2001 in 
Harrison 2001 and the WTTC 2005 and UNWTO 2006) tourist traffic to the Middle 
East has grown strongly in spite of the War in Iraq and the on-going political tensions 
in the region . 
It seems that the disincentives resulting from the war, the anti-Western stance of the 
revolutionary regime in particular against the USA, concerns over human rights, the 
nuclear programme, in respect of which the International Atomic Energy Agency 
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Germany USA Italy UK Canada France Spain 
(IAEA) has been strongly critical of Iran, and the restrictions on visas (until 2005), all 
seem to responsible for Iran's poor image. This provides an almost insurmountable 
task for the tourism industry which could provide much needed income and 
employment opportunities. Although there have been occasional positive 
developments between Iran and the west, each time they have broken down and 
resulted in more difficult resolutions. 
West and in particular, the American policy struggled to manage their relationship with 
Middle East. The American deluded themselves by relying upon European imperial power 
that simply is no longer sufficient, developed surrogate to fight their battles for the, and 
accepted the burden of building-up the force necessary to arbitrate the balance of power in 
the Persian Gulf. In the process they toppled progressive governments, supported dictators, 
turned a blind eye to Israeli atrocities in Lebanon and when it situated them abandoned their 
closest friend, as with Britain and France during the Suez Crisis... The concern above all else 
has been the relatively economic dependence of the Western World on Middle Eastern oil 
(Marsh and Dobson, 2001, p102). 
For Iran, the road to recovery and economic growth is fraught with serious challenges. 
However, the experience of several countries in the Middle East and the rest of the 
world has shown that a mutual positive relationship with the generating markets 
(West) leverages the ability of developing countries to compete in the world market. 
Unfortunately, Iran's strategic situation in the Middle East and its rich tourism 
resources have never been put to use for the economic development of the country or 
to the benefit of the people. For instance, in Iran tourist can ski in the morning, visit 
heritage sites at lunchtime and swim in the afternoon. 
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Chapter 6 
Risk perception 
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Introduction 
The previous chapters highlight the extraordinary events that have disrupted travel 
flows in recent times. Perceived or actual travel-related risk when travelling to a 
region where one's basic need for personal security is compromised affects the 
tourism system. Thoughts about insecurity in the mind of a potential tourist change 
their perceptions of any given destination (Douglas and Mills, 2006). Simply because 
tourism involves moving out of one's norm or comfort zone, tourism takes place 
within the bounds of the concept of security, and the travel decision, the level of risk- 
averseness and the image of the destination are all significantly influenced by the 
tourist's perceptions of risk and safety (Hall, Timothy, & Duval, 2003). Authors such 
as Ryan (1991) have argued that tourists generally avoid politically unstable 
destinations because of the potential that aggression and terrorism will be directed at 
them. The simultaneity of production and consumption associated with tourism 
means that the tourism product cannot be exported in the same way that many other 
goods and services are exported and so tourists tend to be sensitive about political 
unrest or security risks (Mansfeld and Winckler, 2004). The risks that tourists 
perceive need not even be in the actual country to which they are thinking of 
travelling because security issues in one part of a region may result in the risk 
perceptions of the whole region being altered (Mansfeld, 1999). Safety and physical 
security are the primary conditions for the normal tourism development of a 
destination, region, or country. 
In order to understand the issues relating to travel risk and travel-risk perceptions it is 
worth spending some time looking at the concepts of travel risk and travel-risk 
perceptions. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the current literature in the area 
of risk perceptions in the context of tourism and to examine the factors that contribute 
to and influence perceptions of travel related risk. 
Risk is a complex issue and does not only relate to risk of personal physical harm. 
Thus, although some authors (such as Poon and Adams, 2000; Resiniger and 
Mavondo, 2005) argue that safety and security are extremely important issues for 
tourists, others (such as Rohel and Fesenmeier, 1992) identified seven distinct risks 
that might influence the purchasing of travel products. These different types of risks 
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relate to equipment, financial, physical, psychological, satisfaction, social and time. In 
tourism they identified three dimensions of the perceived: physical - equipment risk, 
vacation risk and destination risk. Subsequently, others have been more specific in 
terms of the risks identified when travelling to a different country or region including: 
war, terrorism, and political instability (Clements& Georgiou, 1998; Sonmez&Graefe, 
1998; loannides and Aposopolos, 1999). More importantly, from studying risk and 
travel, the authors found differences in the perception of risk among tourists (Douglas 
and Mills, 2006) where some travellers seemed to be more risk averse than others. 
6.1 What is risk? 
Before reviewing how risk applies to tourists when they are making their travel 
decisions, it is useful to examine the nature of the concept of risk in general. Risk is 
a perception of the future, a perception of how threatening a scenario might be. A 
brief search on the internet reveals at least 33 different definitions of risk (if one 
discounts the irrelevant tracks made by a heavy metal band and a board game of that 
name). Although most definitions harbour the same concept there are different 
aspects of risk worthy of note. Princeton University provides a sensible set of 
definitions for risk: 
" hazard: a source of danger; a possibility of incurring loss or misfortune; "drinking 
alcohol is a health hazard" 
"a venture undertaken without regard to possible loss or injury; "he saw the rewards 
but not the risks of crime"; "there was a danger he would do the wrong thing" 
" exposure to a chance of loss or damage; "We risked losing a lot of money in this 
venture"; "Why risk your life? "; "She laid her job on the line when she told the boss 
that he was wrong" 
" the probability of becoming infected given that exposure to an infectious agent has 
occurred 
" gamble: take a risk in the hope of a favourable outcome; "When you buy these stocks 
you are gambling" 
Source: wordnet. princeton. edu/perl/webwn 
Risk perception is also an example of cognition or awareness, and there may be 
significant similarities or differences between different individuals (Wahlberg and 
Sjoberg, 2000). A risk scenario may not exist yet and may therefore simply be a 
mental picture of the future, constructed over a mental representation of the here and 
now, it is a relative concept. One of the central features of any definition of risk is the 
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distinction between what is real, and what is possible (Markowitz, 1991, Evens and 
Nowotny, 1987 referred by Renn, 1992). 
Furthermore, risk has been defined as the possibility of physical, social, or financial 
loss because of a specific perceived hazard (Macquarie, 1999; Priest, 1990 in 
Reisinger and Mavondo 2005). Rohrmann (1998) argues that this is a dominating 
negative view of risk. It is also possible to have neutral risk i. e., risk is about 
uncertainty of outcomes (good and/or bad ones) of a decision where the element of 
risk does not influence the decision; and even positive aspects to risk perception i. e., 
risk can mean: thrill (danger, induce feeling of excitement). There are clearly multiple 
concepts of risk. The most common uses are (Solvic, 2002): 
" Risk as a hazard; 
" Risk as a probability; 
" Risk as consequence; 
" Risk as a potential adversity or threats. 
Glaesser (2003) noted that in the majority of uses of the term risk, two fundamental 
points are distinguishable. Using a risk perception model, it was attempted to 
describe, free of any value judgment, series of events based on rationality axioms. 
According to this approach, found mostly in insurance mathematics, risk is defined as 
"expected damage". It is a product of damage together with the probability of its 
occurrence. Much social science analysis rejects this notion, arguing instead that risk 
is inherently subjective (Funtowics and Ravetz, 1992; Krimsky and Golding, 1992; 
Otay, 1992; Pidgeon, Hood, Jones, Turner and Gibson, 1992; Solvic, 1992; Wynne, 
1992 in Solvic 2002). In this view, risk does not exist `out there', independent of 
people's minds and culture, waiting to be measured. Instead, human beings have 
invented the concept of risk to help them understand and cope with dangers and 
uncertainty of life. Although these dangers are real, there is no such a thing as a `real 
risk' or `objective risk' (Solvic 2002). 
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6.2 Risk nercention and tourists 
Generally speaking, the perception of risk is a vision based on the likelihood of 
negative consequences resulting from the tourists' decisions/behaviour (Moven and 
Minor 1998 and Glaesser, 2003). The perception of risk tends not to be absolute and 
is, as such, a personal judgement (opinion or belief) with respect to the probability of 
something occurring and the size of the consequences if it did (Rohrmann, 2004). 
With respect to tourism, risk can be defined as what is perceived and experienced by 
tourists, during the process of purchasing and consuming tourism-related services and 
whilst being at the destination (Tsuar, Tzeng, and Wang 1997 in Reisinger and 
Mavondo, 2005) and is one of the major factors that can influence the decision- 
making process with regard to the purchase of the tourist product. Tourism is a part 
of the service sector whose unique characteristics (intangibility, inseparability, 
variability and perishability) intensifies the perceived risk when compared to goods 
(Gronroos, 1990; Mitchell and Greatorex, 1993; Lovelock, 1996; Zeithaml&Bitner, 
1996). In addition to the above factors, the tourism product gives rise to other 
elements, such as poor weather, unfriendly communities, disruptions to travel through 
industrial actions, inedibility of local food, acts of terrorism, crime, political unrest, 
disease, and natural disasters. These factors can all influence the level of perceived 
risk experienced by tourists (Mansfeld 1992; Roehl and Fesenmaier, 1992; Pizam 
and Mansfeld 1996; Mountinho1995; Tsaur, Tzeng and Wang 1997; Witt ; Sonmez, 
1998; Sonmez and Graefe 1998a). 
Risk during the tourism decision and consumption process is the deviation that can 
exist between the expected and the final, subjectively experienced tourism product. If 
the level of perceived risk is greater than some personal threshold limit, the tourist 
may try to reduce exposure to this risk by, say not travelling or travelling elsewhere so 
that the level of risk is reduced (Chandler 1991; Ehglander1991 ; Norton 1987). 
Normally, this threshold value is reached more quickly for a discretionary tourism 
product than, say, for a material product (Kreilkamp, 1998). 
However, risk perceptions are often not based on reality (Sulvic, 1987,1998 and 
Taylor, 2006). Furthermore, it is often not reality but rather the perceptions that 
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determine the behaviour of tourists when making their travel decisions (Weinstein, 
1988 and Sjoberg, 2000, both referred to by Brug et al. (2004). Thus, it does not matter 
how incorrect or wrong a perception of risk may be, it will still influence the 
behaviour of the potential tourist in exactly the same way that decisions would be 
affected by changes in the level of risk from actual events (Moreina 2004). Therefore 
the perception of risk has a direct impact and can, in effect, generate much greater 
losses than those that may be caused by the original harmful event Kaperson et 
al. (1998); Solvic(1992); Weber(2002); Sonmez and Graefe (1998a , 1998b) also 
found that perceived risk has a stronger influence with respect to avoiding a particular 
region than it has to the decision of planning to visit one. For example, those 
perceiving terrorism as a risk may be more likely to avoid travelling to the Middle 
East. 
However, different types of tourists perceive differently in terms of risk and safety, 
and there are different factors that influence this perception (Lepp and Gibson, 2003). 
Roehl and Fesenmaier (1992) came up with a typology of tourists that allocated them 
into three types, based on their perceptions of risk: 
1) risk neutral 
2) functional risk, and 
3) place risk. 
The risk neutral group may not consider tourism to their selected destination to 
involve risk, or perhaps not expose them to any risk greater than that experienced 
during their normal day-to-day life.. The functional risk group felt that the 
possibility of mechanical failure, equipment failure, or organizational problems was 
the major source of travel-related risk. The place risk group perceive vacations as 
being fairly risky and the destination of their most recent vacations as very risky. 
Although no attempt was made to link these categories with Cohen's tourist role 
typology, an interesting similarity is evident. The risk neutral group emphasized more 
the need to experience excitement and adventure when on a vacation than the other 
two groups. 
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In the same vein as that of Plog, set out in Chapter 2, Cohen (1972) identified four 
types of international tourists, based on their preference for either familiarity or 
novelty of the destination: the organized mass tourist, the individual mass tourist, the 
explorer, and the drifter. There is also the fact that while uncertainty or risk may be 
seen as being negative to some tourists it may equally be seen to be part of the 
excitement of tourism. Pearce (1996) hypothesized that the level of travel-risk 
averseness may be related to the experience of the traveller. For him, the more 
experienced tourists may seek to satisfy higher order needs, while the less 
experienced tourists may be more pre-occupied with lower needs such as food and 
safety. Hence experience means less risk-averse and less experience means more 
risk-averse. However, the relationship may be counter to this if actual risk is close to 
perceived risk such that experienced travellers are more aware of the risks they face 
and the less experienced travellers are, perhaps, naive in the assessment of risks. This 
is an aspect that is explored later in this research. 
The significance of risk perception when making travel-related decisions takes on 
higher levels of influence when there has recently been a negative incident. Similarly, 
risks can be categorised into those that are able to be controlled and those that are not. 
Figure 6-1 presents such a categorisation (Glaesser, 2003). 
Figure 6-1 Negative incidents 
High degree of control (Y) 
Reduction in number of flights 
Hotel overbooking 
Water pollution 
Crime waves 
Gradual Epidemic (X ) sudden 
onset Terrorism events 
Fires 
Currency fluctuation 
Low degree of control 
Source: Based on Gee and Gain (1986) in Glaesser 2003 
Hurricane 
Earthquake 
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Figure 6-1 gives a brief overview of potential negative events that could trigger 
tourism crises, subdivided according to how easy they are to control and their onset 
speed. Diagram 6-1 shows Earthquakes to have the lowest level of control (it is on 
the very bottom of axis -Y) followed by currency fluctuations. However, the 
difference between these two negative events is the onset speed, where earthquakes 
are rapid and unexpected and currency fluctuations may be more slow and 
predictable. The rapid nature of, say, earthquakes and hurricanes provide little time if 
any to prepare for the crises although it could be argued that living on a geological 
fault or within the hurricane belt means that there is a higher probability of such 
disasters. Looking at the upper part of diagram 6-1 (+Y and -, + X), water pollution, 
for example, may have a gradual onset but be associated with less control than, say, a 
reduction in the number of flights. 
However, the approach used in Diagram 6-1 is open to criticism. For instance, does 
one get more warning and have greater control over terrorist attacks than over, say, 
fires? Is it possible to have more control over hurricanes than it is to have control 
over earthquakes? These aspects are not as static and clear-cut as presented in the 
diagram. Terrorist attacks might be anticipated but when they happen they are 
generally a shock and as sudden as an earthquake. 
Risk perceptions are subjective; they are in turn, dependent on quantitative risk 
factors, qualitative characteristics of risk sources and individual consumer 
determinants (Judgrmann and Solvic, 1993b; Widemann, 1994 in Glaesser, 2003). In 
addition, particular risk factors exist because of specific criminal or terrorists threats 
(Glaesser, 2003, p . 42). Finally, there are many factors relating to the individuals who 
perceive the levels of risk, such as their nationality (culture) or their exposure to 
media with respect to risks. The next sections look at each type of risk factor that 
may influence risk perceptions. 
6.2.1Ouantitative risk factors 
Glaesser (2003) suggests that there are at least two quantitative factors influencing the 
levels of perceived risk, one being the probability of an incident and the second being 
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the likely magnitude of damage resulting. Both components may be subject to 
distorted risk perceptions for a variety of reasons. The use of mental heuristics by 
tourists can result in misrepresentation of damage probabilities, and this in itself can 
be brought about by the likelihood of the incident occurring and the nature of the 
incident (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1974; Jungermann and Solvic, 1993a in Glaesser, 
2003). 
According to availability heuristics, the perceived likelihood of an incident re- 
occurring increases in the tourist's mind the more easily it is remembered or can be 
imagined. An obvious example of this is when there has recently been an air crash, 
tourists will focus on the crash and not on the many successful flights that occur 
before and after such an incident (Perrow, 1992, p. 370 in Glaesser, 2003). These 
heuristics are only natural and can be expected, but another layer of influence which 
can magnify the results of such incidents is the way in which the media portray events 
(discussed in Chapter 2). 
6.2.2Oualitative characteristics of risk sources 
In addition to the quantitative factors that influence perceptions of risk there are 
qualitative factors that play a role. For instance, the nature of the risk, in terms of 
whether it is voluntarily taken or imposed on the traveller, is considered to be less 
important if the former and more influential if the latter. This probably reflects the 
level of control that the individual feels they have (Jungermann and Solvic, 1993a; 
Avenarius, 1995 in Glaesser, 2003). It also reflects the fact that some travellers are 
happier to take risks than others, as was evident immediately after 9/11 with some 
tourists visiting New York, or say, surfers going to the beach in Australia when there 
has been a recent shark attack. The purpose of the visit is also likely to have an 
influence in that business travellers may have less control over their travel decision 
than leisure or discretionary travellers. Luhmann (1991) distinguishes between risk 
and danger, suggesting that it is risk if decision is the basis of the exposure, and 
danger, if the responsibility is attributed to the environment, that is, one is exposed to 
the event (see Table 6-1). 
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Table 6-1 Natural hazards to tourism in tropical costal areas 
Atmospheric Earth 
Tropical Cyclones I. aýiclýlides 
Tornado Earthquake 
Storm surges tsunami 
Floods volcanoes 
Frosts Erosion 
Droughts Grand failure 
Severe storms 
Biological 
I Iunmtin cpuIcmie 
Plant epidemic 
Animal epidemic 
Plagues 
Bush fire 
Source: adapted from Granger (2000 p. 25) 
Considerable importance is attached to this division when assessing negative events. 
In general, man-made negative events tend to be perceived as having higher levels of 
risk than natural events. According to Jungermann and Slovic 19931, p100: 
"Whilst natural risks are classed as involuntary , unaccountable , not attributable to society 
and therefore, as more or less unavoidable- and obviously not as bad - civilian risks are seen 
as voluntary, controllable, attributable and avoidable -and therefore, obviously worse". 
If a traveller feels that events are under control (either their own control or "the 
authorities") they tend to be associated with less perceived risk than those that are not 
under control (Jungermann and Solvic, 1993a). However, there are also differences 
between events that can be controlled by the individual subject to the risk and those 
that are controlled by someone else. Hence there can be a higher perceived risk 
associated with travelling in a commercial aeroplane than in one's own car even 
though the latter is statistically more risky than the former. 
Counter to this, there is the distinction that can be made between intentional and 
accidental events. We tend, as a species, to over-react to intentional events and so 
have higher levels of perceived risk about them than we do about accidental events. 
Timing is also important, with high levels of risk perceptions about imminent threats 
(higher than warranted) and low levels of perceived risks (lower than warranted) 
about long-term, non-imminent threats. 
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Familiarity with events can be another influencing factor. If travellers are accustomed 
to particular events, then they build up some form of acceptability and perceive them 
as being less of a risk than new events that have not been experienced before. This 
can largely be explained by the fact that new events, because nobody has experienced 
them, have uncertain consequences and it is that uncertainty that leads to higher levels 
of perceived risks - better the devil you know. People learn about the outcomes of 
events and the probability of their reoccurrence in an experiential way, they tend to 
amplify their perception of risks associated with rare but spectacular events (Erev, 
1998, Barron and Erev, 2002, Weber, Sharoni and Blairs, 2001). This is at least partly 
as a result of the fact that rare events often are not experienced in proportion to their 
theoretical likelihood. In those instances where a rare and extreme event is 
experienced, one expects decision-makers to overestimate its risk level. In some parts 
of the world terrorism may still seen as a rare event whereas in others it is 
commonplace. The IRA bombings in Northern Ireland and mainland UK at one stage 
became almost commonplace and therefore lost some of their impact with both the 
media and the people. Does constant exposure to acts such as terrorism reduce the 
threat over time or does it get worse? A genuine question as UNWTO Secretary 
General Frangialli (2005) suggested: 
"There has been a shift in the security paradigm with regard to everyday life and travel, as 
people have come to accept higher levels of uncertainty than in past years". 
6.2.3 Individual risk factors 
In addition to the quantitative and qualitative factors that influence the perception of 
risk of travellers, there are a significant number of personal factors that may result in 
different people holding different levels of risk perceptions with respect to the same 
events. According to O'Banion (1980 in Lawrence and Schmidlin, 2002), individual 
risk perceptions can be categorised as follows: 
" Individuals as a rule tolerate much greater risk in activities over which the 
expert personal control is in the hands of some external body; 
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" Individuals tend to be more favourably disposed to consequences that are 
distributed overtime than to those where a lot of people get it at once (risk 
averse); 
" The more terrible the event, the greater its intuited probability; 
" Low probability events are overestimated; they seem more likely than they are 
in fact. 
In other words, individuals may be expected to respond more negatively to risky 
events that (Lawrence and Schmidlin, 2002): 
" Are under external control; 
" Are low probability but catastrophic in nature; 
" Have recent/or outstanding experience. 
Individual risk factors may vary depending on demographic variables such as age, sex 
and education. Higher risk perceptions can be expected, perhaps, by female tourists in 
comparison to men and a lower risk perception may be found in young tourists aged 
18-24 in comparison with older tourists (the investigation that forms the basis of this 
referred to the United States and the United Kingdom UNWTO, 1994b). A study by 
Nicholson et al. 2004 showed that risk taking in any domain is influenced by a 
combination of general factors, including age, sex and several personality 
characteristics, notably sensation seeking and value openness. However, it may not be 
possible to generalise about risk taking in one domain to risk taking in other domains. 
The results showed that, in addition to the general factors that predicted risk taking in 
all domains, there is a range of domain specific variables that influence whether 
people chose to take or to avoid risk. In sum, risk behaviour is patterned. Some people 
are likely to be consistent risk takers; other will be consistently risk averse, while a 
third group may have domain-specific patterns of risk behaviour. 
A further factor can be seen in terms of the cultural background of travellers, which 
contributes to people perceiving and assessing the risk of events in different ways. 
This can be traced back to various social, behavioural and development forms (Kemp, 
1993 in Glaesser 2003 and; Sonmez and Graefe, 1998). This is witnessed by events 
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such as those of the mid-1980s in Europe, at which time the number of US arrivals 
decreased considerably because of the frequency of terrorist attacks whereas, at the 
same time, internal European arrivals increased (Hurley, 1988, Ryan, 1993). 
Beirmann (2003) reported a similarly high level of sensitivity towards negative events 
by the Japanese as consequence of the Luxor attack in 1997 in Egypt (explained in the 
case of Egypt in chapter 3). This particular risk aversion has even stronger 
consequences in comparison to other cultures since, after consequential absence from 
the destination, a healing process tends to occur only slowly (Gee and Gain, 1986). 
6.2.4 Particular risk factors- criminal or terrorist threats 
A security aspect as a subsection of negative events occupies a special place. Security 
is defined `as the fear of becoming a possible victim of violent crime, such as flight 
safety, terrorist act' (UNWTO, 1994b; Smith 1998). Without doubt, criminal 
activities are a permanent part of daily life and in the context of tourism, they take on 
an even more important level of prominence. In a study by Kemmer (1995), the 
security of a destination was ranked as being second or third aspect in the order of 
importance when selecting a destination. Tolerance towards the risk of being subject 
to acts of terrorism is very short-lived and as soon as they cause serious injury or 
death the behaviour of tourists suddenly changes. Despite continuing to have an 
attractive image, a destination is then classed as being dangerous (Ahmad, 1996). 
Terrorism is a relatively new form of specific risk (Sulvic in Press 2002) which 
occupies a special position within the sphere of negative events. Following recent 
events and the coverage given to them by the media, authors such as Resiniger and 
Mavondo (2005) suggest that the perception that an individual may become a victim 
of terrorism or international conflict is growing. The actual level of tourism risk from 
acts of terrorism is relatively small but can take on disproportional magnitude in terms 
of perceived risk levels, see for instance, Sandler and Enders (2003). As such, while 
56 (7/7) deaths is clearly a relatively large loss in a single place at one point in time, it 
is considerably smaller than many other mortality risks. More people are killed every 
year in car accidents in the UK (Statistics for UK, 2005) than the total numbers of 
people who are killed by terrorist attacks (for the Madrid bombings 4/11, USA 9/11 
and 7/7 July the total amounts to 3,43 1 persons). 
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Sulvic (2002) argues that because the risks associated with terrorism are seen as 
being poorly understood, a catastrophic incident anywhere in the world may be seen 
as an omen of disaster everywhere, thus providing responses that carry immense 
psychological, socioeconomic and political impacts. The boundaries of imagination 
tend to limit the perceptions that people hold of risks experienced as a tourist. Before 
the 9/11 attacks, it is highly unlikely that terrorist attacks of this magnitude were even 
among the possibilities that ordinary citizens contemplated. Political terrorism is a 
product of modernity itself: but the events of 11 September have punched a huge hole 
in the optimism of the new millennium and of that modernity (Halliday, 2002). In 
this way, travel-risk perceptions are geared up and settle at higher levels until the next 
big event occurs or until such time as the memories of the last big event start to fade. 
Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003), however, consider that because no voluntary market 
transaction is involved with risks of terrorism and no form of compensatory benefits 
is available, this makes deaths from terrorism different to other type of deaths. Indeed, 
terrorism risks are highly imprecise and difficult to predict. Since there is little hard 
evidence to rely upon, people's assessments of terrorism -risks are highly variable. 
Estimates of terrorism risks, the number of deaths expected in a year, clearly produces 
a situation of considerable risk ambiguity. However, this ambiguity is not randomly 
and symmetrically distributed around some mean risk value. Rather, there is a long 
tiny-tail probability of extremely catastrophic outcomes (Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 
2003). 
According to Norris et al. (2003), many researchers feel that terrorists spread public 
fear in order to create a powerful bargaining tool. Long (1990, p5) argues that 
terrorists often "use the unreasonable fear and the resulting political disaffiliation it 
has generated among the public to intimidate governments into making political 
concessions in line with its political goals". Indeed, Long (1990) claims that 
terrorism is essentially a psychological phenomenon, "with fear and publicity two of 
its most important elements" (1990). 
In spite of the fact that terrorists may create public fear in order to influence their 
negotiations with targeted governments, fear has secondary consequences that further 
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undermine government authority. Researchers drawing on classic case studies suggest 
that fear fragments and isolates society into anxious groups of individuals concerned 
only with their personal survival (Allen, 1984; Long, 1990; Wardlaw 1982). As 
Hutchinson (1973 in Norris et al., 2003) points out, "terrorism destroys the solidarity, 
cooperation, and interdependence on which social functioning is based, and 
substitutes insecurity and distrust". The collapse of social trust and cooperation could 
have serious effects on how society functions. 
A deeper understanding of psychological reactions to 9/11 plays a central role in 
analyzing the effect of terrorism and the success of counter-terrorist actions (see 
chapter 4). Studies have highlighted three key consequences of fear and anxiety. 
First, fear tends to raise travel-risk perception (Lerner and Keltner 2000,2001; 
Mathews and Macleod 1986). This is consistent with the more general finding that 
events which arouse negative feelings lead to an overestimation of risk (Johnson and 
Tversky, 1983). Furthermore, anxiety and fear encourage a sharp sympathy to threat. 
Secondly, fear leads to risk aversion. Research on threats that involve the potential for' 
physical harm such as crime, natural disasters, and violent conflicts provide evidence 
that personal threat and fear leads to a change in personal behaviour designed to 
minimize risk. Reactions to other terrorist events highlight "the transformation of 
reasonable fear into a kind of irrational hysteria" (Long, 1990) and the deep 
unwillingness of Americans to fly after 9/11; or the precipitous decline in tourism in 
Bali after the 2002 club bombing. 
Thirdly, fear can have a damaging result on the sensible processing of information 
because it leads to worsened cognitive performance (Lerner and Keltner, 2000,2001; 
Mathews and Macleod, 1986). This fits in with research findings on the quality of 
elite and group decision-making under conditions of threat. Other evidence indicates 
that the group decision-making process deteriorates under conditions of threat 
perception and stress (Janis 1982; Hart 1990; Pruitt 1965). Furthermore, Norris et al. 
(2003) distinguished between fear and the cognitive perception of personal and 
national risk because they have different effects, even though they are related (Huddy 
et al. ( 2002)). 
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According to Resiniger and Mavondo (2005), the world in which we live is perceived 
to be riskier than the world before (Fischhoff, Nightingdale, and Ianotta, 2001). 
Capitanchik (2002) argues that nowhere in the world is really safe, terrorist attacks 
could happen anywhere. However, some places are safer than others because of how 
seriously the authorities take security issues. Terrorists may tend to strike where there 
is a lack of security as it increases their chances of success. Developing countries are 
increasingly becoming the most desirable tourist destinations however; this does not 
necessarily mean that authorities pay much attention to security (e. g. Bali). However, 
it could also be argued that increasing security could raise people risk averseness. 
Notwithstanding the influencing factors mentioned above, individual tourists will 
have personal thresholds of risk that they are not prepared to exceed (Kroeber-Riel, 
1992). The level of this individual threshold value is determined in part by the 
credibility of the affected organization, and the speed of its actions and the repetition 
of the events. 
The relatively huge publicity given to terrorist attacks, particularly in the West or 
when the target is Westerners, and the resulting losses generate the kind of risk that 
people are likely to severely misestimate in the future. These terrorist attacks also 
force people to completely rethink their risk beliefs. It could bring the idea into 
people's mind to substitute travel altogether and instead undertake different activities 
or simply go to different destinations The way in which it influences travellers' 
decisions is clearly a critical issue for those nations that are highly dependent on 
tourism revenue. 
6.3 Risk and the impact of culture 
People try to exist in a world which lacks certainty and they do so through the 
domains of technology, law and religion. Luhmann (1976, p. 143) argues that "a basic 
fact of life is that time only goes one way. We are caught in the present which is just 
an infinitesimal borderline between past and future. Humans have to live with a 
future which cannot begin because it moves away if we try to approach it but which 
serves as a projection screen for our present hopes and fears. " In other words, we are 
living with uncertainty and we are conscious of it. 
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According to Hofstede (1980,1989), if uncertainty exceeds threshold limits it creates 
unbearable anxiety in the individual or for society. The technology that Hofstede 
(2001) refers to includes all human artefacts, law, all formal and informal rules that 
guide social behaviour, religion and revealed knowledge of the unknown. Technology 
has helped societies defend themselves against some uncertainties such as those 
caused by nature, laws have been devised and implemented in an attempt to protect 
ourselves from others' actions and, when all else fails, religion provides comfort and 
protection to believers for those uncertainties against which we cannot defend 
ourselves. The knowledge of a life after death is the ultimate certainty of the believer 
which allows him to face uncertainties in this life. The borderline between 
"defending against uncertainties" and "accepting them" is quite fluid and difficult to 
identify. 
Different societies have adapted to uncertainty in different ways. - The view of people 
in high uncertainty avoidance cultures can be summarised as "what is different is 
dangerous", and the view credo of people in low uncertainty avoidance cultures as, 
"what is different is curious" (Hofstede, 1991, p. 119). A study by Dawar, Parker, & 
Price (1996) demonstrated the importance of uncertainty avoidance involved in 
information search behaviour. Finally, the results of a study by Money and Crotts 
(2003) were consistent with the expectations that there are differences in between the 
various cultures with respect to the degree of uncertainty avoidance associated with 
the following tourist decision making process. 
6.3.1 External search 
Consumers with higher risk tolerance levels tend to seek information from marketer- 
dominated mass media sources than those with lower risk profile, but only 
significantly in the case of TV and radio advertising and state/city travel offices. Also, 
consistent with expectations, medium UA (Uncertainty Avoidance) consumers from 
Japan sought information from channel members, such as travel agencies, more than 
the high UA group of Germans, indicative of risk avoiding strategy. However, 
contrary to expectations, risk tolerant cultures seek information from personal sources 
more than those are who risk averse. 
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Hofstede (1991; 2001) argues that culture can be divided into four dimensions. 
Uncertainty Avoidance or UA is one among four. Hofstede in his survey divided 
countries and basically culture into three groups of low, medium and high uncertainty 
avoidance. He believes that uncertainty about the future is a basic fact of human life 
with people trying to cope through the domains of technology, law and religion. 
6.3.2Trip planning 
The influence of culture is evident in the way that people plan their trips. 
Significantly, more of the risk-avoiding Japanese respondents purchased some form 
of travel package prior to their trip. Also, the risk-averse group tended to pre-package 
more of the risk-reducing elements of the trip, such as lodging and a guided tour 
experience at the destination. In contrast to this, the more risk-accepting Germans 
included rental cars (a high-risk item because of the possibility of getting lost, 
accident, etc) more than other items in the package. High levels of risk avoidance can 
also be associated with lengthy decision-making processes because of the need to seek 
out more detailed information and to consider it before acting. 
6.3.3 Travel party characteristics 
Travellers tend to experience higher levels of risk perception when travelling alone as 
opposed to travelling in groups. This is consistent with the notions of "safety-in- 
numbers". 
6.3.4 Trip characteristics 
Finally, significant differences between groups have been identified in terms of the 
length of stay on their trips and the number of locations visited. As might be 
predicted, respondents from Germany stayed on average three times as long and 
visited twice as many locations as their Japanese counterparts. In conclusion, the 
Money and Crotts (2003) study results show that consumers from national cultures 
can be characterized by their levels of uncertainty avoidance when using information 
sources that are related to the channel, instead of personal, destination marketing- 
related, or mass media sources; they also more frequently purchase package tours, 
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travel in larger groups, and stay on average a shorter time and visit fewer destinations 
than the relatively higher risk takers. 
6.4 Risk nercention and the Media 
Individuals have most likely always spent a lot of time communicating information 
about risks to the next generation. New technology has, to some extent, made changes 
to this process and the traditional way is no longer the only way to transfer knowledge 
and much of it may come from the mass media (Wahlberg and Sjoberg, 2000). With 
advances in telecommunications technology, many events today are covered live, or 
are covered by amateur video cameras and shown later to worldwide audiences 
(voluntary member of media). Usually, graphic scenes or pictures are presented 
which have profound effects on the perceptions and attitudes of the public. Harbison 
2003 (cited in Taylor 2006, p2) noted: 
This is a worrying development. It means that even the destructive up and downs of 
the past are going to be magnified in the future. 
Media are often believed to be very important for risk perception, but how much of 
the individual's risk perception is really due to the media, which aspects and what are 
the qualities? There is an extensive belief in the risk research community that the 
media is influential in terms of creating and shaping people's risk perceptions 
(Bastide et al. (1989); Keown, 1989 ; Kone and Mullet, 1994, p 24). Some argue that, 
because the media express themselves in a manner that is understandable to the 
reader/listener/watcher, it is the most common source of information. Konheim (1988) 
suggested that most people do not understand and listen to quantitative measures, but 
to qualitative statements. However, Baired (1986) noted that it is hard to predict just 
how much and how often people listen to media. 
According to Kroeber-Riel (1992), within the various descriptive attempts it is 
possible to differentiate three distinct approaches of the media: 
Reinforcement which is where there is a strengthening and confirmation of existing 
attitudes and opinions by means of expressed information. Here the recipient is 
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selective in the information taken in and opposing thoughts are actively avoided 
(Glaesser, 2003). 
Conviction assumes that mass media is in a position to influence the recipient's 
attitudes and opinions contrary to their own views and in a direction desired by the 
media. Nowadays, this approach tends to be mostly rejected. Exceptionally, this effect 
tends to be attributed to themes that indirectly affect the recipient; in other words, 
which have a more general social relevance and the influence tends to be only 
superficial or temporary (Dunwoody and Peters, 1992). 
Agenda setting is really an extension or continuation of the reinforcement approach, 
which is dominant in media research, by making certain events a subject of 
discussion. This is awarded a selection function, which applies, above all, if it 
concerns topic outside the recipient's personal sphere of experience. Once this 
selection takes place, the media structures the themes that are subjects of the 
discussion by assigning to them preferences (Glaeeser, 2003). The difference from 
daily routine is responsible for negative events having an increased communication 
probability and quicker dissemination process. Therefore, the significance of a 
negative event should be rated higher than that of a normal event. 
In one study of risk perception, it was found that actual and perceived amounts of 
technical detail did not correlate (Sandman et al., 1993). The finding from Vallone et 
al. (1985) shows that when there were clear factions to an issue, both sides found the 
mass media coverage to be biased against them. This shows that the perception of 
information draws heavily upon our already existing views. One opinion in the mass 
media that it is not the content that influences people's opinion, but the sheer amount 
of coverage (Mazur and Lee 1993). 
People have the ability to absorb and process information from the media in different 
ways dependent not only upon the individual but also on the way that the media 
covers items. Besides the individual's prior knowledge and opinions about specific 
matters of risk, their political, geographical and technical knowledge can all help them 
organise and assimilate information (Converse 1964 in Norris et al., 2003 and Price 
and Zaller 1993). A study by Soumerai et al. (1992) found that when the mass media 
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(newspaper and magazines) had a peak in their number of articles about the possible 
connection between aspirin and Reye's syndrome, "the incidence of the disease went 
down to almost Zero, and remained that way while the interest of mass media faded". 
What happened was presumably that people reacted to the risk and changed their 
behaviour, i. e. they no longer gave aspirin to youngsters who were suffering from a 
viral disease, the 'at-risk' group. 
Some quasi-experimental studies in this area concerned the question of whether the 
disclosure of a famous athlete being HIV-positive had any effect on people's risk 
perceptions and behaviour. The results were not very encouraging: although interest 
in AIDS and related topics increased sharply as measured for example by calls to 
AIDS hotlines which in some cases remained above baseline for several weeks, 
factual knowledge and personal risk perception remained virtually unchanged. Tylor 
and Rasinski (1984) found that the influence of information and effects related to 
crime were correlated with their perceptions of future risk. One of the difficulties in 
creating a unified framework to understand these issues is that different kinds of mass 
media seem to have different impact (Snyder and Rouse, 1995). 
Beirman argues that media plays an important role in travel patterns because it has the 
ability to form the public's perceptions of a specific destination or issue. Beirmann 
(2003) furthermore added that it is frequent for destination authorities to criticize the 
media for reacting excessively and giving more prominence to incidents than they 
actually warrant. The media tend to be selective: they exaggerate some risks and 
ignore others, "sacrificing objectivity for sensationalism". Johnson and Covello (1987 
in Wahlberg and Sjoberg, 2000, p179) also argue this point by saying that "the media 
engage in selective and biased reporting that emphasizes drama, wrongdoing and 
conflict". In a similar vein, other researchers suggest that the media focus on rare but 
dramatic events because they are spectacular and yet ignore more common and 
serious events that affect people's lives such as road traffic accidents (Soumerai et 
al. (1992). There are numerous other articles where the same view is presented. Many 
of them (Singer and Enderny 1987; Karpowicz-Lazreg and Mullet1993 in Wahlberg 
and Sjoberg 2000) refer to an article by Combs and Solvic (1979) as a proof of this 
bias. 
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Glaesser (2003) suggested that `this is mostly due to invidious comparisons, perhaps 
due to our insatiable appetite for superlatives' because most often, the news media 
make comparisons in their stories such as `the worst terrorist attack against tourists 
since Luxor', thereby keeping the crisis alive. Furthermore, studies of how the 
perpetrators of these acts are labelled (e. g., as "guerrillas, " "terrorists", or 
"insurgents") suggest the selective use of these terms by journalists in ways that 
correspond to the interests of the government (Epstein, 1977). Picard (1988 in 
Traugott and Brader, 2002 page, 3) "describes a three-stage process of coverage of 
extended terrorists actions that begins with an initial emphasis on the detail of 
incidents lasting about two days, followed by an emphasis on government initiated 
reports of how they are responding with an eventual third phase in which background 
reporting may focus on explaining the event". 
The bias in media coverage is evident in all countries and rarely does the superficial 
content of news events give rise to a discussion of the underlying causes and the 
context of the events. Thematic coverage of this sort quickly gives way to a 
continuing focus on episodic detail of the latest development and government 
responses (Iyengar, 1991). In this way the media does not provide for the information 
needs of the population as a whole, leaving it to the more educated to fill in the gaps 
by undertaking further information searches. According to Norris et al. (2003), public 
concern often just mirrors the network news coverage. This, of course, may be turned 
around and it could equally be argued that the news coverage has rightly interpreted 
public opinion! 
In summary, the risk perceptions that travellers hold are based upon a wide variety of 
factors that range from the culture from which they originate, through to the 
environment in which events take place and the nature of events to the way in which 
the media portray the events and keep them alive in peoples' minds. Demographic 
factors such as age, sex, education and religion all play a part in helping us to 
understand the different ways in which people react to different stimuli such as 
terrorist attacks. 
Mass media unquestionably generates awareness and has an influence not only on the 
way in which people react to events but also on the topics that are discussed openly 
and the opinions that people hold. Glaesser (2003) argues that the way in which the 
198 
media bring about real changes in attitudes and opinions depends on a variety of 
factors. These are aspects that are explored later in this thesis when the responses of 
individuals from varying backgrounds, cultures, ages and sex demonstrate their own 
travel risk perceptions to a host of scenarios. The effects of the media were explored 
in the case studies, both in terms of the magnitude of the impact of serious events and 
also the ability of the media to act as a positive force by promoting the positive 
aspects of a destinations following an event. 
A national survey of 1,000 Americans (2003) suggested that nearly two-thirds of 
respondents felt that the media influenced their views on the importance of terrorism 
as a national problem, according to the Jimirro Center for the Study of Media 
Influence at Penn State. They added that: 
"In this case, the media seems to be heightening awareness of a possible danger, but 
without a direct, imminent threat, the reports are not causing Americans to 
significantly change their daily lives, " Major said. "There are several reasons for this. 
First, news stories generally are written with quotes from experts who disagree with 
one another. One expert is quoted as saying that a disaster in imminent and that 
citizens should engage in these specific behaviours to prepare, and then another 
expert is quoted that it is very unlikely that the disaster is actually going to take place. 
"Rather than serving to inform the public about the proper preparations to make, the 
stories leave readers with a sense of ambiguity because even the experts don't agree. 
Furthermore, stories often fail to clearly outline the steps that people need to take to 
prepare for disasters, " 
(http: //www. comm. psu. edu/jimirro/terrorIO-03. html) 
Wahlberg and Sjoberg(2000) argue that `the big problem in the area of risk perception 
and media coverage is to ascertain the causal pathways. There seem to be correlations 
in this area, even though they are unlikely to exceed 0.50, so there is a relationship 
between these two variables. However, it is not clear if the media content affects 
people's perceptions, or are the journalists just writing about what they know people 
already feel are risky activities or is there an interplay'. 
It is not unwise to assume that if a negative event happens it is not easy to conceal and 
this means that businesses and governments should recognise this and know how to 
respond (Glaesser, 2003). 
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Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter was to examine the concept of risk perception in association 
with travel and, in particular, with respect to the leisure traveller. There are a variety 
of risks that may influence the travel decisions of tourists including those relating to 
physical harm, financial loss and the risk of dissatisfaction from their travel 
experience. Whether the occurrence of negative events, natural and man-made, is 
increasing, or whether it is simply that each disaster has a more disturbing impact 
(Grainger and Crouch 2006), or simply that the mass media influences people in terms 
of their perception of risk; the end result is the same: people have become more 
concerned with risk issues when they travel as tourists. The rest of this thesis 
attempts to examine the travel-risk perceptions of people from a variety of age groups, 
ethnic origins, gender and educational levels to see if there are any particular 
correlation that can be measured between these demographics and the levels of travel- 
risk perceptions. The differences in attitude between different types of travel-risk 
perceptions will also be examined. 
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Chapter 7 
Methodology 
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Introduction 
This chapter examines the various methodologies that could be used to explore the 
research hypotheses that underpin this thesis. In so doing, it discusses the advantages 
and disadvantages associated with each method together with an explanation of the 
reasoning behind the methodology chosen. Such an examination not only investigates 
the methodology with respect to the most appropriate tools to be used but also takes 
into account the nature and scope of data variability that is essential for a thorough 
examination of the issues. As mentioned earlier (see the introduction), the over- 
reaching aim of this study is to examine travel risk and travel risk perceptions: a study 
of travel risk perceptions and the effects of incidents on tourism. The main objectives 
of this research are: 
o To examine the literature with respect to travel risk; 
o To determine the effects of major incidents on travel to specific destinations; 
o To explore the differences in recovery time and to attribute such differences to 
factors such as the nature of the incidents or the marketing response of 
destinations; 
o To evaluate the work that has been done in determining risk perceptions; 
o To study the travel risk perceptions of travellers from different backgrounds; 
o To examine the differences between the perceived risks and actual risks of 
specific destinations; 
o To explore the effects of perceived travel risk on future travel (using Delphi 
Technique) 
7.1 Introduction to the methods 
Quantitative research methods were originally developed in the natural sciences to 
study natural phenomena. There are examples of quantitative methods in the social 
sciences including survey methods, laboratory experiments, formal methods (e. g. 
econometrics) and numerical methods such as mathematical modelling( Straub, liefen 
and Boudreau , 2004). 
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Qualitative research methods were developed in the social sciences to enable 
researchers to study social and cultural phenomena. Examples of qualitative methods 
are action research, case study research and ethnography. There are different sources 
for qualitative data such as observation and participant observation (fieldwork), 
interviews and questionnaires, documents and texts, and the researcher's impressions 
and reactions. 
Qualitative survey method started to gain prominence in development projects during 
the 1980s, primarily in response to the drawbacks of questionnaire type surveys, 
which were considered time-consuming, expensive, lacking adequate data and not 
suitable for an in-depth understanding of many issues (Chambers, 1983 and 1994, 
Pretty et al. (1995) in Marsland et al. (2001). This led to a polarisation in collection and 
analysis of information with traditional, quantitative technique on the one hand, and 
qualitative methods, on the other (see Table 7-1). 
The result of this polarisation of approaches and the associated shortcomings was that 
the users of information were often dissatisfied with the quality of data and resulting 
analytical conclusions. At the same time, it was recognised that there are 
areas/interfaces where the two types of approach can benefit from each other, leading 
in turn to the enhanced quality of information which is required for rational decision- 
making at the various stages of project and programme (Marsland et al. ( 2001)). 
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Table 7-1 Common differences between qualitative and quantitative methods* 
Qualitative Quantitative 
Research question What /why? How many'? Strength of 
association 
Approach Feasible: natural setting High controlled: 
Reasoning Inductive 
Hypothesis Generator 
Sampling Purposive(evolving) 
Measurement Researcher as an instrument 
experimental setting 
Deductive 
Testing 
Statistical 
Psychological/physiological 
(inside view) instrument (outside view) 
Data reduction Words/categories/themes Numerical(statistical) 
Data analysis Coding/categorizing/comparing Statistical/inference/statistical 
estimation 
Source: adapted from geocities. com html 
it is important to note that these differences are not absolute and are often a matter of degree. 
The nature of many research topics promotes the adoption of a combined approach 
utilising quantitative and qualitative techniques. This decision tends to be endorsed by 
practitioners in the evaluation field who hold the view that both qualitative and 
quantitative methods contribute to all aspects of evaluate enquiries and can be 
successfully used together (e. g, Cook, 1995). Researchers, who draw attention to the 
overlapping nature of qualitative and quantitative methods, validate this approach 
(Briedenhann and Wickens, 2002). They argue that neither technique is exclusive and 
that it is acceptable for a single study to utilise both approaches (Wickens, 1999, 
How, 1998). 
However, there are those who argue that these two approaches to research are indeed 
separate, each reflecting its own view of social reality (Briedenhann and Wickens, 
2002). Bryman (2004) argues there seems to be two different versions about the 
nature of quantitative and qualitative research, and these two different versions have 
implications in the writer's minds about whether the two can be combined. 
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" An epistemological version, as in the embedded methods argument and the 
paradigm argument, sees quantitative and qualitative research as grounded in 
incompatible epistemological principles. According to this version of their 
nature, multi-strategy research is not possible. 
"A technical version, which is the position taken by most researchers ( current 
research also follows the same direction) gives a greater prominence to the 
strengths of data-collection and data analysis techniques with which 
quantitative and qualitative research are each associated and sees them as 
capable of being fused. 
While quantitative approaches are characterized as having breath, and qualitative as 
having depth, the key is to combine the breadth of one and the depth of the other 
(Carvalho and Whtye 1997; McGee 2000; Kanbur 2001). Combining the two 
approaches allows them to inform each other, to fulfil the specific aims of the study 
and has broad appeal to many researchers, mainly in the socio-economic field. The 
combined approach certainly offers the best route to appropriate data collection and 
analyses when faced with information objectives and constraints in data collection 
and analysis (Marsland et al. (2001)). 
However, whilst having many positive aspects, a combination approach raises a 
number of important issues. The description of the research plan combining 
qualitative and quantitative components includes how the two methods will address 
the research questions and/or hypothesis, how the data will be integrated, and how the 
result will be interpreted, and how the result will be interpreted taking into account 
data from two different paradigms. Each research question should be able to be 
identified and addressed through a specific aspect of the data analysis, and data 
interpretation. The combination of approaches can result in some aspects of the 
research being appropriately addressed whilst leaving other aspects to only superficial 
treatment. Furthermore, according to Marsland et al. (2001), the combined approach 
is often undertaken without adequately identifying the contribution of each method to 
the study problem. 
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Advantages of combining both types of research include 
http: //www. achrn. org/Combining. htm 
" Research development: one approach is used to inform the other, such as using 
qualitative research to develop an instrument to be used in quantitative 
research; 
" Increase validity: confirmation of result by different mean; 
" Complementarity: adding information, i. e. words to numbers and vice versa. 
Some of the main issues relating to combining qualitative and quantitative research 
are: 
" Reaching beyond single method and single studies; 
" Posing the right research question ; 
" Developing strategies for comparing/evaluating different data and for 
reconciling contradictions; 
" Extending learning through a programme of combined methods of research. 
7.1.1 Models for linking qualitative and quantitative approaches 
There are a variety of ways in which qualitative and quantitative methods may be 
combined in order to enhance the reliability of survey and experiment finding. The 
final choice of particular instruments and their combination will be conditional on the 
extent to which they enhance reliability, affect the duration of the study, bring about 
financial implications and the availability of the necessary expertise(Marsland. et al 
. 2001). There are many descriptions of combined approaches available (e. g. 
Hammersley 1996 ; Morgan 1998b) and four forms that were used successfully in a 
single study are shown in Table 7-2. 
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Table 7-2 Four types of combination of survey instrument 
Type of combination Definition 
Methodologically diverse concepts and data are 
Merging/Integrated/Triangulation integrated at each stage within the study design to 
develop a robust understanding and an integrated 
model tends to involve simultaneous data collection 
using both qualitative and quantitative procedure. 
Sequencing The alternative use of both qualitative and quantitative 
approach in data collection. 
Parallel/concurrent Use of selected tools is the simultaneous but separate use 
of qualitative and quantitative approaches during 
information gathering. 
Coordinated sub-studies Qualitative studies contribute under umbrella of larger 
programme project or longer term studies. 
Source: adapted from Marsland et al. (2001) 
In the field of tourism, it is often impossible to describe the details of tourism 
development or the difficulties of political interference in survey research 
(Briedenhann and Wickens, 2002). In such cases, qualitative research is often found 
to be superior to survey research in describing such processes and constraints. 
Surveys are, however, a good way to gather basic data and find out what major 
concerns are present with respect to tourism development. 
The survey usually requires the collection of data on a number of variables at a single 
phase. The purpose of the questionnaire used in this study is to find out relationships 
between people's attitude and behaviour towards risk-taking and a number of 
variables such as each respondent's nationality, gender, education and occupation, age 
band, religion affiliation, number of trips per year and any previous experience of a 
risky situation. In this way it is hoped to understand the relative travel risk perceptions 
that people have towards such events as terrorist acts, crime, health issues and 
satisfaction levels. Furthermore, the relationship between the demographic variables 
and the expressed travel risk perceptions can also be analysed. 
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The study also relies upon a Delphi exercise which takes information gleaned from 
the questionnaire survey and asks renowned experts in the field to comment on the 
results and express their own opinions. 
7.1.2 Sampling 
Sampling issues are naturally practical. Scholarly decisions may be driven in part by 
theoretical concerns, but it is in sampling, perhaps more than anywhere else in 
research, that theory meets the hard realities of time and cost resources. In an ideal 
world, a researcher would have ample access to the entire target population of persons 
in any area of interest with no thought for cost and time. However, in practice this 
rarely happens. Therefore, the researcher is driven to balance issues of coverage of the 
topic of interest with the allocation of limited resources (Kemper et al., (2003) in 
Tashakkori and Teddle, 2003). 
Sampling techniques can be divided into two types: probability sampling and 
purposive sampling (see table 7-3). Purely quantitative studies typically use larger 
samples selected through probability techniques, while qualitative studies typically 
use smaller samples selected through purposive techniques. However, neither 
purposive nor probability sampling techniques are the sole domain of either research 
tradition. 
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Table 7-3 Probability and purposive sampling technique 
Probability Sampling Technique Purposive Sampling "Technique 
1. Simple random sampling 
2. Systematic random sampling 
3. Stratified random sampling 
o Proportional 
o Nonproportional 
4. Cluster random sampling 
1. Convenience sampling 
2. Extreme/deviant case sampling 
3. Confirming/disconfirming cases and 
typical case sampling 
4. Homogenous case sampling 
5. Stratified purposive sampling and 
random purposive sampling and random 
purposive sampling 
6. Opportunistic and snowball sampling 
* Additional purposive sampling techniques are described by Patton (1990) and 
include intensity sampling, maximum variation sampling, critical case sampling, 
criterion sampling, operational construct sampling, and sampling politically important 
cases. 
Source: adapted from (Kemper et al. (2003) in Tashakkori and Teddle, 2003) 
Generally, researchers seek to have a representative sample that can be treated as if it 
were, in fact, the population. However, it is a rarity when complete representative 
samples can be achieved, although the probability of creating a representative sample 
can be significantly enhanced by probability sampling (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). 
There are a few guidelines for the sampling size rather than a specific definition. 
There are of course time and cost restrictions for researchers so the decision on 
sampling size must also consider these limitations. However, the larger the sample, 
the more precise the results. This leads authors such as Bryman and Cramer (2005) to 
state that differences between the sample and the population, because of sampling, 
can be reduced by increasing sampling size. Furthermore, when collecting data, the 
problem of non-response has to be taken into consideration. Finally, it is important 
that the researcher thinks precisely about the type of analysis that is going to take 
place. In other words, if a cross tabulation is going to take place in order to examine 
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the relation between the respondents' nationalities and the risk of food poisoning 
using a5 Likert scale, then a table with n*5 has to be engendered where `n' is the 
number of different nationalities. Therefore, for there to be a sufficient number of 
cases in each cell a reasonably large sample is essential. 
7.1.3 Study design 
This study examines some specific aspects of travel -related risk. In particular, it 
examines the tourists' perception of risk and through this, the likely impact on the 
demand for travel and therefore the tourism industry. The relevant literature was 
examined and reviewed earlier in the study. The review informed and helped refine 
not only the research questions but also the appropriate methodology and primary 
research needs. In this respect the study adopts a hybrid approach combining both 
qualitative and quantitative, using a Sequential Approach (see table 7-2) to methods 
of data collection with a view to minimising the weaknesses of any particular 
approach. In order to answer the research questions, the primary research in this study 
has been designed to utilise questionnaire surveys, the findings of which are 
supplemented by a Delphi exercise to explore further some of the findings from the 
questionnaire survey. 
The exact combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches depends on the 
purpose of the study and the available time, skill and resources. A multi-strategy 
research approach has been chosen because the researcher cannot rely on quantitative 
questions alone and must buttress the finding with the combinations of qualitative and 
quantitative results from the questionnaire survey and then the Delphi exercise. In 
this regard, the questionnaire survey serves as the preliminary method of data 
collection based on quantitative methods of data collection with a relatively large 
sample. The Delphi survey is intended to utilise the experience of relevant experts to 
explore the likely future of travel to high risk places in general and the Middle East in 
particular, finally focusing on Iran as a specific issue. 
The purpose of the questionnaire survey is to gather information on a wide range of 
key variables that identify some generic thoughts and perceptions about travel-related 
risk. Using this information, the researcher can compare the results with the results of 
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the secondary data (literature) analyses in order to establish significant trends and 
relationships with respect to travel-risk perceptions. For instance, the development 
and measurement of people's perceptions about travel risk in order to see the relation 
between people with different backgrounds and their corresponding risk propensities 
will help us understand risk in terms of travel decision making. Similarly, comparison 
of the results relating to individual travel-risk perceptions with previous research into 
country risk awareness indices will help the researcher understand the relative 
strengths of travel-related risk perceptions. The self-completion questionnaire survey 
has been chosen instead of structured interviews because the latter would have been 
considerably more expensive and time-consuming, because of the cost of travel and 
the time needed to undertake the interviews. In other words, it was not practical to 
interview a large sample that is geographically widespread. This research builds on 
previous studies such as that by Fuchs and Reichel with a sample of 760. 
There are different ways of using sequential combinations in mix methods (Maring 
2001) (see Models 7-1). For the purpose of this study, the third model has been 
chosen for the preferred method of data collection. In this model the sequence of 
design components is reversed, that is, a representative quantitative study is followed 
by a small-scale qualitative (Delphi) study. The qualitative findings are meant to 
assist in a better understanding of the meaning of some of the quantitative findings, 
while the quantitative findings feed into to qualitative findings. Quantitative questions 
produce quantifiable responses and qualitative questions ask about risk perception and 
so provide qualitative data. 
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Models 7-1 Macro sequence of combination 
1) Qualitative Quantitative 
Preparatory study to Main study to test 
generate Hypothesis the Hypothesis 
ualitative 
Descriptive case 
studies 
i 
3) Quantitative 
Study with a large 
sample 
Result 
Result 
Result 
Quantitative 
Generalization: 
Linkage analysis 
Qualitative 
Interpretation with a 
selected sample 
Source: Adapted from Mayring (2001) 
The questionnaire was designed to construct a risk index that was focused on 4 
distinct areas of risk perceptions expressed by people from different backgrounds (eg 
nationality... ) as follows: 
0 Physical risk (7 questions) 
" Financial risk (3 questions) 
" Performance risk (7 questions) 
" Socio-cultural risk (3 questions) 
Most of the questions were phrased as statements referring to the tourist's perception 
prior to travel or based on previous travel experiences. For each statement the 
respondent was asked to indicate to what extent lie/she agreed or disagreed with it, on 
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a Likert scale of 5 points. For example, the risk of getting food poisoning is (Q1). 
The respondents were asked to make the choices in relation to the levels of risk they 
would normally feel applied to their situation when not traveling, i. e. the baseline for 
each respondent would be the normal levels of risk they would expect to face at home. 
In this way one might expect people who were normally exposed to low levels of risk 
to respond with higher levels of risk when traveling and those who were normally 
exposed to high levels of risk to be less risk-averse when travelling. To allow the 
respondent some flexibility in response, they were also invited to identify up to three 
countries that they considered to be of high risk in relation to the specific aspect of 
risk they were considering. 
In addition to the 20 questions that measure the various dimensions of tourist 
destination risk perceptions, the questionnaire included three questions that related to 
risk in different continents to explore perceptions by geographical region. These were 
followed by more focused questions relating to countries in the Middle East and 
surrounding areas. Finally, in order to be able to extrapolate from the survey findings, 
the questionnaire included a section of 11 socio-demographic questions such as age 
and religious affiliation (independent variables) (see Appendix 1). These latter data 
will be used to make some general comments from the responses of the sample. 
The first version of 34 questions (including the demographic questions) resulted in a 
four page survey questionnaire (hard copy) that was pre-tested with 25 academic staff 
in the School of Services Management at Bournemouth University. Although this 
was a somewhat biased pilot sample, it facilitated critical feedback so that the 
questionnaire could be honed to remove ambiguities, clarify obscurities, and 
incorporate additional aspects that may have been overlooked in the original version. 
The responses were also helpful in testing out the efficiency of the questionnaire in 
terms of transferring the data to SPSS for analyses. The questionnaire was then 
translated into an online questionnaire which resulted in an expansion of the questions 
from 34 to 62 in order to make the online survey more easily understandable, given 
the limitations of the online software. The pilot sample that completed the hard copy 
questionnaire were also asked to complete the online survey to ensure that there was 
no change in responses. The consistency of the results using the two approaches was 
confirmed. 
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Probability sampling procedures using stratified samples were identified as being 
appropriate for the questionnaire survey. Stratified sampling is a commonly used 
probability method that is superior to random sampling as it reduces sampling error. 
The researcher first identifies the relevant stratums and their actual representation 
within the population. Random sampling is then used to select a sufficient number of 
subjects from each stratum. "Sufficient" refers to a sample size large enough for us to 
be reasonably confident that the stratum represents the population. In this regard, the 
sample size had to be large enough to include as many different people with different 
backgrounds as possible and in sufficient numbers. 
A stratum is a subset of the population that shares at least one common characteristic. 
Characteristic such as nationality, sex, religion, age group and travel party size were 
initially used to divide the population into groups. However, it was ideal to have 
samples that capture the various combinations of these characteristics in numbers that 
reflect their proportions in the travel statistics. In practice, this is a tall order and not 
feasible given the time and cost of undertaking such a survey. Hence, the researcher 
set out to get as many respondents from each nationality as possible in the first 
instance. The sampling frame was drawn from educational institutions inside and 
outside the UK, including language schools in Bournemouth (34) as they have a 
variety of foreign students who come to the UK to learn English, private sector 
organizations from the finance and insurance sectors, local authority personnel and 
other sources to widen the demographic spread. Bournemouth University staff and 
students were also targeted together with religious centres such as mosques, churches 
and synagogues in Bournemouth in order to get as much variety as possible in terms 
of religious affiliation. 
There are different ways of conducting self-completion questionnaires such as 
supervised, postal and internet. However, considering the sampling frame, current 
research mostly used self-completion and internet-based questionnaires seemed most 
appropriate to achieve the numbers and diversity of respondents required. Dependent 
on the target population, both hard and online copies were used. The hard copy was 
taken by hand to schools, colleges and religious organisations in Bournemouth and 
completed either by the researcher or by the respondent while the researcher was 
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present. Some of the language Schools used the questionnaire as an exercise with 
their students, explaining the precise meaning of each question to prevent any bias 
seeping in through language difficulties. The online survey was set up using a täcility 
offered by Bristol University. This manifests itself as a link through the Bournemouth 
University computer server. In order to build risk indices based on the diticrent 
nationalities and backgrounds, such as gender, education and religion, the sample size 
needed to be fairly large and the primary aim of the survey was to achieve 1200 
respondents to get a sufficient number. 
7.1.4 Questionnaire survey analyses using SPSS 
The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) was developed in Stanford 
University and the University of Chicago in the late 1960's, however since then it has 
been used globally for a variety of academic areas. SPSS includes a variety of features 
that enable the user to analyse, manipulate and display the data (Griffith University 
2007). 
Figure 7-1 The analytical process in SPSS 
Source: drive from http: //www. spss. com/spss/analytical process. htm 
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The appropriate statistical test in SPSS is dependent on the many füctors being 
analysed. In choosing which test is appropriate to use, it is important to consider the 
types of variables and the likely nature of the problems being explored. There are 
three types of variables, categorical, ordinal or interval. Categorical data may have 
two or more different categories but there is no natural ordering to the categories, for 
example Q34 in the questionnaire. An ordinal variable is similar to a categorical 
variable; the difference between the two is that there is a clear ordering of the 
variables; an example of ordinal variable is seen in question Q32 of the survey 
questionnaire. An interval variable is similar to an ordinal variable, except that the 
intervals between the values of the interval variable are equally spaced. The only 
example of interval variable in the questionnaire survey is Q49. It is important to 
identify the type variable because statistical computations and analyses assume that 
the variables have specific levels of measurement, for example one cannot calculate 
the average of nationalities as it is categorical. 
Table 7-4 Distribution of variables in the on-line questionnaire 
Ordinal Categorical/ Nominal Interval 
1-40 (all odd 491 
numbers) 44,45,46,47,48,50,51,53,54 
41-42-43- 
52I ....... ........ 
The wide varieties of statistical techniques are divided into two major groups 
Parametric and non- parametric. 
Since the majority of the variables in the questionnaire are either ordinal or 
categorical, the study has used non-parametric tests instead of parametric tests. Non- 
parametric tests are based on the assumption that data distribution is not normal. Non- 
parametric tests usually make fewer assumptions about the types of data and most of 
the non-parametric tests work on the principles of ranking the data. This process 
results in high scores being represented by large rankings and low scores being 
represented by low rankings. Therefore, the analysis is then carried out on the 
rankings rather than the actual data. Some researchers believe that that non-parametric 
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tests have less power than their parametric counterparts. For the purpose of this study 
the following non-parametric tests have been used: 
" Mann-U-Whitney 
9 Kruskal-Wallis Test 
7.1.5 Mann-Whitney Utest for two unrelated samples 
This test compares the number of times a score from a sample is ranked higher than a 
score from other samples. An example in the current study would be to compare the 
responses between males and females with respect to their risk perceptions and if the 
significant level is (p<0.05) then that means there is a statistically significant 
difference between these two cases. This will be explained further in the next chapter. 
7.1.6 Kruskal-Wallis H test for three or more unrelated samples 
The Kruskal-Wallis test is similar to the Mann-Whitney U test in that the cases in the 
different samples are ranked together in one series. It can be used when there are more 
than 2 categories. For example, to see whether there is a difference between people 
from different religious affiliations, in terms of their ranking of questions 1 -to 23 in 
the risk survey. A value of P greater than 0.05 means that there is no significant 
difference and less that 0.05 means there is a significant difference. It is worth 
mentioning that, following the Kruscakall Wallis test, Post hoc tests for the Kruskal- 
Wallis test will be used and to prevent errors the Benferroni Corrections will take 
place, however more details of this procedure will be explained in the next chapter. 
In addition to the non-parametric tests, the study included descriptive tests, principles 
component analysis and factor analyses. These are all discussed in greater depth in 
the analysis chapter. 
7.1.7 Study Limitations 
There is almost no research undertaken which does not have limitations or need 
qualifications applying to its results, and this study is no exception. In the current 
research the main problems encountered relate to the sample and the number of 
responses achieved. There are a number of factors that underlie these problems, 
including: 
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" The number of schools that failed to cooperate; 
" The lack of understanding of English by some of the students (particularly in 
the language schools); 
" Lack of geographical knowledge by some of the respondents; 
" Some of the respondents found the questionnaire too long and so failed to 
participate fully or at all. 
" Technical problems concerned with the launch of the first round of the on-line 
survey that perhaps reduced the number responses; 
" Being female (the researcher) has its own limitations in terms of getting access 
to the population (security... etc); 
" The sample size achieves a wide demographic spread but there is a bias in that 
many are students or academic staff, and many respondents are from the UK 
7.2 Delphi technique 
The Delphi procedure, named after a Greek oracle at Delphi, was developed by Olaf 
Helmer for the RAND Corporation in the U. S. He was reputed to have provided 
visiting Greeks with information about their futures. The technique has been utilized 
and modified for use in a variety of situations for almost fifty years (Lang, 1998). 
Norman Dalkey and Olaf Helmer have been credited with creating the Delphi 
procedure in 1953 in order to forecast a military issue (Lang, 1998). Since its creation, 
the Delphi procedure has been used frequently to make predictions, elicit opinions, 
and seek consensus. 
Adler and Ziglio (1996) describe the Delphi method as a communication process that 
is structured to produce a detailed examination of a topic/problem and discussion 
from the participating group, but not one that forces a quick compromise. Stutter 
(2004) defines the Delphi method as a way to obtain the opinion of experts without 
necessarily bringing them together face to face. Linstone and Turoff (1975) argue that 
the Delphi technique is in essence a series of sequential questionnaire or rounds 
interspersed by controlled feedback, that seek to gain the most reliable consensus of 
opinion of a group of experts. It is a technique that is useful for situations where 
individual judgements must be tapped and combined in order to address a lack of 
agreement or incomplete state of knowledge (Delbecq et al. (1975)). Turoff and Hiltz 
(2003) suggested that the Delphi procedure consists of a series of steps undertaken to 
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elicit and refine the perspective of a group of people who are either in the area of 
focus or representative of the target group (Rothwell and Kazanas, 1997). 
According to Frechtling (1996), the technique is used to acquire information and 
judgments from participants to facilitate problem-solving, planning, and decision- 
making. It does so without physically bringing the participants together. Instead, 
information is exchanged by post, fax, or email between a selected group of experts. 
This technique is designed to take advantage of participants' creativity as well as the 
facilitating effects of group involvement and interaction (Dunham, 1998). Most often, 
this technique is used for forecasting future events or new products. One of the main 
points behind the Delphi method is to overcome the disadvantages of conventional 
committee procedures and processes. According to Garrod and Fyall (2005 in Ritchie 
and Palmer 2005), the Delphi technique is also much admired for its ability to dig 
beneath the surface of issues and to tap into expertise and insight that otherwise might 
not be available to the researcher. According to Fowles (1978) and Rowe and Wright 
(1999), anonymity, iteration, controlled feedback, and statistical response characterize 
Delphi. The group interaction in Delphi is anonymous, in the sense that comments, 
forecasts, and the like are not attributed to their originator but are presented to the 
group in such a way as to prevent any identification. 
Stutter (1998) argues that the goal is a continual evolution to "oneness of mind" 
(consensus means solidarity of belief) the collective mind, the wholistic society, the 
wholistic earth, etc. However, Gordon (1994) noted that the consensus is less 
important for many investigations than previously; now a useful product of the Delphi 
method is crystallization of reasons for dis-sensus. Garodd and Fyall (2005 in Ritchie 
and Palmer, 2005) also added to the list of applications to which the Delphi technique 
may be used. Furthermore, Delphi is now seen as, no more, nor less than a systematic 
means of synthesizing the judgements of experts; the aggregate judgement 
representing a kind of composite expert composed, in the domain of interest, of the 
expertise of all participants. Finally, Row et el. (1991) suggest that for Delphi to be 
useful it should provide more accurate assessment or judgements than those obtained 
either by individual or by interesting group. 
There are three different structures within the Delphi method (Turrof and Hiltz 2003; 
Stitt-Gohdes and Crews, 2004). These include the Policy Delphi Model, the Trend 
Model (Turrof 1970) and the Structural Model (Lendaris 1980; Geoffrin, 1987). The 
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Policy Delphi works toward discovering the strongest pro and con arguments about 
differing resolutions for a specific policy issue. It does not produce a consensus. The 
Trend Model first deals with a specific trend that is of concern to the group, and 
participants project where they believe the trend will go in the next five years. 
Assumptions and uncertainties are listed when making the projections. The 
assumptions are voted on for validity. The participants are later asked to review the 
valid assumptions and re-estimate their earlier trend projections. Structural Modelling 
allows participants individually to express independent relationships/judgements, but 
they are used to produce a group or whole model or system. This is supported by 
Helmer (1977) who notes that the Delphi is a useful communication method among 
an expert panel that in turn facilitates the formation of a group judgement. 
7.2.1 Strengths and weaknesses of the Delphi technique 
Like other research methods, Delphi has both adherence and critique . The feedback 
between rounds can widen knowledge and stimulate new ideas and in itself be highly 
motivating (Phil, 1971 in Powell 2002) and educational (Stokes 1997 in Powell 2002) 
for the participants. Murphy et al. (1998) noted that Delphi participants bring a wide 
range of direct knowledge and experience to be the decision-making processes, while 
Jones et al. (1992) remark on the benefit of few geographical limitations. Stewart 
(2001) stated: 
"Its( Delphi) capacity to capture those areas of collective knowledge that are held within 
professions but not often verbalized, make it enormously useful in thefield of professional 
education"(p. 922 ). 
The Delphi has been described as a quick (Everret 1993), cheap (Jones et al. (1992) 
and relatively efficient way to combine the knowledge and abilities of a group of 
experts (Lindman 1975). Not everyone would agree with this. Jairath and Weinstein 
(1994) and Williams and Webb (1994) argue that extensive time commitment is 
needed. However, as with any other survey, duration and the cost of survey will be 
related to the scale of survey. 
The Delphi reduces the effect of dominating individuals (the status problem) and 
allows the group to share responsibility. Shared responsibility helps facilitate the 
development of consensus. Shared responsibility also promotes satisfaction through 
participation in and ownership of the resulting decision(s). Controlled feedback 
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through several rounds of the procedure reduces direct confrontation and the 
disadvantages that conflict leads to-quickly accepting or dismissing other opinions, 
focusing on personalities rather than the issues at hand, or closing-off discussion of 
novel or different ideas are recognized as serious problems for interacting groups 
(Lang, 1998). Linstone and Turoff (1975) suggest that the Delphi procedure is 
advantageous in situations where input is needed from more individuals than can 
effectively meet face-to-face; distance, time, and cost prevent frequent meetings; 
severe or politically unacceptable disagreements or power struggles are anticipated; 
communication barriers exist. They suggest that a particularly compelling reason to 
use the Delphi is when the nature of the needed data does not lend itself to 
quantitative analysis and can benefit from subjective judgments. 
Statistical group response, or the tallying of each participant's valuation of the Delphi 
responses, ensures that each person's opinion is reflected in the final response. This 
contributes to the shared responsibility for not only the outcome of the Delphi, but 
also in the process, that eventually provides the outcome. Lindeman (1975), 
furthermore, adds that Delphi's systematic control lends an air of objectivity to the 
outcome and provide a sharing responsibility that is both reassuring and releases the 
participants from group inhibition. McKenna (1994) noted that Delphi may best be 
viewed as a useful communication tool to generate debate, rather than reach a 
conclusion. 
Turoff and Hiltz (1996) identify additional advantages of the Delphi in enabling 
individuals with "differing perspectives and differing cognitive abilities to contribute 
to those parts of a complex problem" for which they have the prerequisite knowledge 
and skills and providing flexibility in the way individuals approach the questions. 
They state that the single most important criterion in the design of a Delphi structure 
is the provision to enable individuals "to choose the sequence in which to examine 
and contribute to the problem solving process". They further added that "a person 
may choose to participate in the group communication process when they feel they 
want to". Powell (2002) argues that the main advantage of the Delphi is reported to be 
the achievement of consensus in a given area of uncertainty or lack of empirical 
evidence (Delbecq et al. (1975), Dawson and Barker 1995, Murphy et al. (l998)). 
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Anonymity is an important Delphi technique characteristic. Without the identification 
of those contributing information or making specific judgment, candor may be 
increased. Anonymity of respondents can reduce the potential for peer pressure, 
organisational allegiances or personalities to enter into the respondents' judgmental 
process. This means that the issues involved are more likely to be judged on their 
intrinsic merit alone, minimising the potential for outside influences to enter the 
respondent's complex and often controversial judgments. This iteration process gives 
respondents several `bites at the cherry' enabling them to think more deeply about the 
issues at hand, to revisit the problems, and ultimately to apply their expertise. 
Individuals are at liberty to change their minds from their initial view, and are able to 
do so without fear of losing face in the eyes of other experts in their field (Row and 
Wright, 1999 in Ritchie and Palmer, 2005, p. 86). Turoff and Hiltz (1996) cite these 
advantages of anonymity: 
" If a participant provides an idea/suggestion/judgement and in the end it 
deemed unsuitable, no one loses face; 
" When a participant commits his/her name to an idea/suggestion/judgment, it is 
harder to reject/change it later; 
" The idea/suggestion/judgment may be biased by who introduced it if 
anonymity is not used. 
The Delphi also has a number of limitations. Inappropriate choice of the Delphi 
techniques as a research tool may result in research failure. 
Gordon (1994) suggested that Delphi studies are difficult to perform well. A great 
deal of attention must be given to the choice of participants; the questionnaires must 
be meticulously prepared and tested to avoid ambiguity. 
Delphi needs highly motivated participants. The quality of responses depends upon 
the interest and motivation of the participants. Multi round studies require a great 
deal of time: inevitably, some participants will drop out during the process (Gordon 
1994). 
Linstone and Turoff (1975) outline potential problems which may lead to 
dissatisfaction and drop out. These include the imposition of constraints on the views 
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of the participants by excessive structuring of the Delphi questionnaires, failure to 
take disagreements and divergent views into account in subsequent rounds, and 
failing to compensate participants adequately for their work. 
Sackman (1975) noted that the consensus approach may lead to a watered down 
version of the best opinion, while Rennie (1981, in Powell 2002) expressed concern 
that the method generated only bland statements that represented the lowest 
common denominator. 
Armstrong (1978) and Woudenberg (1991) discuss the difficulty in assessing the 
accuracy and reliability of a method that has judgment and opinion as its basis. 
Martino (1978) underlines the fact that Delphi is a method of last resort in dealing 
with extremely complex problems for which there are no adequate models. 
Other potential limitations of the Delphi procedure may be the biases introduced by 
the methods used to selected participants, design questionnaires, and process results. 
Lang (1998) suggests that selecting as diverse a group as possible may minimize bias 
due to non-random selection of participants. However, Turoff and Hiltz (1996) point 
out that the very reason for using the technique may be to elicit the opinions of a 
small, select group of experts with little diversity. In the instructional development 
process, there may be increased opportunity to minimize bias by selecting a larger 
group of more diverse participants. 
In addition, participants' responses may be interpreted differently than intended or 
valued differentially by the investigator. Makridakis and Wheelright (1978) 
"summarize the general complaints against the Delphi method in terms of (a) a low 
level reliability of judgements among experts and therefore dependency of forecasts 
on the particular judges selected; (b) the sensitivity of results to ambiguity in the 
questionnaire that is used for data collection in each round; and (c) the difficulty in 
assessing the degree of expertise incorporated into the forecast". 
Inclusion as one of the "experts" may be a motive for a participant to be involved, a 
prestige motive. Other authors have noted that participants are motivated through 
opportunities to interact with others with similar interests and benefit from the 
information generated (Turoff and Hiltz, 1996; Lang, 1998). 
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Imposing the researcher's own views and preconceptions towards a problem can bias 
the respondent group through the scenarios painted at each round and not allowing for 
the proper contribution of others to the problems.. Finally, it is easy to underestimate 
the demanding nature of a Delphi. Participants should be properly recognized as 
consultants and properly compensated for their time if the Delphi is not a part of their 
job function (Linston and Turoff, 1975). 
7.2.2 The rationale for the Delphi technique 
The researchers are often faced with a situation in which outside parties have 
conflicting views on a topic under study. The Delphi technique is widely recognized 
as a consensus building tool, which has been applied as a means of cognition and 
inquiry in variety of fields. Gamon (1991) believes that the Delphi technique is 
particularly suited for evaluation which focuses on the identification of problems and 
their possible solutions. 
Delphi is particularly appropriate when decision-making is required in a political or 
emotional environment, or when the decisions affect strong factions with opposing 
preferences (Cline, 2000). The technique is recommended in evaluation studies when 
conflicts between stakeholders are disruptive, which can become interpersonal and 
derail the focus of study (Patton, 1997, p151). 
However, before deciding whether or not the Delphi method should be used, it is very 
important to consider the context within which the method is to be applied (Delbecq 
et al. (1975)). A number of questions need to be asked before deciding whether TO 
select or rule out the Delphi technique (Adler and Ziglio, 1996): 
" What kind of group communication process is desirable in order to explore the 
problem at hand? 
" Who are the people with expertise on the problem and where are they located? 
" What are the alternative techniques available and what results can reasonably 
be expected from their application? 
Only when the above questions are answered can one decide whether the Delphi 
method is appropriate to the context in which it will be applied. Adler and Ziglio 
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(1996) claim that failure to address these questions may lead to inappropriate 
applications of Delphi. 
Typically, one of the following leads to the need for using the Delphi (Stitt-Gohdes 
and Crews, 2004): 
" The problem does not lend itself to precise analytical techniques but can 
benefit from subjective judgment on a collective basis; 
" More individuals are needed than can effectively interact in a face -to -face 
exchange; 
" Time and cost make frequent group meetings infeasible; 
" Disagreements among individuals are so severe or politically unpalatable that 
the communication process be referred and/or anonymity assured; 
" The heterogeneity of the participants must be preserved to assured validity of 
the result, i. e. avoidance of domination by quantity or by strength of 
personality (Linstone &Turoff, 1975 in Stitt-Gohdes and Crews, 2004). 
The Delphi is an enabling mechanism whereby disparate and potentially conflicting 
opinions and hostile attitudes can be incorporated and dealt with. This approach 
seemed to be very suitable for the study in hand since tourism in Iran (Middle East) is 
encapsulated in a complex political environment. The Delphi is looking at predictions 
that are driven by risk. Risk is assessed by independent judgements of experts - it is 
ideal for this as it allows the collection of a wide range of independent judgements 
and enables one to gain: 
9A combined assessment of the risk; 
"A composite view about speed of recovery; 
A composite set of assumptions used by different experts. 
7.2.3 How to conduct the Delphi techniques 
Powell (2002) noted that many studies demonstrate some degree of interpretation and 
flexibility. A classic Delphi survey follows a prescribed set of procedures that reflect 
both behavioural and statistical processes. Linstone & Turoff (1975) suggested that 
there are four individual phases in the Delphi process. 
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" The first explores the subject being researched, giving participants the 
opportunity to contribute information they feel is appropriate. 
" The second phase moves to determine an understanding of how the entire 
group views the issues. 
" The third phase is used to explore disagreement and determine reasons for 
differences. 
" The fourth phase is a final evaluation of all gathered information (Linston& 
Turoff, 1975). 
Typically, three rounds of questionnaires are sent to the expert panel although the 
decision over the number of rounds is largely pragmatic (Jones et al. 1992). Row 
(1994) noted that the first round questionnaire is usually unstructured and seeks an 
open response. This allows the participants relatively free scope to elaborate on the 
topic under investigation. A qualitative analysis of the result is then undertaken and 
this provides the basis on which to construct the second round and subsequent 
questionnaires. Powell (2002) believes that the role of the first round is to identify 
issues to be addressed in later rounds. Open-ended questions are recognized to 
increase the richness of the data collected. However, alternative approaches are 
widely found in the Delphi literature. 
The second and subsequent rounds are more specific, with the questionnaire seeking 
quantification of earlier findings, usually through rating or ranking techniques. 
Because the researcher feeds back results from previous rounds, there tends to be 
convergence to a consensus of opinion. Jairath and Weinstein (1994) and Murphy et 
al. (1998) describe the process of feedback to participants as paramount, since this is 
the only communication between them. As noted earlier, however, there is a 
possibility of more than three rounds, but there is need to balance time, cost and 
possible participant fatigue (Jones et al. (1992); Rowe 1994; Hassan et al. (2000). 
Turoff and Hiltz (2003) noted that the particular objectives of Delphi design are also 
characterised by two practices commonly applied to Delphi studies. First, it should be 
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clear to the respondents that they do not have to respond to every question, but can 
decide to take a no judgement view. Secondly, one usually solicits the respondent's 
confidence in their judgement, particularly when they are quantified judgements. This 
has been found to improve the quality of the estimates made in Delphi exercises 
(Dalkey 1970). Successful use of the Delphi involves a communication procedure 
through which information /feedback/opinion is obtained from the participants. The 
following (see Table 7-5) summarizes stages proposed by Beech (1999): 
Table 7.5 Summary stages of the Delphi technique 
1. Selection of panel (responders) and allocation of identification numbers; 
2. Construction and distribution of first questionnaire (Round One). Completion 
and return of Round One questionnaire; 
3. Collation and categorization of suggestions and construction of second 
questionnaire (Round two); 
4. Distribution of second questionnaire (Round Two). Completion and return of 
round Two questionnaire; 
5. Construction of third questionnaire ( Round Three) which is similar to Round 
Two incorporated; 
6. Distribution of third questionnaire (Round Three). Completion and return of 
Round Three questionnaire ; 
7. Recollection of individual and group scores for each suggestion; 
8. Achievement of group consensus with calculation of summary statistics: 
maximum, minimum, and range of score for each suggestion; 
9 Distribution and use of finding. 
Fowles (1978) also proposed a similar process. Continuation of the process could be 
repeated if desired. The Coordinator performs iterations of the preceding process 
until it becomes clear that no new ideas are emerging and that all strengths, 
weaknesses and opinions have been identified (Dunham, 1998). 
7.2.4 Panel selection 
The structuring of group communications is an essential component of the Delphi. 
The contributions of individuals, through this technique, are able to produce a group 
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view which is not normally achievable (Stitt-Gohdes and Crews, 2004). Critical to 
this communication process are four factors: "some feedback of individual 
contributions of information and knowledge; some assessment of the group judgment 
or view; some opportunity for individuals to revise views; and some degree of 
anonymity for the individual responses" (Linstone and Turoff, 1975, p. 5 & Rowe and 
Wright, 1999). 
In selecting the most appropriate research tool, however, Linstone and Turoff (1975) 
caution the researcher to consider the circumstances surrounding the "necessarily 
associated group communication process" (p. 6). They suggest these guiding 
questions: "who is it that should communicate about the problem, what alternative 
mechanisms are available for the communication, and what can we expect to obtain 
with these alternatives" (p. 6). Wheeler et al. (1990) argue that the Delphi panel needs 
to be balanced in terms of the successive rounds of the study. Gibbs, Graves and 
Bernas (2001) in their study of evaluation guidelines for multimedia software used 
these criteria to determine who should be selected and invited to participate: 
" Participants had published articles in the last five years on computer-based 
courseware design, development, or evaluation; 
" Participants had taught courses about the topic; or 
" Participants' primary employment responsibilities related to these areas (p. 4). 
Powel (2003) suggested that heterogeneous rather homogenous groups produce a 
higher proportion of high quality, highly acceptable solutions (p379). To motivate 
participants to remain active and complete all the rounds in a Delphi study, it is 
important that they understand the goal of the study and feel they are a part of the 
group. The participants must also believe they are able to contribute valuable 
judgments and help examine the problem via discussion with their peers (Stitt-Gohdes 
and Crews 2004). 
It is clear that there is wide variation in numbers of participants. Reid (1988), for 
example, noted panel size ranging from 10 to 1685. Turoff and Holtz (2003) noted 
that Delphi commonly applied to a group of 30 to 100 individuals. Guidance 
suggested that numbers of participants would vary according to the scope of the 
problem and resource available (Delberg et al. (1975), Fink et al. (1991), Hassan et al. 
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(2000) in Powell, 2002). Gordon (1994) noted that most studies use panels of 15 to 
35 people. The length of the list should anticipate an acceptance rate between 35 and 
75 percent. Murphy et al. (1998) believe that the more participants there are, the 
better, suggesting that as the number of judges increases, the reliability of a composite 
judgement increases. However, they also comment that: 
"There is very little actual empirical evidence on the effect of the number of participants on 
the reliability or validity of consensus process". (p. 37) 
Smith (1995) suggests that the panel size should be determined by the number of 
experts available, which is typically 40 to 50, but adds that successful Delphi studies 
have been conducted with as few as four and as many as 904 panellists . Powell 
(2002) argues that the Delphi does not call for expert panels to be representivative 
samples for statistical purposes. Representativeness, it seems, assessed on the 
qualities of the expert panel rather than its numbers. Turoff and Hiltz (2003) 
suggested that is a good Delphi survey attempts to tackle the problem from many 
different perspectives. Sometimes this referred to as including questions in the Delphi 
survey which approach the problem both from the "bottom -up" and from the "top- 
down" perspectives. 
For this study the Delphi Panel was constructed from a group of eminent tourism 
experts who have achieved international reputations relating to tourism, tourism 
development and/or tourism in the Middle East. Because the panel was to be used to 
both ratify the findings from the questionnaire survey and then to move on to examine 
tourism development in the Middle East, it was felt that a relatively small Delphi 
Panel could be used. 
7.2.5 Analvsine the findings 
A method of data analysis appears to vary according to the purpose of the Delphi 
study, structure of the rounds, types of questions and numbers of participants (Powell, 
2002). Typically, content analysis techniques are used to identify major themes 
generated by the initial unstructured questionnaire. These are then translated into a 
structured questionnaire that forms the basis of the following rounds. Second and 
subsequent round data, being questionnaire in nature, are analysed using ranking or 
rating techniques (Jairath and Weinstein, 1994). Third and subsequent rounds should 
indicate to participants the central tendency and dispersion of scores from the 
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previous round. A means of showing the dispersion of scores is important, as a bi- 
modal distribution would demonstrate a lack of consensus that might otherwise be 
hidden. Participants should also be given an indication of where their score was 
placed in relation to the overall picture. The opportunity to revise previous scores in 
light of this is an important element in the move towards consensus (Powell et al. 
2002). 
The Delphi provides different opportunities to researchers to researcher than survey 
research. Essential components of the Delphi technique include the communication 
process, a group of expert, and essential feedback (Stitt-Gohdes and Crews, 2004). 
The technique benefits from being a democratic and structured approach that 
harnesses the collective wisdom to participants (Powel, 2003, p181). Its most 
significant strength lies in the ability to garner opinion and seek consensus among a 
diverse group of participants. 
7.2.6 Identifvin2 sampling technique, population and sample 
There a number of approaches that could be taken in order to capture as much 
information as possible whether qualitative or quantitative, and it is dependent on 
what the research is intended to achieve. This research has taken a stratified 
purposive sampling, where selection is targeted to be representative of each 
continental base in terms of the level of development, to find out if there are any 
significant differences in attitudes and perceptions between people coming from 
different cultures and income levels in the different continents. According to the 
definition of the technique, it involves purposefully selecting target populations into 
strata (e. g., above average, average, below average) with the goal of discovering 
elements that are similar or different across the subgroups. 
7.2.7 Selection of Academics 
The academics have a significant role as a primary source of data collection for this 
study. This is because, as mentioned earlier, the Delphi technique will take place after 
the questionnaire survey and academics will be chosen from the preliminary list of 
academics from the questionnaire surveys for Delphi technique. The nominators were 
identified from: 
a) The International Academy for the Study of Tourism (IAST); 
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b) Annals of Tourism Research. 
However, many of those who were selected are in the current study of the literature. 
7.2.8 International Academy for the Study of Tourism (LAST) 
The IAST is incorporated as a non-profit corporation with its official headquarters in 
the School of Hotel and Tourism Management, The Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University, and Hong Kong. 
The goal of the Academy is to further the scholarly research and professional 
investigation of tourism. Related objectives include: (a) encouraging the application 
of tourism research findings and (b) advancing the international diffusion and 
exchange of knowledge about tourism. Its membership is comprised of 74 (founding 
members and members) highly accomplished tourism researchers from throughout the 
world. 
7.2.9 Annals of Tourism Research 
Annals of Tourism Research is a social sciences journal focusing upon academic 
perspectives on tourism. While striving for a balance of theory and application, 
Annals is ultimately dedicated to developing theoretical constructs and new 
approaches which further an understanding of tourism. Its strategies are to invite and 
encourage offerings from various disciplines; to serve as a forum through which these 
may interact; and thus to expand the frontiers of knowledge by contributing to the 
literature on tourism social science. To perform its role in the development of a 
theoretically integrated and methodologically enriched multidisciplinary body of 
knowledge on tourism, Annals publishes manuscripts dealing with various aspects of 
this phenomenon. Papers on anthropological, business, economic, educational, 
environmental, geographic, historical, political, psychological, philosophical, 
religious, sociological, inter alia, aspects of tourism (including conceptual essays, case 
studies, and industry -oriented expositions) may be submitted. Purely descriptive 
manuscripts which do not contribute to the development of knowledge are not 
considered suitable. 
There are more than 100 editorial board members of Annals of Tourism Research. 
However, some of them are also members of IAST and among them are some whose 
work has been used in the literature. 
231 
7.2.10 Delphi methodology (sampling, rounds and analyses) 
The sampling method that has been adopted is a stratified purposive sampling, as 
explained earlier in countries selection. It has been decided to select four candidates 
from each region as follows: 
1. Both from IAST and Annual equally( if its possible); 
2. Select four more as reserves candidates in case some of the earlier ones 
selected chose to decline; 
3. Furthermore, it has been tried to choose people whose PhD was achieved in 
the same country in which they work, geographical area of research and area 
of research. 
Initially 49 participants were selected; all the three rounds of the survey took the form 
of a letter dispatched by email from 2 March 2007 to May 2007. In the first round the 
letter elucidated the objective of the study and the number of rounds in brief and 
anonymity was guaranteed and, finally and most importantly, asked them if they were 
willing to participate. It also explained that their contribution would be very important 
for this research. 
Analysing the responses does not require complex statistical tests. The percentage of 
the responses in the frequency table has been taken into account to summarise the 
responses. Theses were sent to panellists and they were asked to revise their decision 
if they so wished. However, because there are two sets of scores to compare from the 
same participants the non-parametric test of Wilcoxon Signed-rank is used because a 
non parametric test is needed as the data distribution is not normal and the variables 
are not interval data. The test will show if the ranking by each panellist has changed 
significantly between each two rounds. The detail of analysis and the finding of the 
Delphi will be explained in chapter 9. 
Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the methods that were used in colleting data, the reasoning 
behind them, and the limitations of data collections. It explained that this study uses a 
hybrid method of data collection starting with quantitative survey or quantitative 
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method of data collection and concluding with a qualitative method using the Delphi 
technique. It also explained the process of the data collection for the current study. 
The next chapter will go through the questionnaire, the tests tliat have been used to 
analyse the data, and the analysis itself and the final product of the questionnaire 
survey. 
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Chapter 8 
Questionnaire analysis 
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Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the methodology used to undertake this study. This 
chapter focuses on the first part of the data collection (questionnaire survey) and 
explains various methods that have been utilised to analyse the data in more detail and 
the outcomes of the questionnaire survey. 
8.1 A brief to the questionnaire 
A total of 781 questionnaires were completed, 322 male respondents (41.2%) and 427 
(56%) female respondents. The ages range from 16 to over 60 years old, as shown in 
table 8-1. The respondents were asked to register their perceptions on 124 different 
aspects of travel-related risks and to identify their demographics. The largest category 
of respondents was students (a bias introduced because of the way in which the data 
were collected) and the most frequently identified nationality was British (again 
because of the manner in which the data were collected). More than 70% of 
respondents travelled more than once a year and only 2% of the respondents travelled 
less than once per annum. In terms of their marital status and age groups, 62% of 
respondents were single while the largest age category (48%) was people between the 
ages of 18 and 29. 
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Table 8-1 Descriptive difference of respondents in terms of demographics 
Age in band Frequency Percentage 
18< 76 9.7 
18-29 377 48.3 
30-39 127 16.3 
40-49 79 10.1 
50-59 73 9.3 
60+ 76 3.5 
Missing 22 2.8 
Gender 
Male 322 41.2 
Female 427 56.0 
Missing 22 2.8 
Marital statues 
Married 195 25 
Single 490 62.7 
Other 73 9.3 
Missing 23 2.9 
Number of annual travels(X) 
X=0 17 2.2 
X>=2 399 51 
2<X<=5 242 31.1 
5<X<=10 49 27 
X>10 22 38 
Missing 52 6.7 
Occupation 
Student(1) 442 56.6 
Employee(2) 75 9.7 
Teacher(3) 151 19.3 
Manager(4) 57 7.3 
Retired(5) 14 1.8 
Business(6) 13 1.7 
Missing 28 3.6 
Education 
Primary 28 3.6 
Secondary 166 21.1 
Degree 313 40.1 
Postgraduate 239 31 
Missing 50 6.4 
Region 
Africa 8 
North Africa 11 1.4 
Latin America 12 1.5 
Europe 544 69.7 
Asia 101 12.9 
Middle east 55 7 
Missing 50 6.4 
Religion 
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Christian 356 45.6 
Jewish 5 0.7 
Islam 74 10 
Other 33 4.4 
Not affiliate with any formal 275 37 
religion 
Missing 38 4.9 
8.2 Analyses 
The first step undertaken was to build an index of people's risk perceptions on the 
basis of the mean of 20 questions that measure overall destination perception risk. A 
Cronbach's alpha test was employed to ensure the reliability of the index for overall 
risk perceptions. The Cronbach's alpha test, over all risk questions, was 0.8962 and it 
should be noted that deleting one of the questions did not significantly improve the 
alpha score. 
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Table8-2 Questions measuring destination risk perception and Cronbach's Alpha 
results(N=78 1) 
Types of risks Mean Alpha if item 
deleted 
The risk of getting food poisoning is... 2.96 . 89 
The risk of having health problems is.. 3.07 . 891 
The risk of being involved in a natural disaster (eg 
earthquake/Storm) is... 
2.78 
. 890 
The risk of getting injured in an accident (eg car, bus,... ) is... 3.05 . 890 
The risk of crime (theft, robbery, and pickpocket) is... 3.46 . 890 
The risk to me by acts of terrorism is... 2.90 . 
891 
The risk of being exposed to danger due to political unrest (civil 
unrest) is... 
2.76 
. 888 
The risk of not getting good value for money is... 3.06 . 895 
The risk of incurring unexpected expenses is... 3.31 . 
893 
The risk of suffering as a result of credit card fraud is... 3.07 . 891 
The risk of experiencing poor weather is... 2.99 . 
896 
The risk of having to put up with poor hotel accommodation is... 3.10 . 891 
The risk that the place will be overcrowded is... 3.19 . 892 
The risk that I will not like the food is... 2.78 . 893 
The risk that my travel will be disrupted because of possible 
industrial action/strikes (eg at the airport, railways, buses)is... 
2.94 
. 890 
The risk that the tourist facilities will not be acceptable(eg beach ) 2.71 . 890 is... 
The risk that the local population may not be friendly is... 2.68 . 889 
The risk that my trip might change my own behaviour is... 2.54 . 
892 
The risk that my code of dress and behaviour will not be well 
received by the local people is... 
2 62 990 
The risk of not being able to communicate with local people 
(language) is... 30 . 893 
Note: a reliability coefficient of . 70 or 
higher is considered "acceptable" in most Social 
Science research situations(field, 2005) 
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Graph 8-1 Questions measuring destination risk perception 
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Following on from developing an index on the basis of the overall risk, it is useful to 
construct a second index that utilises the higher 4 and 5 rankings for each question. In 
this way, the higher perceptions of risk can be compared with the mean, to look for 
any significant differences. The results are shown in the following graph and in the 
majority of the cases the rankings are quite similar to those derived when using the 
mean measurement. Both results show that crime has the highest mean (Graph 8-1) 
and most frequent 4 and 5 answer(Graph 8-2), while the risk of terrorism, in spite of 
what one might have expected from the literature, took l1 "' place and people seem to 
be more concerned about financial risks than any other form of risk. It may be 
because people are not actually presented with the actual imminent danger of 
terrorism or because people mostly see the terrorism in the media as more likely to 
affect other people "third person effect" than them (Duck and Mullin 1995). 
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Graph 8-2 Destination risk perception 
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8.2.1 Non-parametric tests 
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The next step was to examine the relationship between the demographic variables and 
the way in which people responded to each of the questions. It was also felt to be 
prudent to see how previous experience can actually make a significant difference to 
the way that people perceive travel-related risks. This latter line of enquiry being 
based on the assumption that people who have had unpleasant experience(s) are more 
aware and wary of such risks than people who have not previously had such negative 
experiences. 
The data were analysed to determine whether gender influenced the perceived level of 
risk in each of the risk areas. This analysis looked to see if there is any difference in 
the ranking of perceived risk levels between men and women. The results of the 
Mann U Whitney test are shown in Table 8-3. It can be seen that, in all cases, there 
was a significant relationship in half of the cases which means at alpha (significance 
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level) p=0.05 the null hypothesis was rejected in each case. There Ihre, it can he 
concluded that observed differences between groups is of statistical significance and 
so there is a difference between the genders, with women being identified as having 
the higher levels of perceived risk. In other words, there is evidence that females are 
more concerned about travel risks than their male counterparts (See Table 8-3) . 
This 
finding supports what had been uncovered during the analysis of the literature where 
studies such as that by Lepp and Gibson (2003) revealed that women perceived a 
greater degree of risk regarding health and food. Wandel (1994) also found that there 
is a difference between males and females, but only about the "fat issue" where, not 
surprisingly, women seemed more concerned than men. 
Table 8-3 Mann- Whitney U test for destination risk perception and Gender 
ýVIVYIýPýYIVIIIIýVIIrYýIýVIVýIIYIIý'ý -. '.. ý". ý""ý" 
Types of risks Male Female MUW z P<0.05 
The risk of getting food 328.47 381.64 53363.500 -3.526 0.0004 
poisoning is: 
The risk of being 
involved in natural 
disaster 
The risk of terrorism 
The risk of being 
exposed to danger due to 
political unrest 
The risk of place being 
over crowded 
The risk that I will not 
like the food 
The risk of possible 
industrial action 
The risk that tourist 
facilities will not be 
acceptable 
The risk of my code of 
dress not being received 
by the local people 
The risk of not being 
able to communicate 
with local people 
328.86 387.79 
327.02 391.03 
338.51 369.83 
334.95 379.06 
347.43 379.60 
339.48 375.77 
340.28 378.58 
339.59 375.70 
343.19 374.06 
53637.000 -3.854 0.0001 
53116.000 -4.193 0.0000 
5651 1.500 -2.071 0.0393 
55435.000 -2.979 0.0028 
59459.500 -2.106 0.0352 
56806.500 -2.430 0.0150 
57096.500 -2.564 0.010 
56839.500 -2.375 0.0175 
58009.000 -2.. 030 0.0423 
However, when undertaking Mann U Whitney tests, the results indicated that there 
were no statistical differences between the genders in terms of their perceptions of 
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financial and crime risk. Indeed further examination of the data relating to those who 
had responded at either the 4 or 5 level ratings shows that there was only one aspect 
that demonstrated a significant difference between the genders, that being the risk of 
overcrowding at the 5 level where female respondents appear to be more concerned. 
Research by others also revealed gender differences with respect to environmental 
concerned, with females tending to show more concern and behavioural adjustment 
(e. g., Zelenzy, Chua and Aldrich in Hunter et al. (2004)). This could also explain why 
there is a significant difference between males and females, where females seem more 
concerned with cultural risks in the Middle East, or why females see Iran and Saudi 
Arabia as more risky than males. The restrictive policies towards females make them 
think that they will have to sacrifice some of their civil liberties to go there. 
Furthermore, it shows that even if there was no war in the Middle East or political 
tension (claimed to be the main reasons for damaging the pull factor of the region) the 
cultural barriers can also harm the image of the region where perhaps attracting 
family or females is far more challenging. 
Table 8-4 shows the results of the analysis of differences between the marital status of 
respondents and their perceptions of destination risk. To test whether there are any 
differences between marital status and the way people perceived risk, the Kruskal 
Wallis Test was applied. 
Table 8-4 Kruskal-Wallis for the destination risk perception and marital status 
The risk of suffering credit Married 393.36 7.959 0.011) 
card fraud is : Single 350.14 
Other 396.73 
The risk that I will not like Married 326.11 9.292 0.010 
the food is: Single 378.11 
Other 382.47 
The risk of my code of Married 331.32 6.306 0.043 
dress not being received by Single 373.65 
the local people is: Other 344.10 
The identification of a significant p-value in Kruskal Wallis is not, on its own, 
sufficient to demonstrate this relationship. A significant p-value only shows that the 
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mean rankings are not equal (i. e., rejects the null hypothesis); it does not, on its own, 
say which mathematical means are significantly different from which other ones. 
Therefore, to examine the numbers more fully, so that it is able to establish where the 
significant differences are, it is necessary to undertake a post hoc test that allows the 
production of multiple comparisons between means of a factor. These comparisons 
are usually not planned at the beginning of the study but are suggested by the data 
during the course of study for dependent variables. 
Following the Kruskal Wallis test, the Mann-Whitney test was applied to each pair of 
groups and adjusted a value with an approximation to the Bonferroni method. The 
Bonferroni adjustment is simply to multiply the p value by the number of paired 
comparisons being made before deciding if it is significant or not. For the current data 
there are three groups, the pair comparison was taken for all three groups and if there 
was a p<0.05 then p had to be multiplied by the number of pairs and if the p value 
was still smaller than the 0.05 (Bonferroni adjustment) then that pair can be 
considered to be significantly different (see table] 0-5). Thus, to calculate the number 
of pair comparisons fork groups: The number of paired comparisons = (k x (k-1)) / 2. 
Table 8-5 Mann U Whitney post hoc test for marital status and destination 
Types of risks Marital statues Mean ranking Asyrnpt. sig 
The risk of suffering credit Married-single 
card fraud is : 
359.71 317.75 0.0405 
The risk that I will not like the Married-single 
food is: 
The risk of my code of dress Married-single 
not being received by the local 
people is: 
296.23 343.18 0.0096 
297.39 335.84 0.0453 
The Kruskal Wallis test results show that there are significant differences among them 
somewhere - which is what leads to the post hoc tests. The three categories of marital 
status in terms of risk relating to credit card fraud, not liking the food, and the code of 
dress, the Post Hoc Paired Comparisons after Kruskal, the Mann U Whitney test show 
that in fact, the only statistically significant result is between the married and single 
categories. While the evidence suggests that single people are more concerned with 
performance risk, the same analysis shows that married people are more concerned 
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with the financial risk involved in travel. It is worth mentioning that in the current 
survey more than 60% of married people were younger than 49 years old and perhaps 
with dependent children and therefore with relatively more limited financial 
resources. The same methodology was used to examine the relationships between 
perceived risk and age. The results are shown in Table 8-6. 
Table 8-6 Kruskal-Wallis for the destination risk perception and age band 
Types of risks Age Mean Chi- Asympt. sig 
band ranking square 
The risk of getting food 18< 268.81 28.045 0.00003 
poising is: 18-29 351.10 
30-39 405.81 
40-49 373.26 
50-59 380.16 
60+ 446.84 
The risk of incurring 18< 267.47 24.992 0.0001 
unexpected expense 18-29 356.76 
30-39 410.38 
40-49 381.44 
50-59 362.54 
60+ 402.26 
The risk of suffering as a 18< 299.98 15.347 0.009 
result of credit card fraud 18-29 355.42 
30-39 393.20 
40-49 386.69 
50-59 401.80 
60+ 414.18 
The risk that I will not like 18< 440.34 24.635 0.0001 
the food 18-29 378.73 
30-39 357.00 
40-49 309.11 
50-59 300.76 
60+ 367.52 
The risk of my code of 18< 366.70 19.315 0.002 
dress not being well 18-29 378.60 
received by the local people 30-39 385.02 
40-49 314.89 
50-59 299.21 
60+ 277.98 
The risk of not being able 
to communicate with local 
people 
I8< 
18-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60+ 
262.17 
377.96 
380.31 
327.94 
376.14 
371.31 
23.234 0.0003 
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Table 8-7 The post hoc Mann u Whitney test for the age and perceived risk 
Types of risks Age band Mean ranking Asympisig 
The risk of getting food 18<and 18-29 177.88 227.52 0.0195 
poising is 18<and 30-39 75.75 110.51 0.0075 
18<and 40-49 64.65 87.20 0.015 
18<and 50-59 58.67 73.28 0.0015 
18<60+ 43.86 67.89 0.003 
The risk of incurring 18< and 30-39 72.62 108.55 0.0075 
unexpected expense 
The risk of suffering credit 
card fraud 
The risk that I will not like 
the food 
The risk of my code of dress 
not being received by the 
local people 
18<60+ 
18<and 50-59 85.09 
18-29 and 50-59 76.24 
The risk of not being able to 18< and 19-29 
communicate with local 18< and 30-39 
people 18< and 50-59 
158.35 
75.26 
59.60 
0.0375 
59.35 0.0075 
63.67 0.03 
226.80 0.0075 
106.88 0.0075 
82.56 0.0075 
The results in Table 8-7 show that the only significant difference is between the 
category "under 18" compared with other categories, whilst the youngest category 
are less concerned. This may be because they are not decision makers and in most 
cases the decision is being made for them. 
Table 8-8 demonstrates the results of occupation and perceived risks; it follows the 
same routine as those above. 
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Table 8-8 Kruskal-Wallis for the destination risk perception and occupation 
Types of risks Occupation 
The risk of getting food Student (1) 
poisoning is: Employee (2) 
Teacher (3) 
Manager (4) 
Retired (5) 
Business (6) 
Mean Chi- Asympt. sig 
ranking square 
432 19.009 0.002 
72 
129 
53 
7 
12 
The risk of being exposed Student (l) 426 11.575 0.041 
to political danger due Employee (2) 69 
political unrest Teacher (3) 129 
Manager (4) 54 
Retired (5) 7 
Business (6) 13 
The risk that i will like not Student (1) 
the food Employee (2) 
Teacher (3) 
Manager (4) 
Retired (5) 
Business (6) 
433 17.610 0.003 
73 
140 
53 
7 
13 
Table 8-9 Post Hoc Mann u Whitney for occupation and perceived risks 
Types of risks Highest level of Mean Asympt. sig 
education 
The risk of getting food Student-employce 244.94 297.81) 0.0435 
poisoning is: 
The risk that I will not like Student-teacher 300.27 245.95 0.002 
the food 
The results show that there is only a small but significant difference between the 
type of occupation and the perceived level of risk. For example, that between 
students and employees, in terms of the risk of getting food poisoning, and between 
students and teachers in terms of not liking the food. 
The results show that, in terms of the level of educational attainment, there are some 
significant differences, mostly between people with primary education and those 
who fall into the other categories. People with primary level of education in all 
cases have a lower mean compared to the other groups. There do seem to be some 
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differences between the way people with undergraduate degrees and postgraduate 
levels of education perceive the risks of communication and codes of dress, where 
the people with degree level education gave higher rankings than those with 
postgraduate degrees. The only other significant difference is found between 
secondary levels of education and those with postgraduate education. If education is 
a proxy for awareness or some other psychological trait that helps determine the way 
that people consider risk, then this is reflected in the primary education versus other 
categories. However, it is more of a challenge to believe that this explains the 
difference between graduate and post-graduate respondents except, perhaps, through 
the maturity of the respondents. 
Table 8-10 Kruskal-Wallis for the destination risk perception and educational 
attainment 
Types of risks 
The risk of getting injured 
in car accident 
The risk of incurring 
unexpected expenses is 
The risk that I will not like 
the food is 
The risk that my code of 
dress and behaviour will 
not be received well by the 
local people is 
The risk of not being able 
to communicate with local 
people 
Highest level 
of education 
Primary 
Secondary 
Degree 
Postgraduate 
Primary 
Secondary 
Degree 
Postgraduate 
Primary 
Secondary 
Degree 
Postgraduate 
Primary 
Secondary 
Degree 
Postgraduate 
Primary 
Secondary 
Degree 
Postgraduate 
Mean 
ranking 
237.32 
392.22 
366.81 
338.52 
247.94 
328.92 
373.96 
363.34 
460.30 
382.07 
359.29 
332.68 
371.52 
394.07 
367.55 
314.47 
309.00 
354.99 
382.95 
322.09 
Chi- Asympt. sig 
square 
19.148 0.0004 
13.945 0.003 
13.099 0.004 
14.044 0.003 
13.469 0.003 
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Table 8-11 The post hoc test (Mann U Whitney) for the destination risk perception 
and educational attainment 
Types of risks Highest level of Mean ranking Asympt. sig 
education 
The risk of getting Primary-secondary 62.64 102.83 0.0012 
injured in a car accident Primary-degree 112.19 172.56 0.0048 
is: Primary-Postgraduate 91.50 127.61 0.048 
The risk of incurring Primary-degree 112.06 171.13 0.0078 
unexpected expenses is: Primary-Postgraduate 87.96 129.124 0.0246 
The risk that I will not Primary-Postgraduate 167.73 121.93 0.0066 
like the food is: 
The risk that my code of Secondary- 213.21 175.52 0.0036 
dress and behaviour will postgraduate 277.35 238.63 0.0162 
not be received well by Degree-postgraduate 
the local people is: 
The risk of not being Degree-postgraduate 280.53 235.39 0.0024 
able to communicate 
with local people: 
Similarly, the differences here are in accord with those identified in Table 8-9 
because the majority of respondents with primary education are people under the age 
of 18 and perhaps the same reasoning applies here. 
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Table 8-12 Kruskal-Wallises for the destination risk perception and religious 
affiliation 
Types of risks Religion Mean Chi- Asympt. si 
ranking square g 
The risk of terrorism Christian 360.78 9.766 0.045 
Jewish 465.70 
Islam 350.22 
Others 436.73 
Not affiliated 336.57 
The risk of not getting Christian 358.79 17.042 0.002 
good value for money Jewish 406.60 
Islam 430.45 
Others 292.03 
Not affiliated 335.28 
The risk of experiencing Christian 351.78 13.929 0.00l 
poor weather Jewish 488.30 
Islam 422.94 
Others 305.42 
Not affiliated 345.68 
The risk that I will not Christian 376.46 23.143 0.0001 
like the food Jewish 110.50 
Islam 415.74 
Others 281.38 
Not affiliated 331.48 
The risk that the local Christian 354.27 16.369 0.003 
population might not be Jewish 612.88 
friendly Islam 411.15 
Others 296.64 
Not affiliated 345.53 
The risk that my trip Christian 354.29 13.011 0.011 
might change my own Jewish 472.50 
behaviour Islam 362.24 
Others 242.12 
Not affiliated 361.97 
The risk of not being able Christian 360.51 26.007 0.00003 
to communicate with local Jewish 386.30 
people Islam 278.45 
Others 241.36 
Not affiliated 379.94 
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Table 8-13 The post hoc test (Mann U Whitney) for destination risk perception and 
religious affiliation 
Types of risks religion Mean ranking Asynr 
The risk of not getting Christian- Islam 196.22 237.85 0.045 
good value for money Islam- Not affiliated 57.95 39.80 0.017 
Others- Not affiliated 203.98 158.99 0.002 
The risk of experiencing Christian- Islam 197.89 238.92 0.0500 
poor weather Islam- Not affiliated 197.30 160.12 0.022 
The risk that I will not Islam -Others 60.15 40.21 0.015 
like the food Islam- Not affiliated 199.70 160.36 0.02 
The risk that local Christian-Jewish 170.51 223.90 0.006 
population might not be 
friendly 
The risk that my trip Christian -Others 191.36 131.14 0.013 
might change my own Others- Not affiliated 102.94 152.05 0.01 1 
behaviour 
The risk of not being Christian- Islam 213.38 165.13 0.012 
able to communicate Christian -Others 191.65 128.15 0.007 
with local people Islam Not affiliated 129.13 176.07 0.001 
Others- Not affiliated 96.77 153.39 0.001 
In terms of religion the most frequent religion that shows some statically significant 
differences from other religions is Islam. Those that indicated that they were of the 
Islam faith had a higher mean in all cases, except for the risk of not being able to 
communicate with local people. Christians are in second place in terms of having 
some differences with other groups. Those of Jewish affiliation appear to be 
associated with higher levels of risk perception for not liking the food and the risk 
that local people will not be friendly, which fits with the stereotypical image ofJews. 
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Table 8-14 Kruskal-Wallises for destination risk perception and travelling as a 
single person, with family or with friends: 
Types of risks Are you Mean CIIi- Asyrnpt. sig 
generally ranking square 
travel: 
The risk of being involved Alone 309.29 12.290 0.002 
in a natural disaster Family 369.28 
Friends 371.22 
The risk of not getting good Alone 396.42 10.749 0.005 
value for money Family 351.05 
Friends 330.72 
The risk that the local Alone 331.30 7.099 0.029 
population might not be Family 351.98 
friendly Friends 394.42 
The risk that my code of Alone 319.09 7.629 0.029 
dress and behaviour will Family 359.30 
not be received well by Friends 375.05 
locals 
The risk of not being able Alone 322.24 6.152 0.046 
to communicate with local Family 362.69 
people Friends 369.25 
Table 8-15 the post hoc test (Mann U Whitney) for destination risk perception 
and travelling as a single person, with family or with friends 
Types of risks Are you generally Mean Chi-square Asympt. sig 
travel: ranking 
'I he risk of bcins Alone-friends I(, ß;. 84 202.54 0.006 
involve with natural 
disaster 
The risk of not getting Alone-Friends 206.49 170.86 0.0024 
good value for money 
The risk that local Alone-Friends 170.69 198.42 0.027 
population might not be 
friendly 
The risk that my code Alone-Friends 168.29 196.69 0.025 
of dress and behaviour 
will not be received 
well by locals 
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Table 8-15 shows that there are differences between those who travel alone and 
people who travel with friends. People who travel with friends tended to have higher 
levels of ranking to the risks in the above table with the exception of not getting 
good value for money. 
Table 8-16 Mann- Whitney U test for destination risk perception and whether 
travellers have been involved in risky situations 
Types of risks Yes No MUW z P<0.05 
The risk of getting food 395.39 333.65 40899.000 -3.799 0.000 
poising is: 
The risk of crime 374.37 342.45 45497.500 -1.980 0.048 
The risk that my travel 388.58 336.31 42240.500 -3.227 0.001 
will be disrupted because 
of industrial 
action/strikes 
Generally people who had been involved in risky situations prior to the questionnaire 
tended to show more concern about all kinds of risks. Perhaps this is because 
experience is a more important explanatory factor than other factors in the 
demographics of respondents. 
Table 8-17 Mann- Whitney U test for destination risk perception and it 'a relative has 
been involved in a risky situation 
Mean Ranking 
Types of risks Yes No 
The risk of having health 376.26 340.76 
problems is 
The risk of getting 387.72 342.56 
injured in an accident 
The risk of crime 392.22 335.07 
The risk of incurring 393.17 336.86 
unexpected expense 
The risk that the place 378.17 340.12 
will be overcrowded 
The risk that my travel 374.95 341.46 
will be disrupted because 
of industrial 
action/strikes 
The risk that the trip 392.35 338.63 
changes my own 
behaviour 
The risk of not being 377.42 342.45 
able to communicate 
with local nennle 
MUW z P<0.05 
46942.00 -2.400 0.016 
46700.00 -2.571 0.10 
44573.00 -3.212 0.001 
40792.00 -3.438 0.001 
43324.500 -2.351 0.019 
43668.000 2.045 0.041 
42398 -2.634 0.008 
44175.500 2.102 0.036 
....... ___ r_ýr. _ 
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As seen in Table 8-16, Table 8-17 shows that it is not just those who have been 
directly involved in risky situations who are associated with higher levels of risk 
perceptions, it is also those who have relatives who have been subject to risky 
situations. The result shows that those who have had a relative involved in an 
accident are more risk averse than those who have not. 
8.2.2 Factor analysis 
Factor analysis is a collection of methods used to examine how the underlying 
constuct influences the responses on a number of measured variables 
(Decoster, 1998). Factor analysis groups variables with similar characteristics 
together (University of Newcastle, 2006). Field (2005) adds that to measure the 
characteristics the research needs to ensure that the questions that were asked do, in 
fact, measure the structure that was intended to be measured. 
When undertaking factor analysis there are three distinct stages that can be followed: 
1. First, it is important to identify and measure the inter-relationships between all 
of the variables being used in the analyses. This is normally achieved by 
building a correlation matrix which shows the correlation between each 
variable and each other variable being included. This results in a triangular 
matrix where the diagonal cells are all 1.0 showing that it is the correlation 
between the variable and itself. Everything else under the diagonal shows the 
correlation between one variable and the remaining variables. 
2. Second, in order to examine the relationship of correlated variables, factors are 
extracted from the correlation matrix based on the correlation coefficients of 
the variables. 
3. Third, the factors are rotated in order to maximize the relationship between the 
variables and some of the factors (University of Newcastle, 2006). 
Field (2005) suggested that to undertake factor analysis it is necessary to ensure that 
the variables conform roughly to a normal distribution and that they are measured at 
an interval level, which the likertscale data are, although Field also goes on to 
suggest that that they are perhaps wrongly assumed to be such. 
There are several ways of conducting factor analyses and the method chosen depends 
on many factors. This study has used Principal Components Analysis to reduce the 
data. Field (2005) believes, strictly speaking, that it is not really factor analysis; 
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however, the two procedures may often yield similar results (Afshinia 2005; Field 
2005). Principal Components Analysis is conceptually less complex than factor 
analysis. It bears numerous similarities to discriminate analysis and is a 
psychometrically sound procedure. According to Stevens (1992), with 30 or more 
variables and communalities greater than 0.7 for all variables, different solutions are 
unlikely, but with fewer than 20 variables and any low commonalties (<0.4) 
differences can occur. However, none of these conditions apply to the current data set. 
Looking at the correlation matrix (see Appendix 2), the pattern of relationships 
between the variables can be seen. The highest correlation observed between any 
two of the variables is 0.677 (the risk of terrorism and political unrest). The 
significance values (1-tailed) associated with the correlations show that the highest 
level of significance between any 2 variables is . 043 
(risk of poor weather and 
political unrest, which is presumably spurious unless it can be shown that countries 
that have an image of political unrest are also in climatic regions where weather 
conditions are uncertain). Therefore, there are no variables that are significantly 
correlated and the determinant of the matrix was found to be 0.001 which is greater 
than the necessary threshold value of 0.00001. 
There does not seem to be a problem of excessive multicollinearity within the data 
set. To conclude, all 20 destination risk perception questions in the analyses correlate 
reasonably well and none of the correlation coefficients is significantly large. 
Therefore, there is no need to consider eliminating variables at this stage (Field 
2005). 
The dataset was then subjected to the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy and Bartlett's test of sphericity. According to Field (2005), the KMO 
statistic produces values between 0 and 1. If a value of zero is achieved this suggests 
that the sum of partial correlations is relatively large compared with the sum of the 
correlations. This identifies whether there is diffusion in the pattern of correlations. 
If this is found to be the case, then one could argue that factor analysis is an 
inappropriate tool to use (see table 8-18). Intermediate values such as those around 
0.5 to 0.7 and above can be thought of as being in the range of satisfactory to good, 
and this position continues to increase as values approach 1.0 (Kaiser, 1974 in Field, 
2005). The dataset used in this study produces a value which is close to one (0.922) 
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demonstrating that the pattern of the correlations is relatively dense and so läctor 
analyses can be considered an appropriate technique( Field 2005). 
Table 8-18 KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. . 
`>'--' 
Bartlett's Test of Approx. Chi-Square 5212.344 
Sphericity Df 190 
Sig. . 0005 
In order to confirm the appropriateness of factor analyses further, the Bartlett 
measure was used. Bartlett's measure tests the null hypothesis that the original 
correlation matrix is an identity matrix (a square matrix that is made up of zeros with 
1's across the diagonal). There has to be some relationship for factor analysis to 
work and so Bartlett's measure tests have to have a measure of less than 0.5. The 
Bartlett's measure tests for the data show the value of 0.0005< 0.001 and that 
suggests that it is highly significant and therefore, again, it suggests that factor 
analysis is suitable. 
The following communalities table shows how the variables change from before to 
after factor extractions. Field (2005) argues that principal component analysis works 
on the initial assumption that all variances are common, so before the extraction the 
communalities are all 1. The extraction column shown in Table (8-19) reflects the 
common data found in the variable structure. This can be described in two ways: for 
example, it can be said that 52.5% of the variance associated with question one is 
common or shared variance or that the proportion of variance is explained by the 
underlying factors. The amount of variance that can be explained by the retained 
factor is presented by the communalities after the extractions. 
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Table 8-19 Communalities 
Extraction 
Initial 
The risk of getting food poisoning is... 1.000 
. 
525 
The risk of having health problems is.. 1.000 . 474 
The risk of being involved in a natural disaster (eg earthquake/Storm) is... 1.000 
. 
690 
The risk of getting injured in an accident (eg car, bus.... ) is... 1.000 
. 
506 
The risk of crime (theft, robbery, pick-pocket, etc) is... 1.000 
. 
500 
The risk to me by acts of terrorism is... 1.000 . 656 
The risk of being exposed to danger due to political unrest (civil unrest) 1.000 
. 
699 
is... 
The risk of not getting good value for money is... 1.000 . 549 
The risk of incurring unexpected expenses is... 1.000 . 667 
The risk of suffering as a result of credit card fraud is... 1.000 . 501 
The risk of experiencing poor weather is... 1.000 . 602 
The risk of having to put up with poor hotel accommodation is... 1.000 . 494 
The risk that the place will be overcrowded is... 1.000 
. 411 
The risk that I will not like the food is... 1.000 . 507 The risk that my travel will be disrupted because of possible industrial 
action/strikes (eg at the airport, railways, buses)is... 1.000 . 500 
The risk that the tourist facilities will not be acceptable (eg beach) is... 1.000 . 540 
The risk that the local population may not be friendly is... 1.000 
. 
525 
The risk that my trip might change my own behaviour is... 1.000 
. 582 
The risk that my code of dress and behaviour will not be well received by 1.000 
. 
668 
the local people is... 
The risk of not being able to communicate with local people (language) 1.000 
. 618 is... 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Table 8-20 shows the component matrix before rotation. This matrix contains the 
loading of each variable onto each factor. By default, SPSS displays all loading. 
However, it has been requested that all loading less than 0.4 be suppressed in the 
output so there are blank spaces for many of the loadings. 
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Table 8-20 Component Matrix (a) 
The risk of being exposed to danger due to 
political unrest (civil unrest) is... 
The risk that the tourist facilities will not be 
acceptable (eg beach) is... 
The risk that the local population may not be 
friendly is... 
The risk that my code of dress and behaviour 
will not be well received by the local people is... 
The risk of getting injured in an accident (eg 
car, bus,... ) is... 
The risk that my travel will be disrupted because 
of possible industrial action/strikes (eg at the 
airport, railways, buses)is... 
The risk of crime (theft, robbery, pickpocket) 
is... 
The risk of suffering as a result of credit card 
fraud is... 
The risk of being involved in a natural disaster 
(eg earthquake/Storm) is... 
The risk to me by acts of terrorism is... 
The risk of having to put up with poor hotel 
accommodation is... 
The risk of having health problems is.. 
The risk of getting food poisoning is... 
The risk that the place will be overcrowded is... 
The risk that my trip might change my own 
behaviour is... 
The risk of incurring unexpected expenses is 
The risk that I will not like the food is... 
The risk of experiencing poor weather is... 
The risk of not getting good value for money is. 
The risk of not being able to communicate with 
local people (language) is... 
612 -. 430 
604 
593 
587 
543 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a4 components extracted. 
However, with the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy, the data 
needs to extract four factors (retaining all factors with eigenvalues greater than 1). 
But Jolliffe (1972,1986 in field 2005) reports that the Kaiser criterion is too strict 
and suggests a third of option of retaining all factors with eigenvalues more than . 
7. 
The difference between how many factors are retained using Kaiser's methods 
compared to Jolliffe can be significant. Research has indicated that the Kaiser 
criterion is accurate when the number of factors is less than 30 and communalities 
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after extraction are more than 0.7 or, if the sample size is less 250, when the average 
communalities is greater than 0.6. In cases where none of the above apply it has been 
suggested that the use of a scree plot could be helpful (see Figure 8-1). The scree 
plot is a graph based on the eigenvalues associated with each component factor. The 
graph is useful for determining how many factors to retain in the analyses, the point 
of interest being where the curve starts to flatten out. 
Figure 8-1 Scree Plot 
y 
CJ 
5_f, 
G3a 
The arrow on the graph shows the point of inflexion on the curve. The curve is 
difficult to interpret because it starts to tail off after the three factors, hence it is 
probably safe to go with three factors. 
The rotated component matrix (a) in table 8-21 shows the questions that load onto 
the same factor. However, the table contains the same information as table 10-20 but 
is calculated after the rotation. 
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Component Number 
Table 8-21 Rotated Component Matrix 
Type of risk 
The risk of being involved in a natural disaster 
Component 
l23 
. 
801 
The risk of experiencing poor weather is... . 
719 
The risk that I will not like the food is... . 
640 
The risk that the tourist facilities will not be 617 
acceptable 
The risk of having to put up with poor hotel 
. 599 accommodation is... 
The risk that the local population may not be 
. 557 friendly is... 
The risk that my travel will be disrupted because of 
possible industrial action/strikes . 
428 . 555 
The risk that the place will be overcrowded is... 
. 
549 
The risk of not being able to communicate with 
local people (language) is... 
The risk that my trip might change my own 
behaviour is... 
The risk that my code of dress and behaviour will 
not be well received by the local people is... 
The risk of incurring unexpected expenses is... 
The risk of not getting good value for money is 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
1 
ýA 
law 
. 726 
. 
704 
. 650 
4 
. 409 
. 465 
. 751 
. 636 
Comparing this matrix with the unrotated matrix in table 8-20 shows that before 
rotation there were more variables loaded highly into factor one and the remaining 
factors were not significant. However, the rotation matrix has clarified the situation 
and more were loaded into 3 factors. Field recommended the suppression of loading 
lower than 0.4 in order to focus on only those that are significant and then to order 
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variables by loading size (this is done here) which makes the interpretation 
considerably easier because there is no need to scan the matrix to identify 
substantive loadings. 
The questions that are highly loaded into factor one all seem to relate to physical 
risk. The questions that are highly loaded into the second factor all seem to relate to 
performance risk and those loading into the third factor mostly have questions in 
relation to the socio cultural aspects of risk. Finally, the financial aspects of risk are 
highly related to factor 4. There are two aspects of risk (crime related to money) 
despite being highly related to physical risk are also related to factor four, the 
financial aspect of risk (highlighted). And industrial disruption seems mostly related 
to performance risk. 
These analyses reveal that there are initially three distinct aspects of risk. However, 
the analysis has also shown that the risk of credit card fraud loaded higher into 
physical risk than financial risks and this may be considered unexpected. 
8.2.3 Regions and risk 
The first step undertaken was to build an index of people's risk perceptions on the 
basis of the mean of 6 questions that measure overall destination perception risk for 
each of 7 regions. A Cronbach's alpha test was employed to ensure the reliability of 
the index for overall risk perceptions. The Cronbach's alpha test, over all risk 
questions, was 0.809 and it should be noted that deleting one of the questions did not 
significantly improve the alpha score. 
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Table 8-22 Item-Total Statistics 
Mean 
ranking 
Cronbach's Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Africa crime 
. 
59 
. 
804 
Africa political unrest 
. 
62 
. 
803 
Africa natural disaster 
. 
20 
. 
806 
Africa health risk 
. 
83 
. 
806 
Africa terrorism 
. 12 . 806 
Africa cultural barriers . 38 . 801 
North America crime 
. 
71 
. 
806 
North America political unrest 11 . 811 
North America natural disaster 
. 
38 
. 
805 
North America health risk 
. 
07 
. 
811 
North America terrorism 
. 
45 
. 
806 
North America cultural barriers . 12 . 812 Latin America crime 
. 
82 
. 
806 
Latin America political unrest . 50 . 
806 
Latin America natural disaster 
. 
26 . 802 
Latin America health risk . 
47 . 
803 
Latin America terrorism 
. 
15 . 804 
Latin America cultural barriers 
. 27 . 
805 
East Asia and Pacific crime . 39 . 804 East Asia and Pacific political unrest 
. 26 . 
803 
East Asia and Pacific natural disaster 
. 
61 
. 
807 
East Asia and Pacific health risk 
. 56 . 
807 
East Asia and Pacific terrorism 
. 
20 
. 
804 
East Asia and Pacific cultural barriers 39 . 806 
Europe crime 
. 
63 
. 
807 
Europe political unrest . 
16 . 810 
Europe natural disaster 
. 12 . 
810 
Europe health risk 
. 
11 
. 
810 
Europe terrorism 
. 
33 . 804 
Europe cultural barriers 
. 25 . 811 
Middle East crime . 40 . 
802 
Middle East political unrest . 63 . 805 Middle East natural disaster . 23 . 
807 
Middle East health risks . 42 . 
804 
Middle East terrorism 
. 67 . 
804 
Middle East cultural barriers 
. 
59 
. 
801 
South Asia crime . 39 . 
801 
South Asia political unrest . 34 . 801 
South Asia natural disaster 
. 
57 
. 805 
South Asia health risk . 40 . 813 
South Asia terrorism 
. 28 . 806 South Asia cultural barriers . 46 . 802 
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Graph 8-3 Regional risk ranking l 
u. 
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The results (summarised in Graph 8-3) indicate that while there is evidence that 
people are more concerned in terms of health risk in Africa, it can also been seen that 
risk of crime has a higher mean ranking in Latin America. The Middle East shows 
the highest mean of ranking in terms of three risks; terrorism; political unrest and 
cultural barriers. 
Following on from developing an index on the basis of the overall risk, it is useful to 
construct a second index that just utilises the frequency of risks in each region. In this 
way, the higher perceptions of risk can be compared with the mean, to look for any 
significant differences. The results are shown in Graph 8-4 and in the majority of 
cases the rankings are highly similar to those derived when using the mean 
measurement. Both results show that crime has the highest mean while it also has the 
highest frequency answer and the risk of terrorism took third place followed by health 
risks. In other words, people, in general, seem to be more concerned about crime or 
health risks relative to any other form of risk. 
262 
ýQQ 
ý 
. -J 
Q 
Graph 8-4 Types of regional risks 
Frequency 
percentages 
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20.4 ' 38.3 26.1 11.6 61.4 
83.4 6.6 46.7 10.9 55,9 
12.4 44.4 15.3 33,2 20.1 
37.9 11.9 27.3 24.7 39.4 
Asia East 
39.3 
33.6 
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40.1 
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41,7 
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8.2.4 The relationship between a region's perceived risks and the re1ion of origin 
Kruskal Wallis shows that there are many significant differences among the variables 
relating to the risks associated with a region and the region of origin of the 
respondent. However, it does not, on its own, say which means are significantly 
different from which other ones (see table 8-23), thercfore the Mann U Whitney test 
has been undertaken(see table 8-24). 
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Table 8-23 Kruskal Wallis between regions' perceived risks and region of origin 
Regions type of risks Region of Mean Chi- Asyinpt. sig 
origin ranking; square 
Africa crime Africa(1) 360.61) 19.038 002 
N. America(2) 373.77 
L. America(3) 145.00 
Europe(4) 369.69 
Asia(5) 34R. 35 
M. East (6) 368.84 
N. America 
L. America 
371.00 22.755 0003 
362.92 
133.73 
365.31 
351.91 
372.70 
456.00 20.821 0008 
321.00 
353.73 
351.78 
386.45 
395.72 
400.50 17.951 0030 
394.14 
384.14 
368.38 
293.23 
390.31 
328.29 25.604 0001 
499.59 
205.21 
: 69.45 
315.16 : >, s .>_. .:. ... 
" 
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Latin America natural 
disaster 
East and pacific natural 
disaster 
Europe crime 
Europe natural disaster 
Europe health risk 
Europe cultural barriers 
Middle east political unrest 
M. East 
Africa 
N. America 
L. America 
Europe 
Asia 
M. East 
Africa 
N. America 
L. America 
Europe 
Asia 
M. East 
Africa 
N. America 
L. America 
Europe 
Asia 
M. East 
Africa 
N. America 
L. America 
Europe 
Asia 
M. east 
Africa 
N. America 
L. America 
Europe 
Asia 
M. Fast 
Africa 
N. America 
L. America 
Europe 
Asia 
M. east 
Africa 
N. America 
L. America 
Europe 
Asia 
M. East 
Africa 
N. America 
L. America 
Europe 
Asia 
M. East 
323.48 
365.14 21.021) 0008 
328.00 
292.79 
373.26 
307.23 
316.96 
289.64 21.166 0007 
480.00 
]87.50 
366.58 
342.29 
322.41 
342.50 29.353 0005 
243.50 
177.50 
259.15 
171.81 
255.54 
383.29 25.804 0005 
420.27 
164.60 
367.44 
303.29 
361.77 
317.50 22.341 0004 
317.50 
353.20 
351.41 
405.83 
344.90 
370.50 11.797 039 
319.50 
319.50 
352.74 
399.43 
360.69 
370.50 16.899 0046 
300.95 
518.40 
350.27 
396.27 
357.75 
230.93 26.609 0005 
421.82 
258.86 
374.39 
328.09 
284.08 
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Middle east health risk 
Middle east terrorism 
Middle east cultural 
barriers 
Africa 206.50 27.021 0005 
N. America 336.68 
L. America 239.05 
Europe 376.18 
Asia 324.60 
M. East 287.56 
Africa 270.64 18.401 0024 
N. America 442.91 
L. America 
Europe 
410.32 
368.88 
Asia 331.36 
M. East 292.87 
Africa 299.64 14.064 015 
N. America 374.14 
L. America 276.36 
Europe 369.65 
Asia 350.86 
M. East 288.05 
South Asia cultural barriers Africa 
N. America 
L. America 
Europe 
Asia 
M. East 
a adjusted<0.0033 
244 2l 14.841 Oll 
388.55 
323.36 
372.25 
313.72 
323.99 
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Table 8-24 The post hoc test (Mann U Whitney) for the destination risk perception 
and region of origin: 
Africa Crime 
Africa Political 
unrest 
N. America crime 
North America 
natural disaster 
Region of origin Mean ranking Asympt. sig 
Africa -Latin America 14.25 R 002 
N. America - L. America 15.82 9.50 001 
L. America - Europe 110.00 278.00 0005 
L. America - Asia 29.00 59.39 0002 
L. America - M. East 16.50 36.74 0001 
Europe - Asia 320.39 305.10 0005 
Africa -Latin America 14.25 08.00 0020 
N. America - L. America 17.45 7.00 0005 
L. America - Europe 90.50 279.12 0005 
L. America -Asia 32.50 58.85 0017 
L. America - M. East 29.41 33.14 0018 
Europe - Middle East 
Asia - Middle East 
N. America - L. America 
L. America - Europe 
L. America - Asia 
L. America - M. cast 
Europe - Asia 
Asia - Middle East 
300.76 242.25 0003 
83.96 62.75 0005 
15.00 09.00 0030 
101.95 279.54 0005 
25.50 58.83 0005 
14.91 36.15 0005 
329.33 262.84 0005 
69.35 89.85 0005 
L. America political N. America - L. America 16.95. 7.46 0001 
unrest L. America - Europe 150.71 276.26 0016 
N. America - M. East 45.59 29.78 00.30 
L America health N. America - L. America 16.91 07.50 0005 
risk L. America - Europe 140.00 277.01 0006 
L America natural Europe - Asia 325.46 267.09 0001 
disaster 
14.59 07.05 0013 
120.80 276.35 0001 
17.10 34.27 0013 
325.15 269.21 0006 
400.45 271.65 0005 
310.11 358.43 0005 
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East Asia and Pacific Europe - Asia 
natural disaster Asia - Middle East 
South Asia natural Europe - Asia 
disaster 
232.73 154.40 0005 
41.74 57.81 OOl 
334.06 233.09 0005 
South Asia cultural Europe - Asia 326.50 274.58 0029 
barriers 
Middle East political Europe - Middle East 302.68 228.24 0002 
unrest 
Middle East health Europe - Middle East 302.56 229.41 0005 
risk 
Middle East Europe - Middle East 301.62 239.96 0015 
terrorism 
Middle East cultural Europe - Middle East 301.53 234.39 001 
barriers 
a adjusted <0033 
The results of the post hoc tests show that, the most frequent statistical difference is 
between people from Latin America and other regions, in all cases except one. The 
respondents from Latin America have given lower rankings whilst Europeans gave 
higher rankings than the rest of the regions. Furthermore, there is no statistically 
significant difference between the way Europeans ranked risks in the Middle East 
and the way all other regions were ranked. Where there were considerable 
differences was between the way that European travellers and those from the Middle 
East ranked risk when travelling to destinations in the Middle East. Not surprisingly, 
there is a statistically significant difference between Asians and others in terms of 
the risk of natural disasters while the mean overall ranking by Asians is lower than 
the rest. 
8.3 Middle East 
Routine tests were undertaken for the Middle East and some selected countries to 
examine the mean ranking and to identify the top countries that ranked highly in 
relation to the rest of the countries in the Middle East. Secondly, an index was 
created that just utilises the frequency of risks in each country and this derived a 
similar result to the rankings. 
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Table 8-25 Country mean risk rankings and Alpha test 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Countries Mean ranking Deleted 
Afghanistan 4.36 907 
Bahrain 2.75 
Egypt 3.23 
. 903 
Iran 3.89 
. 902 
Iraq 4.58 
. 
905 
Israel 4.11 
. 
909 
Jordan 3.28 
. 899 
Kuwait 3.01 
. 897 
Lebanon 3.69 
. 903 
Libya 3.26 
. 897 
Oman 2.77 
. 901 
Palestine 4.2 
. 907 
Qatar 2.75 
. 901 
Saudi Arabia 2.97 
. 900 
Syrian Arab 3.24 
. 898 Republic 
Turkey 2.68 
. 905 
UAE 2.49 
. 902 
Yemen 3.03 
. 901 
The data in Table 8-25 shows the mean ranking (significant as demonstrated by the 
alpha score) and this is then transformed into Graph 8-5 showing that Iraq scored the 
highest level of risk perception with a mean value of 4.58, and Afghanistan was 
second with a mean value of 4.36 and so on. These results are not particularly 
surprising. 
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The percentage of respondents who identified countries such as Iraq as having either 
a4 or 5 risk value is shown in Graph 8-26. It can be seen that more than 90 per cent 
of all respondents found that both Iraq and Afghanistan were rated 4 or 5 in terms of 
their travel-risk perceptions. 
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8.3.1 Factor analysis for the countries 
The correlation matrix based on countries, included as appendix 3, demonstrates the 
pattern of relationships between them in terms of risk. The R matrix (or correlation 
matrix) shows that the highest correlation between any 2 countries is 0.649 (between 
Oman and Qatar). The significance values (1-tailed) associated with the correlations 
show that the highest level of significance between any 2 countries is . 
317 (between 
the Emirates and Afghanistan). Therefore there are no countries that are significantly 
correlated and the determinant of matrix was found to be 0.000825 which is greater 
than the necessary threshold value of 0.00001. 
The dataset used in this study, when subjected to the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy and Bartlett's test of sphericity, produces a value which is close 
to one (0.900), demonstrating that the pattern of the correlations is relatively dense 
and so factor analysis can be considered an appropriate technique (Field 2005). The 
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Bartlett's measure tests for the data shows the value of 0.0005< 0.001 sind that 
suggests that it is highly significant and therefore, again, it suggests that factor 
analysis is suitable. 
Country KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Adequacy. 
Bartiett's Test of Approx. Chi-Square 
The following communalities table shows the variable before and after factor 
extractions. The extraction column shown in Table (8-26) reflects the common data 
found in the variable structure. This can be described in two ways: for example, it 
can be said that 5.9% of the variance associated with question one is common or 
shared variance or that the proportion of variance is explained by the underlying 
factors. The amount of variance is that can be explained by the retained factor is 
presented by the communalities after the extractions. 
Table 8-27 Communalities 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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The arrow on the scatter graph shows the point of inflexion on the curve (graph 9-2). 
The curve starts to flatten out after the third factor. It could also be argued that the 
fourth factor has an eigenvalue, which is less than one, and, given that the sample 
size is relatively large, it is probably safe to assume the Kaiser criterion. 
Figure 8-2 Scree Plot 
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Table 8-29 shows the component matrix before rotation. This matrix contains the 
loading of each country onto each factor. By default, SPSS displays all loading. 
However, it has been requested that all loading less than 0.4 be suppressed in the 
output and so there are blank spaces for many of the loadings. 
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Table 8-28 Country Component Matrix " 
in Arab Republic 
3n 
i Arabia 
r 
ne 
804 
. 799 
. 765 
. 735 
. 715 
. 709 
. 
693 
. 663 
. 658 
. 
646 
. 598 
. 578 
. 576 
. 526 
. 439 
. 477 
. 424 
Component 
23 
-. 411 
-. 489 
-. 426 
. 404 
-. 444 
. 655 
. 
642 
. 
642 
Israel 
. 
421 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a3 components extracted. 
The rotated component matrixa in Table 8-29 shows the countries that load onto the 
same factor (all factors less than 0.4 have not been displayed). Comparison of this 
matrix with the unrotated matrix in Table 8-28 shows that more countries in the 
unrotated matrix were loaded highly into factor one, and the remaining factors were 
not significant.. However, the rotation matrix clarifies things significantly; there are 
three factors and the countries loaded higher into factor one and two relatively. 
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Rotated Component Matrix 
123 
552 
hmu tan 72 3 
inon . 
605 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
Looking at the countries that loaded highly into factor one, it would seem that all of 
them relate to having lower mean rankings (see Table 8-25). Therefore, they could 
perhaps be labelled as "average risk" countries. In this way, the second group can fall 
into a category of "higher than average" risk and finally countries in factor 3 can be 
labelled as "high risk" countries or "countries that I must never go to". 
Following the factor analysis that ended with three main categories (or travel 
patterns), it may be useful to explore in more detail aspects relating to those 
relationships. Such as that between factor three countries (high risk countries) and the 
weakest relationship in factor two (Iran), to see if there are any differences in terms of 
travel patterns between Iran and high risk countries. This will allow us to explore it' 
there are any differences between people of different ages or between people from 
different regions. 
The first step was to take a Kruskal Wallis test to find out if there are any statistically 
significant differences between the different age groups. The result is shown in Table 
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8-31. It was necessary to do pair wise tests in order to find out about such differences 
(see Table 8-31). 
Table 8-30 Test Statistics"b 
a adjusted <0033 
The result mainly indicates that the only difference is between the under 18 age 
category and the others, where in most cases the travel decision will not be made by 
the respondents in this age group. 
The following Tables (Table 8-32 and Table 8-33) show the results of the Kruskal 
Wallis tests followed by the Mann U Whitney tests. 
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a Kruskal Wallis Test 
b Grouping Variable: Age in bands 
Table 8-32 Test Statistics"" 
Table 8-33 Mann U Whitney: Regions and Iran 
Iran Europe - Middle East 227.34 137.38 0.0005 
Asia - Middle East 81.68 55.07 0.0001 
N. America - Middle East 47.06 27.95 0.002 
rpsaoumeý: _. .. ka; Mi 
Aüt 
The results indicate that although there are no statistically significant differences 
between people from different regions towards the high risk countries which are 
included in factor three, there are some differences between Middle Eastern and 
North American, European and Asian people in terms of their perceptions of Iran. It 
could be argued that those people from the Middle East are less concerned about 
risks in Iran while the perceived risks in four other countries, namely Israel, 
Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon, are not significantly different from the point of 
view of visitors from other regions. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the responses to the questionnaires relating to travel-risk 
perceptions, exploring a variety of travel-related risks as well as the geographical 
location of both origin and destination of travellers. There are some significant 
findings, not only in terms of the rankings associated with the type of risks that are of 
most concern to travellers, but also in terms of the role of the country of origin in 
determining the perceived level of risk for specific destinations. Many of these 
findings support the intuitive feelings of tourism writers and researchers. For 
instance, the travellers who are travelling to regions that have an image of risk with 
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a Kruskal Wallis Test 
b Grouping Variable: Region 
respect to physical harm, such as the Middle East, are much more concerned about 
this risk if they come from, say, Europe than they are if they come from the Middle 
East. Also of interest is the relatively low ranking that the questionnaire respondents 
gave to the risk of being caught up in acts of terrorism, placing it as the 11th concern 
and well behind the risk of crime, incurring unexpected expenses and not being able 
to communicate with the local people. This perhaps flies in the face of the media 
reports relating to travel-risk which in recent times have tended to focus on acts of 
terrorism. These findings will be compared with the views of the global tourism 
experts used in the Delphi Exercise reported in the next chapter. 
Given the importance of the risk of crime to the traveller, a further exploration was 
made to look at whether travellers' perceptions about the countries that are high-risk 
in terms of crime are reflecting the actuality of incidents of crime against travellers. 
Again, it would seem that the image or stereo type of destinations does more to colour 
the view of travellers than the actual events. The top three destinations in terms of 
perceived crime as identified by the travellers were the USA, Italy and Spain whereas, 
according to data acquired from a major insurance company, the top three destinations 
in terms of actual crime-related claims were the Czech Republic, Thailand and 
Switzerland(See chapter 9). 
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Introduction 
Having undertaken the questionnaire survey targeting a wide range of travellers and 
tourists, it was felt that a mini-Delphi study could provide a useful instrument to 
either confirm or refute the information provided by the questionnaire respondents. 
The Delphi Exercise can also add to the knowledge base by exploring aspects of risk 
in relation to specific destinations and in terms of the ways that the current risk 
positions may be altered to improve the future prospects of tourism development. 
The mini-Delphi study enlisted the support of 49 internationally-respected tourism 
experts. The exercise involved three rounds of iteration where the first round 
replicated the questionnaire that was given to the survey respondents together with a 
summary of the survey findings. Panel members were also asked to provide 
comments on each aspect that was covered in the original questionnaire so that they 
could provide their views. The second round of the exercise provided the panel 
members with a synthesis of the first round results and invited them to change their 
views in the lights of those responses. It then added 2 further questions to explore in 
more detail the regional aspects of risks and types of risks that are associated with 
each specific region. 
The third round again replicated the questionnaire questions and provided the second 
round responses, inviting the panel members again to reconsider their viewpoints. But 
then it had a more substantial element that explored the situation in the Middle East 
and selected countries in greater depth and also focused upon the situation with 
respect to Iran and possible ways of alleviating some of the difficulties experienced in 
developing tourism in that country. 
The initial email that went out to the list of potential Delphi Panel members was sent 
to 49 international tourism specialists. The original target was to enlist the support of 
38 Panel Members, knowing that there would be an attrition rate and that the study 
would probably finish its third and final round with around 20 panel members. 
Selection of the panel members was on the grounds of their writing and research 
experience, interests in tourism development and their knowledge of tourism in 
general and, in some cases, their knowledge of the Middle East in particular. Of the 
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49 academics selected, 36 agreed to take part and of the 36 who agreed to take part 
there were 28 experts from quite disparate geographical locations (USA and Canada 
to Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong, Israel; UAE, Turkey and Europe) who 
actually responded in the first round. 
In measuring consensus, criteria vary from study to study, the frequency distribution 
is often used to assess the level of agreement (McKenna 1994) and the criterion of a 
majority, at least 51% responding to any given response, is often used to determine 
consensus (McKenna 1994). However, others such as Aker et al. (2003) argued that 
the level of consensus should be 75% within their study. Some also undertake Inter- 
quartile ranges to determine how much consensus there is. Using this approach, the 
level of consensus is measured by taking the difference between the values recorded 
at the 25`h and 75th percentiles. If the value of that difference is 1 or less then it can be 
assumed that a consensus has been achieved. However, there is no consensus in the 
literature in terms of how to use Interquartile, some suggesting values greater than 1 
as being an acceptable threshold to determine consensus (Raskin 1994). This study 
uses non-parametric data and this, together with the nature and variety of choices 
facing respondents makes such an approach inappropriate. Because the types of 
options that respondents are presented with vary from binary choices to questions 
with 7 options, it was felt that a frequency measure would fit best and the threshold of 
consensus was set at 70% of all panellists, for each question. 
9.1 The Delnhi rounds 
The first round of the Delphi gave the respondents a two-page summary of the 
findings from the questionnaire survey and included 19 of the questions that were 
included in the original survey, relating to travel risk perceptions. The questionnaire 
was distributed by email and panellists were asked to respond within 10 working days 
of receiving it. The questionnaires kept their Likert scale and binary format but 
included an option that allowed the respondents to explain their responses if they so 
wished. This allowed the respondents to expand on their views rather than simply be 
confined to a simple yes or no as in the case of the binary questions, or scoring 1 to 5 
in the case of the Likert Scale questions. 
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For the second round of Delphi, a summary of the responses (expressed as 
percentages in terms of the distribution of answers) that were made during the first 
round was provided for the panel members. They were asked to look at the 
distribution of responses that were made for each question and consider whether or 
not they would like to reconsider their responses as there still were some divergences 
of opinion. They were also asked 2 new questions concerning travel risk at the 
regional level. Of the 28 respondents to the first round of the exercise, 25 completed 
and returned the second-round questionnaire. One of the members indicated that they 
would not be able to participate in the last round due to unforeseen circumstances and 
another two who did not respond were both based in the Middle East. By the end of 
round two a consensus was found to exist for 8 of the 19 questions that had been sent 
during the first and second round. Therefore these 8 questions were eliminated from 
the third round of the exercise. 
Round three served as the final round for the study. Summary statistics using 
frequency percentages of the responses from the preceding round, showing their own 
responses to each question, together with a summary of responses from the rest of the 
panel were reported to each panel member. Because of consensus found on the 8 
questions in round two, only 15 questions were submitted in round three for members 
to evaluate, including 2 new questions regarding travel risk in the Middle East and 
Iran. This third instrument was sent to the 25 panel members who responded in round 
two. Twenty three individuals responded to this third round, yielding an overall 
response rate of 82%. Frequency, percentage and ranking were used to evaluate the 
third round. 
9.2 Delphi findings 
In response to the questions relating to the individual traveller, there was indication of 
a consensus that some travellers are more risk-averse than others. More than 74% of 
the panel members suggested that the innate travel-risk averseness of the traveller was 
an important factor when making their travel decisions. This result, although slightly 
decreasing during the second round, increased to 79% in the final round. According to 
the panellists, the risk of physical harm was by far the most significant risk area that 
concerned travellers, then in second place came financial risk, whereas satisfaction 
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with the tourist destination choice was felt to be least the important area of risk. The 
consensus with respect to the ranking of these risks increased from 71.4% in the first 
round to 80% in the second round and finally to more than 80% in the final round. 
However, the strong consensus was only achieved with respect to the panellists' 
views regarding physical risk. The other two areas were only subject to a majority 
decision rather than a consensus. The frequency of risk-related events occurring also 
featured in the responses made by panellists, with comments such as: 
I think that financial risk is more likely to occur and, thus, tourists are 
more concerned about this (17). 
The vast majority of panellists in the first round (88%) felt that physical, financial and 
destination satisfaction would vary according to the region of the world in which the 
destination was located. This majority was consolidated in the second round with a 
consensus of more than 90% in agreement. These findings appear to be in line with 
hypothesis 4 that those travel-related risks are a major determinant of the travel 
decisions made by tourists. 
The specific destination to which travellers were going was deemed even more 
important in determining the level of travel-risk perception, with a majority of 96% of 
panel members indicating that this was important or very important. This level of 
agreement was maintained in the second round. The fact that the destination is 
important in forming risk perceptions is further reinforced by the fact that more than 
80% of panellists in the first round and more than 90% in the second round'felt that 
not only was the specific destination important as an influence, but even the region in 
which the destination was located is an important influence. This suggests that the 
perceptions of travel risk are painted with quite a broad brush and a destination can be 
subjected to higher levels of travel-risk perceptions by association, even though the 
specific destination may have low actual risk levels. This suggests that there is a 
strong perceptual relationship between the different regions of the world and the type 
of travel-related risk, which helps to form people's perceptions. This may be 
important in making travel decisions if some regions are stereotyped as exposing 
travellers to certain types of risk. 
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Moreover, almost the same percentage (92% in the first round and 96% in the second 
round) said that people feel more at risk if they travel outside their normal region of 
residence. This was a point that was noted when analysing the difference between 
Middle East travellers going to destinations within the Middle East as opposed to 
travellers from outside the region. This does not mean, however, that travellers from 
outside a region are not exposed to more risk than travellers within the region! It can 
be considered as being similar to the phrase `just because you are paranoid does not 
mean that everyone is out to get you! ". However, some mentioned that it depends on 
where the tourists go (panellists 26,25,18), some also pointed to the fact that they 
thought the Middle East was a risky place to go and others suggested that a lack of 
familiarity has both positive and negative effects on travel-risk perceptions and 
decisions (17,16,12,3,6,10,18). 
An individual's risk averseness is important as it will affect where he/she 
chooses to go on holiday, when and where. This is because travel decisions 
are reliant on the individual imagining what it will be like, what kind of 
holiday experience they will have. Obviously past experience, friends, media 
etc will influence their imagined experience but ultimately the decision is 
based on the fit between the person's comfort zone and the holiday they 
think they will get. (15) 
Risk is about control, the extent to which someone wants or needs to have 
control over what happens to them. Package holidays are highly controlled, 
and more likely to attract people who are risk averse. Independent travel 
across different countries, cultures, transport networks, language and time 
zones is less controllable by the individual and more likely to appeal to 
people who accept a degree of uncertainty (risk) in what they do. (15) 
Risk awareness is partly subjective (depending upon the age, education 
levels etc of the individual) and partly objective (in that it depends upon the 
amount and accuracy of the information available). It is true, therefore, 
that to many travellers risk is far less important than to many other people. 
(2) 
The comments that were made with respect to the innate travel risk averseness of 
individuals, the level of travel experience of individuals, or the risk-perceptions 
associated with different regions were quite varied. However, there was some 
agreement about the role of the media in highlighting risks and recent events in some 
regions of the world. This was a point mentioned by several panel members (27,23, 
15,3,5,22 and 2) and that travellers from developed countries with open media are 
more likely to know and understand the risks involved in travel to destinations (16) 
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and the foreign-ness of travellers to the destinations for which they are bound (25,15 
and 5). There is clearly some overlap between this latter element and the innate 
travel-risk averseness of individuals and it was noted by several panel members that 
some cultures may be more likely to be more travel risk averse than others 
(25,16,10,15,27,21 and 2). Some anecdotal evidence mentioned by panel members 
included: 
Cultures are different and they most likely incorporate different 
perceptions of risk Also depending upon origin (and associated personal 
attributes) people will feel different degrees of risk pertaining to different 
destinations. (25) 
While many believed that Americans are highly risk averse (21,27,15), another 
panellist said (2): 
It might be an issue of propaganda. In the United States, for instance, the 
government publishes a travel-warning page, which it updates periodically. 
This includes places where apparent dangers really do exist, but it also 
includes countries that are probably safe to visit, but because they are seen 
as `enemies' or adversaries, they are placed on the list. 
Americans more risk averse and also geographically challenged so they 
are often unable to distinguish different destinations (For Americans they 
are all foreign 9 (21). 
Believe that travellers' tolerance of risk is partly conditioned by the 
degree of each type of risk that they live with at home Eg Dos Palmas 
resort in the Palawan Islands of Southern Philippines which experienced a 
dreadful terrorist attack in 2001 experienced a change in visitor mix from 
Europeans to Asians and particularly South Koreans following the attack 
(16) 
Risk awareness is also dependent on how often - how familiar the person 
is with travelling to a certain place. Before going to a "new "place people 
are more likely to be worried (if the information about the place is 
negative). If they have a good experience there, they are more likely to be 
more positive the next time round. (21) 
The age, gender, culture and occupation of travellers may influence their level of 
travel-risk averseness. In a similar way, the country of origin can be seen as a 
composite factor that reflects culture. The response to the question "do you think the 
country from which the traveller originates is an important influence on their level of 
travel-risk averseness" showed that a majority of panellists (68%) suggested that it 
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does have a strong influence. One of the panellists referred to the categorisation of 
cultures by Hofstede (2001) that was discussed in the literature review: 
Yes, definitely. The categorisation of cultures by Hofstede also helps us on 
this subject. To me, people from the eastern world are less risk aversive 
while those from the western society are more. (18) 
Some also argue that geopolitical circumstances affect their country's relationships 
with other countries and regions of the world and this can influence the level of risk 
averseness (3,16,15). Along the same train of thought, travellers from countries 
subject to threats of terrorist attacks are likely to be more averse to visiting those 
countries that make the threats. In the final round 86% of respondents suggested that 
the country of origin is important or very important and the result had not changed 
from the second to the third round. 
There seems to be a high positive correlation between the panel's view about the 
traveller's age and increases in risk averseness right from the very first round. While 
some suggested that: 
Older people are more concerned about physical risk, perhaps caused by 
unexpected illness or trauma, while this is less of an issue for younger 
people. Younger people are more concerned about financial risk, while 
older, more experienced individuals are more worldly and, therefore, less 
likely to be subjected to financial risk (5) 
It could also be argued that older people may have had more travel experience and 
that experience may be influencing them rather than their absolute age. These 
findings support the views that came out of the questionnaire survey, namely that 
older people (mainly over 50) are less concerned about financial risk. These findings 
are in line with other studies that suggested young people were `high risk travelers' 
because of their age and `naivety' [inexperience] (Jones et al ., 2006). In other words, 
a lack of awareness leads to a lack of averseness. 
Looking further into the demographics of travellers and how they may impact on their 
level of risk averseness, there was some feeling amongst panel members that females 
are more sensitive to travel-related risk [especially personal safety] (25,12,5) than 
their male counterparts and again this tended to support the results of the 
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questionnaire survey findings (chapter 8). However, some emphasised that gender 
alone is not a factor that influences attitudes to risk and that: 
Gender alone does not determine levels of risk averseness. Gender 
combined with the lifecycle stage of the individual is very important. 
(15) 
In this regard, the consensus developed suggesting that males are neutrally risk averse 
increasing from 67% in the first round, through 75% in the second round and finally 
to 76% in the final round. Panellists were equally agreed that females are perceived to 
be highly risk averse with more than 78% of panellists supporting this view in the 
final round, having grown from 71% of panellists in the first round. It seems that the 
earlier findings from the questionnaire survey are supported in the Delphi and that 
both support hypothesis 3 that travel related risk perceptions are influenced by the 
demographics of the traveller. 
The majority of panellists (80%) believed that previous experience is very important 
in determining the level of risk averseness, while some believe that the purpose of 
travel can influence attitudes, with leisure (discretionary) tourists being more 
susceptible to changing their travel decisions. In addition, leisure tourists may operate 
according to the following mode: 
Negative experience = nasty taste = to be avoided in future. (12) 
The findings of the questionnaire survey demonstrated that there was a significant 
difference between people who had experienced, directly themselves or indirectly 
through a relative, a risky situation when travelling, and those who had not. The latter 
group was seen to be less risk averse than the former. One of the panellists mentioned 
that risk averseness is related to awareness, previous experience and knowledge. 
Again, it is difficult to control for this variable in isolation. However, as mentioned 
earlier, the findings of the questionnaire survey show that there is a statistically 
significant difference between people who have been exposed to negative experiences 
(themselves or one of their relatives) and their level of risk averseness. The 
importance of previous experience in determining the level of risk averseness 
received a 96% level of agreement in the second round. The findings of the 
questionnaire survey also (see Table 8-16 and 8-17, chapter 8) suggested that people 
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who either themselves or whose relatives have been involved in risky situations 
previously tend to show more concern about all kinds of risks. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Floye et al. (2003) when they suggested that travel experience is 
the most significant predictor of travel intentions and that past experience might 
dominate one's perception of risk (Pinhey and Inverson 1994; Sonmez and Graefe 
1998). These findings may suggest that hypothesis 3, that the previous experience of 
the tourists is more important in determining travel related risk perceptions than any 
other factor, is true. 
The comments made with respect to the influence of education suggest that the 
majority believe that education does have an influence on the level of risk averseness. 
Many (27,26,25,21,15), suggest that the differences between education levels are 
based on the premise that the more educated people are, the more aware and 
knowledgeable of travel risks they become. However, others have suggested that this 
relationship could work counter to this and that the more educated people are, the less 
risk averse they become, perhaps because of the confidence given by their better 
knowledge. It is difficult to isolate these factors as one would expect a high degree of 
correlation between age, income, education, occupation and previous travel 
experience. In which case, any one or combination of these factors could be the 
causal factor for influencing travel risk averseness. In the final round of the Delphi, 
more than 95% of panellists agreed that education is a very important or important 
factor. 
Although the majority of panel members felt that the occupation of travellers would 
influence their level of risk averseness, less than 50% of panel members rated this at 
either the 4 or 5 level of influence (very important or important). The panel members' 
responses to this aspect were coloured by statements such as: 
If an individual is risk averse in their everyday life then they are more likely 
to be risk averse when travelling for example if someone is self employed 
(which may be seen as a `risky' option by someone else) then they may be 
less risk averse when travelling. How much 'risk' is involved in someone's 
day-to-day job is a factor for example trading on the stock market with other 
people's money is a 'risky' business, which may again affect travel 
decisions relative to risk There will always be exceptions though, for 
example the person who has a mundane job but decides to go bungee 
jumping! (15) 
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The final round of the Delphi was not able to produce a consensus that occupation 
was an important influence on travel-risk perceptions, with only 65% of panellists 
feeling that this was the case. The questionnaire survey was also not able to show 
significant differences between people's travel-risk perceptions and their occupation. 
The question relating to the religious affiliation of the traveller brought out some 
interesting issues. The results of the questionnaire survey showed that the most 
significant differences were between Muslim people and the rest. Many of the 
panellists in the Delphi study also pointed to the same conclusion, arguing that since 
9/11 the world's view toward Islam has changed and Muslims feel that they are at 
more risk in non-Muslim countries (12,3). It was also suggested that Jews may feel 
more vulnerable and hence more risk averse when going to Islamic countries for the 
same reasons. Some see the differences in religion in the same way as differences in 
culture (religion being a sub-set of culture) and so travellers may feel less comfortable 
the more "alien" the religious beliefs are to their own. Overall, a consensus amongst 
panel members was not reached during the first round, showing that 35.7% ranked 
religious affiliation as being a neutral factor whilst the same percentage sees it as 
having a strong influence on travel-risk perceptions. 
According to one of the respondents: 
Some Christians may be intimidated by the cultural differences involved in 
travelling to Islamic countries for a variety of reasons, which may affect 
their travel. I recently went to Iran which caused a great deal of 
consternation among friends and family. Partly it was because of the 
exoticism and strangeness of going to a fundamentalist Islamic country. 
Yet, in reality, Iran is quite an easy place to visit with very friendly people. 
(5) 
And another panellist pointed out that: 
Fatalism is part of some religions and cultures (22) 
Which is likely to lessen the level of travel-risk averseness as the fate of the traveller. 
was in the hands of a higher power. In the final round 75% of panellists suggested that 
travel risk averseness is not driven by people's religious affiliation. 
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In the first round of the Delphi, the majority of panellists suggested that people are 
more travel risk averse if they travel with their family members rather than when they 
alone. In support of this view, some panel members suggested that it depends on who 
they were travelling with and the majority felt that travelling with family, especially 
with young children, means being more risk averse (27,25,22,21,19,18,16 13,3 , 5, 
6,7,15,10). By the third round of the Delphi, the panel was evenly divided between 
those that felt who people are more risk averse when'travelling alone (50%) and those 
who suggested that people are less risk averse when travelling alone (50%). 
A key issue to be addressed when trying to understand travel decisions with respect to 
travel-related risk, is the relationship between perceived and actual risk. Whereas the 
morals of persuading travellers that an area is less risky than it actually is may be 
called into question, there could be a major shortfall in realising the potential of 
tourism if people hold a perceived risk of travel that is much greater than the actual 
reality. In the first round of the Delphi, panel members generally felt that there was 
no strong correlation between perceived travel risk and actual risk in many instances 
(travel to Iran being quoted as an example of how out of synchronisation these may 
be). However, others felt that there may be a correlation in terms of real and 
perceived risk with respect to health risks (19). Overall, it was felt that perceived risk 
was likely to be higher than actual risk (19,16,6,15,3,4,5) for most travellers. 
It is important to mention here that the role of the media and the travel 
advisory desk and insurance companies is of paramount importance. As the 
perception of risk could also be related to the fact that travel insurance 
companies could refuse to insure a traveller to a certain destination. 
The media de-mystifies risk, risk becomes personalised. The media turns it 
from unknown to known and thus more likely, even if statistically someone is 
very unlikely to be the victim of crime or terrorism whilst travelling. The 
important factor is not what is, but what is perceived to be (15). 
In terms of the media, any look at Mexico would suggest people shouldn't 
travel there, even if a risky situation is located in only one small region. 
Likewise, people tend to be shocked to learn that there is still tourism going 
on in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, albeit limited in region and scope 
(3). 
It doesn't matter what the real risk is, if I feel a destination is risky, then I 
will be more cautious than if I feel a place is not risky, even though the real 
risk may be higher. The earlier example of travel to Iran is a case in point. 
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It is perceived as an incredibly risky destination /hr most Westerners, 
_vet 
iiv 
experience bras just the opposite (5). 
In the third round of the Delphi the majority of panellists (60%) suggested that there 
is no correlation between the actual and perceived levels of travel related risk, while 
one of the panellists noted that: 
I agree with the even-split level of the answer given that perceptions do not 
necessarily translate into reality. These perceptions must be accompanied 
by situational factors which transform perceptions into aclualitv... Sonic 
regional countries, for instance, in Africa and Asia, arc more risk-prone to 
visit than in others. The situation might be explained in part by political 
tension and in part also by religious differences, perhaps reinli)rced h1' 
differences in cultural outlook (24). 
Although limited in scope, the results of comparing perceived risks (Table 9-1) with 
actual risks, as identified by insurance company `claims data', indicate that there is no 
correlation between the two. A view shared by more than half of the experts in the 
Delphi exercise. It seems, from this evidence, that there is some justification in 
rejecting the null hypothesis 7, that travel related risk perceptions are highly 
correlated with actual travel related risks. 
Table 9- 1 Top three countries: Actual vs Perceived Risk 
Types of risks 
The risk of crime (theft, robbery, and 
pickpocket) is... 
Countries Countries 
Perceived Actual 
India Egypt 
China Caribbean 
Thailand USA 
LISA Czech republic 
Italy 'T'hailand 
Spain Switzerland 
In terms of the longitudinal aspects of risk perception, the panel members were asked 
if there was a perception that travel is riskier now than it was 10 years ago. The initial 
view from panel members was that the level of travel-related risk had not changed 
much over the past ten years. Some pointed out that over this period they tell that the 
health risk had declined in importance whilst the terrorist threat had increased (25). 
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After 9/11 and all the following terrorism incidents the risk associated with 
travel has changed completely. Before, the travel risk was more of targeting 
specific individuals and small scale. Nowadays 9/11 et al however are 
activities targeting general public who were unlucky to be in the wrong 
place at the wrong time. 
Many of these activities are not locality specific but more likely to be "one 
group against another group of people", i. e. Islamists against the whole 
world. Bali, Madrid, Israel and Palestine, Africa, N. America, UK. " the 
geographic pattern or boundary isn't clear but the political pattern is quite 
obvious (12). 
Some suggested that the actual level of risk has not changed but that the perceived 
level of risk has changed (increased) and some see the media as being responsible for 
this increase (5,22,10) 
The level of risk of travel really hasn't changed over time. The only thing that has 
changed is that the American media (which means the global mass media) has 
picked on fear as the dominant theme of its media coverage in the last six years. 
There are as many terrorist attacks now against tourists as there were 30 years 
ago. There are as many natural catastrophes that affect tourists as there were 30 
years ago. As many tourists are being victimized by crime and swindles as 30 
years ago (5,22,10). 
The final result from the Delphi study was that rather than staying fairly constant over 
the ten year period, 70% of the panel now felt that travel-related risk is higher now 
than it was previously. 
More than 80% of panellists in the first round felt that the region in which the 
destination is located will affect travellers' responses. One of the panellists noted that: 
I believe that the current political situation has created what President Bush 
termed as `the axis of evil' has definitely created zones with higher 
perceived levels of risk (19) 
By the time the Delphi had run its course, this view was consolidated and more than 
92 % of panellists felt that the region was a significant influence on travel-risk 
perceptions. The agreement increased to more than 92% by the final round. 
In response to the question as to whether people are more concerned about the travel 
risk related to acts of terrorism and political unrest rather than to other forms of risk, 
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more than 82% of the panellists in the first round felt that this was the case. The 
second round resulted in this becoming a unanimous view of the panel, suggesting 
that the unpredictable nature of political-related activities (mainly terrorism) sends 
chilling signals to the tourism community as opposed to, say, natural disasters that are 
well-known and can sometimes be predicted with some precision (24). 
On the same theme, panel members were asked to identify which of the different 
types of risk was the single most important. After the first round some 46% of the 
panellists identified terrorism as the greatest single threat with crime being regarded 
as the second single most important type of risk (25% of panellists). As we have seen, 
the panellists believe that terrorist acts are perceived as being a higher threat than 
natural disasters (25,18,17,15,16 and 3). They added that while natural disasters 
cause death, they happen rarely and may also be seen as being an act of God, 
therefore taking them out of the decision process. However, terrorism and political 
unrest are seen as being significant when people travel, as they tend to target civilians. 
Panel members again came back to the role of the media in setting the stage for risk 
perceptions of terrorism, adding that media coverage of terrorism and political issues 
is generally significantly higher (4,5) presumably because of its "spectacular" nature. 
The panellists exceeded the consensus threshold level in the final round, with more 
than 77% of them agreeing that political risk, namely terrorism, is the greatest single 
risk. 
Given the overwhelming level of agreement among the panel in terms of the role of 
terrorism in setting the stage of travel-risk perceptions, it is interesting to compare this 
with the questionnaire survey results where travellers ranked the risk of terrorism only 
in 11`h place. It may be the result of the circumstances that respondents were in when 
there was no direct, immense threat and so the risk of terrorism has not been 
perceived highly. Alternatively, it may be that the public are not as influenced by the 
media as the panel of experts feel they are. The results from the Delphi and the 
questionnaire survey are not supportive of each other and so it can be concluded there 
is not enough evidence to reject hypothesis H5, that travel related risk associated with 
political unrest is more significant than any other form of travel related risks as a 
driver of travel decisions, whilst there is also not enough evidence to confirm the 
hypothesis. 
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9.3 Regional risk 
The regional results from both the questionnaire survey and the Delphi exercise are 
shown in Graphs 9-1 and 9-2. Both research approaches show that the majority of 
respondents ranked the Middle East as the region with the highest level of risk. 
However, to temper the results it can be noted that some respondents suggested that: 
My choice is affected by perceived levels of terrorism, health problems and 
crime associated with particular regions and which may or may not have 
been highlighted by the medial newspapers. (21) 
However, subjectivity is an issue for everyone who answers this questions ie 
how factors such as culture, gender etc affect perceptions of the other. 
Hence am I more likely to see my own `home' region Europe as being less of 
a risk than those regions that are culturally very dijjerent! (15) 
Following the Middle East as the region perceived to have the highest travel-related 
risk, Africa was ranked second greatest risk by both the questionnaire survey and the 
Delphi panel. However, the Delphi panel also ranked South America at the same level 
of risk as Africa, whereas the survey questionnaire ranked it as third. One panellist 
mentioned that although crime, such as drug trafficking and militants, is quite high in 
South America, as a destination it is not as well known to the travellers as other 
regions. In both the questionnaire survey and the Delphi, Europe was considered to be 
the least risky region, followed by North America. However, interestingly enough, 
the USA ranked as the country with highest level of crime in the questionnaire survey. 
Some panellists felt that looking at regions was not precise enough and that individual 
countries should be considered 'Some risks are associated with countries' (14). 
Another panellist also mentioned that `risk and level of development are correlated'. 
However, some centrally governed states e. g. China are quite safe from major 
problems (although perhaps higher risk in terms of contaminated food) (25). 
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Graph 9-1 Regional risks ranking(Delphi) where 7 is the 
lowest perceived risk and I is the highest 
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One of the respondent suggested that: 
There will he no broad agreement on this issue and that there are regional 
variations and interpretations of the risk divide, broadly defined. Much of' 
the debate is multi faceted: political, religions, economic, cultural, or even 
seen as a clash of civilization, etc. It is a subject that evokes emotions, 
epitomised in the statement: "One man's meat is another man's poison ". 
Depending on assessor's viewpoint, there will he subjective and conflicting 
interpretations of the situation. Certain characteristics of' 'risk ' are 
associated with certain regions. One thing is certain: We have wihºc'ssed 
considerable insecurity, which seems to he a global phenomenon in the new 
millennium. 
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Graph 9-2 Regional risks ranking (questionnaire survey) 
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The picture painted about the travel-risk when travelling to different regions is quite 
clear. Graphs 9-1,9-2 and 9-3 show that the Middle East region is perceived as 
having the highest risk with nearly 62% of the Delphi panel members rating it as a "1" 
in the sense of having the greatest level of perceived risk and a further 14.2", %% rating 
the region as a "2" the second highest perceived risk level. This result is not too 
dissimilar from the results from the questionnaire survey (9-3) where over 60% of 
respondents rated the Middle East region as either "I" or "2". Africa scores the 
second highest rating of perceived risk by the Delphi panel members with more than 
52% of the panellists rating it "1" or "2", and this view is echoed in the questionnaire 
survey (9-3) with 57% of respondents giving the same responses. The overall ranking 
of perceived travel-risk from the questionnaire survey and Delphi exercise revealed 
the same result. Letting 1 be the region with highest perceived risk and 7 the region 
with lowest perceived risk, the order of regions was as fellows: 
2% 
1. Middle East 
2. Africa 
3. South America 
3. South Asia 
5. East Asia and Pacific 
6. North America 
7. Europe 
It is notable that the highest level of consensus achieved in both approaches was that 
the Middle East was rated the most risky region in the world. In general the Delphi 
panellists were not able to reach a consensus in terms of general ranking fier the other 
regions. 
Graph 9-3 Regional risks ranking (Delphi) where I is the 
highest perceived risk and I is the lowest 
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In terms of the types of regional risks, the panel members were asked to comment on 
the types of perceived risks that were associated with the different regions, a topic that 
was also explored in the questionnaire survey (graph 9-4 and 9-5). 
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Graph 9-4 Types of regional risks(Delphi) 
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The consensus between the results of the questionnaire survey and the panellists is 
evident. In both results Africa was deemed by the majority to have the highest 
perceived risk for Health risk issues, whilst North America and South America are 
both ranked high in terms of Crime related risk. Europe was perceived to be the satcst 
region in both sets of results, and within Europe crime was seen to be the greatest risk. 
As one panellist mentioned (25), this is perhaps because "Crime is a fairly high 
frequency event". 
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Graph 9-5 Types of regional risks 
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Although there were clear differences between the Delphi and questionnaire results in 
terms of the perceptions about specific travel-related risks in each of the regions, there 
were also some commonalities. For instance, Crime figured highly for the regions of 
Europe, North and South America. Although the questionnaire survey gave more 
power to the concerns about natural disasters in South and East Asia , the Delphi 
panellists also gave this form of risk relatively high ratings for these regions, the 
impact of the Boxing Day 2004 Tsunami undoubtedly influencing this perception. 
The main risk concerns associated with the Middle East from the questionnaire survey 
are terrorism, political unrest and cultural barriers. The views frone the Delphi 
panellists were similar, with 90% of the experts suggesting that political unrest and 
terrorism were the main issues in this region, but the cultural barriers were considered 
less important at 40%. 
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From these results it seems evident that hypothesis H6: that there are signilicant 
differences between the different regions of the world and their perceived travcl- 
related risks, cannot be rejected. 
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The Delphi exercise also included two aspects relating to travel risk that were not 
included in the questionnaire survey. These two aspects were focused on the 
difficulties in achieving tourism development in the Middle East region general and in 
Iran, in particular. More than 90% of the panellists strongly or very strongly agreed 
with hypothesis H8: that the Middle East region's tourism development has suffered 
because of the perceived level of travel-related risk. Many of panellists believed that 
the solution to these difficulties lies in political developments; however, they felt that 
little could be done to improve the political and ethical issues. Some panel members 
also felt that the image of the Middle East has gone badly wrong, and people are 
unable to differentiate between countries within the region at present. Others felt that 
the perceived levels of risk were not far from the actual, suggesting that it is not the 
perception of Middle East that is dangerous it is `rcality'(7). Some panel members 
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also drew parallels with Northern Ireland where similar image problems, generated 
during the conflict period, have caused tourism development to falter (17,7,15,27). 
Many of the panel members suggested that the solution to better tourism development 
requires an enhancement in the levels of safety and that the Middle East would need 
to generate confidence in the tourists' minds about their sincerity with respect to 
fighting terrorism. The aggressive policies shown towards Israel were also mentioned 
as an area that would need to be improved. Although, as we have seen, the Delphi 
panel members were not as convinced about the importance of cultural barriers as 
those responding to the questionnaire survey, the experts did suggest that there is a 
need for awareness programmes for the indigenous population so that they become 
more tolerant towards foreigners, curbing extremist propaganda which urges locals to 
hate or kill foreigners (2,3,5,6,7,8 15,16,27). Some anecdotal evidence mentioned 
by panel members included: 
As the Middle East features almost daily new reports of hazardous incidents 
in one country or another in the Middle East it is hard to imagine that the 
area as a whole can reduce the image. There are, of course, some notable 
exceptions such as Dubai but until the troubles are resolved the problems 
are not perceptions' but `reality'. Foreign Office guidelines will not remove 
high risk destinations until their status is changed and this will have an 
impact on people's likelihood to visit. Egypt has demonstrated that terrorist 
events can be overcome but it does need consistent level of stability to do so 
(7). 
Nothing - Image is like a brand. The second hardest thing in branding is to 
change the brand. The hardest is to create it. As a westerner, the brand 
identity/destination image of the Middle East is as one being unsafe 
however; it can change by targeting new markets, such as Russia and 
former Russian Republics(5) 
Focus on their present markets and try to increase visitation and length of 
stay from them rather than spending a lot of time and money with newer 
western markets (11). 
Stress the positive aspects of tourism in each destination; 
Provide good, reliable information to the tourist and travel agent; 
as far as possible 'steer' the tourist to the relatively risk free areas of the 
country(2). 
You have to define your terms. Middle East is broad for most people and 
includes most of the Arabian Peninsula, as well as Israel and its neighbours. 
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Yes, it has an effect Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon. No it does not have an 
effect Egypt, Saudi, Dubai all for various reasons. Israel survives only on 
religious tourism and Jewish commitment tourism. Egypt is ok but cannot 
diversify. Saudi is Ok because of the Haj and Dubai is Ok because of 
$$$(5). 
..... but presenting an image that Dubai is liberal, westernised, fashionable, 
new, luxury, fantasy, business-as-usual, everybody-is-welcome, even though 
not far across the water the war is still on-going. It is a really good PR that 
Dubai did. Aggressive marketing, price cut (it is really cheap holidaying in 
Dubai), government-led tourism development, tolerance towards everything 
from religion, drinking, drugs etc (as long as you don't get caught). Also 
Dubai establishes itself as a safe, secured, law and order, clean, affordable 
luxury destination (12). 
Some of the earlier comments are in line with findings of related questions in the 
questionnaire survey, which show that there is a travel pattern in the Middle East and 
countries fall in to three categories: 
" Very High Risk (I must not go); 
9 High Risk, and; 
9 Average risk. 
In contrast with most of the comments, one of the panellists believes that "there are 
"hot spots" in many places - including many American cities, or almost at any soccer 
game. The perceived risks outside these certain hotspots, including many areas 
within the Middle East are not higher than elsewhere (25). 
Many of the panellists generally believed that Iran is a very desirable destination (3), 
its fabulous culture, history and art is a major attraction (16,12) and that it is blessed 
with many unique tourist sites (2,12) and friendly hosts (5,17,12). However, 
running counter to this, the majority (74%) either very strongly or strongly agreed 
with hypothesis H9: that the travel risk perception of Iran is the main hindrance to the 
development of tourism activities. The panellists went on to suggest that the high risk 
perception has been created mainly through political means such as anti-western 
attitudes and religious restrictions (i. e. not female friendly). They also suggested that 
the problems are probably not safety issues as a result of terrorism or crime (2,5,11, 
12,15,16,23,28) and that the issue of perceived risk in travelling to Iran is a little 
more complex than for other countries of the region. However, one of the respondents 
suggested that 28: 
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It isn't travel risk in the country that causes people not to travel there - it is 
basic cultural ignorance and a fear of the unknown. 
Some see a resolution to the difficulties in solving the political differences between 
Iran and the West, mainly between Iran and USA. Also, while Iran is labelled as a 
harbourer of terrorists and a hostile nation by the USA and other countries, one cannot 
expect it to be successful in developing tourism (3,7,12,27): 
Actions such as this will ensure the failure of Iran to develop a tourism 
industry based upon western clients. The position could alter dramatically if 
the political situation were to change. Iran would receive a considerable 
pent-up demand from long-haul tourists in Western Europe and North 
America. (2) 
A few disagreed with the emphasis being placed solely on the political problems, 
suggesting instead that Iran suffers from an antiquated visa system, high costs, poor 
access and poor infrastructure (5) and that Iran is perceived as boring (hardly a recipe 
for successful development! ): 
It will NEVER be an international destination until and unless these issues 
are addressed. Politics is the least of its worries, especially given that there 
is a large and emerging non-western travel market....... It also suffers f ers from 
an unclear destination image. Egypt has taken antiquities; Dubai - Arab 
tourism; Turkey resorts; many other places shopping. How will it position 
itself uniquely? (10) 
... Until the risk of becoming a victim of religious 
bigotry is reduced many 
will avoid the country. The bad press about its nuclear programme is, to my 
mind, of secondary importance to the fear of unprovoked danger by not 
believing in their particular religious 'brand. Tourism is about welcoming 
people regardless of their race or religious beliefs and the perception of the 
way in which Iran is governed is that the religious leaders are more 
powerful that its elected ones. There is no clear demonstration that they 
wish to welcome tourists and so if they do want to become a popular 
destination they will have to spend a lot of money convincing would-be 
visitors that they will be welcome. (7) 
9.4 The Delphi Progression 
Although not a key aspect of this research, it is worth spending a brief moment 
looking at the effectiveness of the Delphi exercise as an approach. The questionnaire 
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survey gives the respondents a single opportunity to respond to the issues. In contrast, 
the Delphi exercise gives panel members multiple opportunities to respond and then 
modify their responses. This particular study gave panel members three opportunities 
to revisit their responses and it is worth considering whether this multiple opportunity 
achieved any significant changes in the responses provided. 
To examine whether or not iterative panel data perform differently to non-iterative, 
the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test was implemented. The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test 
indicates that there were significant changes in the responses to 5 of the questions 
between round one and round two (Table 9-2 and 9-3). For example, for question 
relating to the importance of previous experiences influencing travel-risk perceptions 
there were 5 panel members in the first round who felt that the impact of previous 
experience was not important, but by the second round they had changed their view 
and this resulted in a consensus (100%) of panel members holding this view (see 
Table 9-1, previous experience). For the question relating to the impact of occupation 
on the travel-risk perceptions again there were 5 panel members who changed their 
view from the first to the second round. In three other questions there were panel 
members who changed their point of view between the first and second rounds. 
Given the panel size (25) at the second round this means that on average 20% of the 
panel made changes to their responses after considering the viewpoint of the panel as 
a whole. On that basis one might agree that there is a difference in the performance of 
iterative panel exercises compared with non-iterative. This does not mean, however, 
that the former perform better than the latter in terms of their reliability or accuracy. 
The same test was undertaken on the responses made in the second and third rounds 
of the Delphi exercise and it was found that there were no significant changes 
between these two rounds. Therefore if it were not for the additional exploration of 
the issues relating to the Middle East and Iran, the third round did not add anything to 
our understanding of the issues. 
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Table 9-2 Wilcoxon Signed-Rank 
S. Previous experience Negative Ranks 
- Previous experience Positive Ranks 
Ties 
Total 
S. Impact of occupation Negative Ranks 
- Impact of occupation Positive Ranks 
Ties 
Total 
S. Impact of education - Negative Ranks 
Impact of education Positive Ranks 
Ties 
Total 
S. Country of origin - Negative Ranks 
Country of origin Positive Ranks 
Ties 
Total 
S. Greatest single risk - Negative Ranks 
Greatest single risk Positive Ranks 
Ties 
Total 
a S. Previous experience < Previous experience 
b S. Previous experience > Previous experience 
c S. Previous experience = Previous experience 
d S. Impact of occupation < Impact of occupation 
e S. Impact of occupation > Impact of occupation 
f S. Impact of occupation = Impact of occupation 
gS Impact of education < Impact of education 
hS Impact of education > Impact of education 
i S. Impact of education = Impact of education 
j S. Country of origin < Country of origin 
k S. Country of origin > Country of origin 
I S. Country of origin = Country of origin 
m S. Greatest single risk < Greatest single risk 
n S. Greatest single risk > Greatest single risk 
o S. Greatest single risk = Greatest single risk 
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
0(a) . 00 . 00 
5(b) 3.00 15.00 
18(c) 
23 
0(d) . 00 . 00 
5(e) 3.00 15.00 
18(f) 
23 
0(g) . 00 . 00 
4(h) 2.50 10.00 
19(i) 
23 
10) 3.50 3.50 
6(k) 4.08 24.50 
16(I) 
23 
5(m) 3.00 15.00 
0(n) . 00 . 00 
14(o) 
19 
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Table 9-3 Test Statistics(c) 
As can be seen in Graph 9-1, the mean values relating to each of these issues increase 
as we move from round I to round 2. 
Conclusion 
The Delphi analysis more or less confirmed the results that were derived from the 
questionnaire, with a few important exceptions. Probably the most significant is the 
importance that the panel members, almost universally, gave to terrorism in shaping 
travel-risk perceptions. Yet when the travellers were asked this, they only rated 
terrorism as the 11 `h level of risk. For the operation of the Delphi it should be noted 
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that after three rounds, the Delphi consensus was achieved on 18 out of 23 statements 
(see appendix 4) encompassing individual risk perception, general risk, types of 
regional risk perception, and in particular the Middle East and Iran (see appendix D- 
1). 
It should be noted that the conclusions of the study are based on an interpretation of 
data presented in the study and restricted to the population survey, however most of 
the findings are in line with public perspective (questionnaire survey). Second, the 
consensus findings are tourism-based. Finally, because of the failure to get responses 
from a couple of panellists from the Middle East region, after round one, the majority 
of panel members (except one) seem to normally reside outside the Middle East area. 
This chapter compared the results of the Delphi analyses with those derived from the 
questionnaire survey and found that there were similarities in the responses as well as 
divergences, particularly in the ranking of different types of risks. Tourism in the 
Middle East and Iran was explored briefly, in terms of the reasons underlying its 
relatively poor performance as well as the future prospects. In spite of the region 
being rich in tourism assets from climate through environment to heritage, there are 
many obstacles that hinder the growth and development of tourism to the region in 
general and to Iran in particular. Whereas the region is painted with a brush that 
suggests it is a risky place to visit because of political unrest and terrorism, it is 
possibile hostility towards westerners, the treatment of the female sex and the cultural 
gap that keeps many western visitors away from even the most peaceful and secure 
Middle Eastern country. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
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Evaluation of research objectives 
The central objectives of this research were seven-fold. To examine the literature 
with respect to travel risk, to determine the effects of major incidents on travel to 
specific destinations; to explore the differences in recovery time and to attribute such 
differences to factors such as the nature of the incidents or the marketing response of 
destinations; to evaluate the work that has been done in determining risk perceptions; 
to study the travel risk perceptions of travellers from different backgrounds; to 
examine the differences between the perceived risks and actual risks of specific 
destinations; To explore the effects of perceived travel risk on future travel (using the 
Delphi Technique). 
10.1 Objectives one and four 
" To examine the literature with respect to travel risk 
" To evaluate the work that has been done in determining risk perceptions 
The key difference between these two objectives shown above is that the first relates 
to those activities that may disrupt the operation of the tourism system. That is, they 
could be relatively minor blips to the system such as an airline crash, or major blips 
such as the outbreak of war. The second objective listed above is concerned with the 
factors that influence the levels of risk perceived by tourists, notwithstanding the 
influence of specific events included in the former objective. These could relate to 
demographic factors such as age, sex and education or to other experiential factors 
such as the level of risk to which they are normally exposed, the media images of a 
destination or even previous experience. 
The literature (Chapter 2) introduced the tourism system, and examined how the 
popularity and desirability of specific tourism destinations is influenced by different 
push and pull factors (Margrete and Edelheim 2004) and, in particular, the impact of 
impediments into tourism motivation in the light political event. Many experts believe 
that tourists implement their freedom and power to avoid risky situations or 
destinations (Hall, 1994; Wahab, 1996; Wall, 1996, p145; Wahab et al. 1996; Pizam 
1999, Sonmez 1999; Sonmez et al. 1999; Cooper, 2001; Aktas et al. in Theohold 
2005). The literature also discussed how some believe that while that natural disasters 
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can obstruct the flow of tourism, terrorism risk tends to frighten the travelling public 
more severely. Violent protest, social unrest, civil war, terrorist actions, the perceived 
violations of human rights, or even the mere threat of these activities can all serve to 
cause tourists to alter their travel behaviours Hall(1994). 
The main goal of Chapter 6 was to examine the concept of risk perception in 
association with travel and in particular, with respect to the leisure traveller. The 
literature discussed how the images people have of destinations are of immense 
importance in discretionary forms of tourism such as recreational vacations, where the 
destination is not predetermined by business demands or social necessities. This is 
because the product, at least for the first-time visitor, is an intangible one that cannot 
be directly experienced prior to its consumption. In these cases, potential visitors 
must rely on their images in choosing one destination over another. In other words, as 
far as the tourism originating country is concerned, the perceived risk of a particular 
destination is everything because it is that perception that will influence demand. Of 
course, there may be travel-risk perceptions about the fundamental and generic 
aspects of tourism such as the risks involved and perceived associated with the 
different modes of transport. These may influence whether a traveller will fly or drive 
or go by sea, for instance. However, once the fundamentals are decided it is very 
much a question of the perception of the destination or the region in which the 
destination is located. 
The literature also revealed that there are a variety of risks that may influence the 
travel decisions of tourists, including those relating to physical harm, financial loss 
and the risk of dissatisfaction from their travel experience; and that there are many 
factors that may contribute to it, such as individual background and demographic 
characteristics. It further considered whether it is the frequency of negative events, 
natural and man-made that is increasing or it is simply that each disaster has a more 
disturbing impact (Grainger and Crouch 2006), or simply that the mass media 
influences people in terms of their perception of risk. The end result is the same; 
people seem to have become more concerned with risk issues when they travel as 
tourists. When the tourism experts were asked whether there had been a change in 
risk or risk perceptions over the past 10 years, it was interesting to see that although 
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the first round suggested that there had not been a change, these views were modified 
as the Delphi progressed. A second round response was that the level of risk 
perception had changed on some aspects of risk, notably health risks, but by the end 
of the Delphi the experts (70% of them) felt that the level of perceived risk had 
increased and this falls in line with the findings from the literature and one's, own 
instinctive thoughts. 
10.2 Objectives two and three: 
" To determine the effects of major incidents on travel to specific destinations 
" To explore the differences in recovery time and to attribute such differences to 
factors such as the nature of the incidents or the marketing response of 
destinations. 
A selection of incidents and the time recovery period with respect to six case studies 
was undertaken for this study from developed and developing countries in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 4. These attacks, in spite of not being targeted at tourism, increased 
people's risk perceptions of travelling and reduced the arrivals number. Pizam and 
Flesicher (2001) also suggested in their study that terrorist attacks, whether of high or 
low intensity, do affect tourism flows. 
This study has shown that as result of attacks, the number of tourists who visited 
Egypt a year after the attack decreased by one million. The corresponding figure for 
Indonesia was a decrease of 600,000 and for the USA a decline of 2.7 million (See 
Graph 4-24). Tourism revenue also declined in the earlier cases. The direct loss to 
Egypt was 1 billion US$ (See Figure 3-2), more than 5,200 US$ million in the USA 
(See Graph 4-1) and 1248 million US$ in Indonesia (See Graph 3-6). The impacts 
however were less significant in the three other case study areas, namely Kenya, 
Spain and the UK and the impacts were found to be less in terms of both arrivals and 
expenditure where the figure carried on as either the same as before the attacks, or 
even higher. 
In terms of the next objective, all destinations increased security post attacks and 
undertook an extensive marketing campaign. However, one might argue that the 
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increased security may raise risk averseness in travellers who may feel that the risk 
must be high if the level of security has been increased. Some have argued that the 
size of an economy (GDP) has got much to do with ability of a country to resist 
terrorist attacks (Sandlers and Enders, 2005) but this view is not supported by the 
evidence from the case studies. Tourism in Spain and the UK are good examples of 
where the tourism flows did not decrease significantly following the terrorist attacks, 
even though the characteristics (countries of origin, socio-economic groupings etc) of 
visitors may have been changed by the events. On the other hand, the USA showed a 
significantly different pattern of effects and the recovery of the industry took more 
than three years. Pizam and Flesicher (2001) suggested that the magnitude and nature 
of the impact depends on the frequency of attacks (which may act as a proxy for the 
likelihood of future attacks) and where there were no repeat attacks, they concluded 
that tourism in the area tended to return to normal in a period of between 6-12 
months. The results of this study suggested that the recovery period does vary 
significantly and that there are many factors that may explain such variations. Such 
factors include the timing of the attack, the stage of tourism development, the scale of 
the attacks, the frequency of the attacks and the responses after the attacks (Pizam 
1999; Darkus and Kutan, 2001; Frey et al. 2004; Bruck and Wickstrom 2004, Darkus 
and Kutan, 2001). It is difficult to see only one factor being responsible for explaining 
the recovery period and the impact of the attacks. This study also suggests that 
while, not surprisingly, travel-warning issues have a significant role in shaping the 
traveller's mind, the issue of travel warnings is dominated by more general marketing 
and political issues. 
10.3 Objective five: 
" To study the travel risk perceptions of travellers from different backgrounds 
The study has shown conclusively that the perceptions and attitudes of tourists play an 
important role in the holiday decision-making process and that perception of risk is a 
multidimensional concept. Each dimension of risk has a different magnitude and 
impact on the tourism industry. In this regard, this study has provided a broad 
approach for the classification of risk perceptions and evaluation of those perceptions. 
The study also recommended that demographic variables are, to some extent, 
influential factors in determining the level of perceived travel-related risk. However, 
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it would seem from the evidence that some variables are more important than others 
in explaining variations in risk perceptions. The demographics of travellers alone do 
not determine the tourists' behaviour and this finding is in line with the finding by 
Cleaver (2000) who concluded that "gender and martial status and dependent 
children offer more insight". This study also suggests that age is to some extent an 
influential factor in determining risk perceptions but not in a simple linear fashion. 
The young seem less concerned than the old and the middle-age groups seemed to be 
the most concerned of all. Also, the type of risk seemed to vary by age groupings. In 
contrast, occupation and education levels did not seem to offer much in the way of 
explanatory power when it comes to the level of travel risk perceptions. The influence 
of a traveller's previous experience and/or those close to them was found to be highly 
influential in determining travel risk perceptions, bringing worse fears into reality. 
This was a finding of the literature and the analyses of this thesis (Goodrich 1978; 
Perdue 198; Sonmez and Graefe 1998). 
10.4 Objective six 
" To examine the differences between the perceived risks and actual risks of 
specific destinations 
According to Psychometric research which "rests on pioneering research in cognitive 
and social psychology", perceived risk may be characterized by a distorted view of 
actual risk, formed by the lack of knowledge, previous viewpoints and subjective 
individual knowledge without real substance (Jasanoff 1998). This study briefly 
looked at the data provided by a major insurance company in terms of crime and 
health claims whilst travelling. The questionnaire survey asked the respondents to 
reflect their views about the different destinations and their perceptions of risk related 
to those countries. The results from the questionnaire when compared with the actual 
claims from the insurance company data set revealed how perceptions could be. far 
from the reality. The countries identified by travellers as being of high risk with 
respect to health issues and crime did not correlate with the top countries in terms of 
actual claims. From this finding one can surmise that there is no real correlation 
between actual and perceived risks, that perhaps the images derived by travellers 
outweigh the evidence in terms of where the real risks are located. This is useful 
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information for destination marketing agents who may be able to attract visitors even 
when the reality is such that there is a relatively high level of risk for visitors. 
Equally, it must be depressing for marketing managers to find that the image of their 
destination is such that tourists feel there is a high level of risk associated with visits 
to their destination even when the truth is that the risk is relatively low. This problem 
is similar to those relating to modes of transport where travellers may perceive air 
travel as being relatively risky in spite of the evidence that road traffic accidents offer 
far more risk. The Delphi panel members started off their rounds by suggesting that 
there was also no strong correlation between perceived and actual risk, but this view 
softened during the course of the exercise when they argued that there are some 
aspects of risk where travellers generally perceive them to be higher than the actual 
and ended up by suggesting that in general, travellers will perceive risks to be higher 
than they actually are. 
10.5 Obiective seven 
To explore the effects of perceived travel risk on future travel (using Delphi 
Technique) 
In line with previous studies (Sunmez, 1999, Thomas, 2003b), travel related risk is a 
major factor in travel decision making while the result of Delphi survey suggested 
that political risks are the greatest single type of event that generates travel-risk 
averseness This finding is also consistent with the view expressed by Jones et al. 
(2006). The study also shows that although the public may be influenced by the media 
in terms of their perceived levels of travel-related risk, their perceptions of risk may 
not necessarily run parallel to the way that the media or academic experts feel about 
the issues. Attitudes towards risk are more complex and in some cases difficult to 
formalise. For instance, while the majority of experts in this study believe that 
terrorism is the greatest single type of event that generates travel-risk averseness and 
that people are more concerned about travel-risk related to acts of terrorism and 
political unrest than they are about other risks such as those related to natural 
disasters, the questionnaire survey revealed that terrorism is far from being the major 
risk concern to people. 
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It also emerged from the preliminary study that there is a strong relationship between 
the region of the world and the perception of travellers towards risk. The region 
involved in the travel decision enters the debate in two ways. First, in terms of the 
way that people originating from different regions feel about travel-related risk. For 
example, people originating from a region such as Latin America, where crime is 
more prevalent, have lower perceptions of crime-related risks when they travel than, 
say, travellers originating from Europe. Secondly, it became clear from the survey 
data and was later supported by the Delphi study, that some regions to which tourists 
may travel are associated with specific types of travel-related risks. Some regions, 
such as Africa, were notable because of elevated risk perceptions regarding health, 
others, such as the Middle East, in terms of the risks associated with political unrest 
and terrorism. In addition, it was evident that tourism travel to the Middle East has 
suffered from the perceived levels of travel-related risk (mainly political and cultural) 
and that travel related risk is one of the most significant factors that have hindered the 
development of tourism activities in the region in general and in Iran in particular. 
The findings also brought to light the fact that there is an identified travel pattern in 
the Middle East where countries in the Middle East region can be divided into three 
groups (1) very high risk, (2) risky and (3) countries with an average level of risk. 
The survey also explored how many believed that the tourism industry in Iran has 
suffered as a result of the political and anti-western policies emanating from within 
the country, combined with religious restrictions, particularly towards the foreigner 
(i. e. female unfriendly limitations). Moreover, the majority of the international 
tourism experts in the Delphi panel suggested that little could be done to improve the 
prospects of tourism in the country unless the political situation changed. This 
research suggests that although the five major aspects of sun, sand, sea, sex and 
security are seen as a core to developing tourism in most regions in the world, the 
sixth "s" seems to be critical in the Middle East, `Secularity'. 
10.6 Implications of the study 
The series of terrorist attacks that have taken place in recent times, particularly the 
high scale events that targeted civilians and tourists, has raised issues for tourism 
managers who are responsible for planning or marketing tourism. The main issues 
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being how to deal with the somewhat indeterminate impacts and long term effects of 
the attacks. A good understanding of risk perceptions and the factors that influence 
them is one area where they could focus to develop a risk management plan and to 
deal with severe events. Jasanoff (1998) suggested that "theories of risk perception" 
are naturally political as they take within them implicit understandings about how to 
systematize and put into practice policies for managing risk. This study has 
highlighted the complexities of how risk perceptions are formed and the factors that 
influence such formation. By drawing attention to the travellers' perceptions about 
the hierarchy of risks and the factors that influence them, it will help policy and 
strategy makers build in relevant aspects when making their plans. 
This study has contributed to a better understanding of risk perceptions, both from 
travellers' side and the experts' point of view. This is important because the experts 
chosen for the Delphi Panel were influential tourism specialists whose advice is often 
sought by destinations when making their tourism strategies. If the experts' views do 
not concur with those held by the travellers there is a danger that strategists may 
overreact in some cases, such as convincing the travellers that their destination is safe 
from political unrest, and overlook the importance of assuring visitors that crime and 
health are not high risk elements of travel to that destination. The travellers' 
perspective is even more critical for the policy maker in terms of how people 
conceptualize and perceive different kinds of risk. The data gathered from the public 
also show, for instance, that people seem to be less aware about the level of crime risk 
in South America whereas the experts in the Delphi were aware of these risks. 
These issues are particularly important for tourism policy makers and so destinations 
need to be aware of the dimensions of risks and how they are likely to impact on their 
industry. Such awareness would enable tourism managers/planner to design and 
implement policies to reduce the negative effects of risk perception. These issues are 
relevant to destination marketers, travel intermediaries, insurance companies and the 
wider tourism industry. 
The study also suggests that there is evidence that indicates that the Iranian 
Government is reluctant to proactively attract tourists. The results also demonstrate 
that the Middle Eastern travellers are less concerned about travelling to Iran than 
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visitors from outside the region, a point that could be of interest to the Iranian 
government for their marketing plans. This aspect can be generalised further in that 
people tended to have higher levels of perceived risk when travelling to countries 
outside their region than when travelling within. This may to a large extent be 
because the greater the difference between their cultures, the greater the level of 
unknown which leads to greater uncertainty and hence risk perceptions. This too is a 
useful outcome for those involved with promoting and developing tourism, the 
challenge of educating potential visitors as to the richness of their culture in order to 
reduce the levels of uncertainty. 
10.7 Limitations 
Research is rarely ideal and there are always compromises to be made as a result of 
resource constraints and the availability of data. The researcher has done all within 
her power to optimise this research within the constraints imposed by these factors. 
However, there are several limitations associated with the findings of this research 
and hence in terms of the general applicability of the results reported in this thesis. 
Firstly, 51 % of the questionnaire respondents were British citizens and thus the results 
are somewhat Anglo-biased, whereas it would have been better if the respondents had 
been more diverse. Due to resource and time constraints and therefore the nature of 
the data collection, the respondents were grouped more heavily in terms of age groups 
than would have been ideal. For instance, with 48 % of the respondents being 
between 18-29 years old and a further 9% being 17 years old the sample is weighted 
towards the young travellers, a fact further amplified by noting that 56 % of the 
sample were recorded as being students. Furthermore, due to a lack of geographical 
knowledge by many respondents it proved more useful to count South Asia and East 
Asia as a single region as it avoided confusion amongst respondents. This study was 
originally intended to focus far more on the development of tourism in Iran and the 
activities of the Government in Iran in stimulating tourists' travel risk perceptions. 
However, such views are considered contentious in Iran `as the Iranian government 
has grown increasingly suspicious of academics and academic institutions as possible 
driving forces behind efforts to change the government in Iran' (Herald Tribune 
10.05.07). Adding further fuel to this fire, the warning issued by the Iranian 
government suggesting that Iranian academics need to be careful about what they say 
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(BBC, 30.05.07) tends to deter researchers from fully pursuing their intended goals. 
This research was constrained in this respect on the advice of my supervisors and this 
limited the level of detail that could be explored with respect to the situation in Iran. 
This research did not take place in a vacuum and thus the data collection period was 
not sterile in terms of factors that may influence the respondents' attitudes towards 
risks. In particular, as the questionnaire data started to be collected the conflict 
between Israel and its neighbours heightened, bringing the conflict to respondents' 
television and radio sets on a daily basis. In order to counter this and to see if there 
were any significant differences in responses during the crisis and after the crisis, the 
questionnaire collection period spanned the pre-, during and post-conflict periods. 
Although there were no statistically significant differences between the structure of 
the responses in these three periods, the researcher feels that any effect will have been 
diminished by the fact that the data collection took place across the three different 
periods. 
Finally, as Abediei and Gardeazabal (2002) suggested, `research of this sort could 
potentially have an undesirable impact if terrorists learned that their actions affect 
economies negatively, assuming that is what they want to do'. They add: 
We do hope that the finding by Nelson in Scott (1992) is true that media attention 
does not cause terrorism, and that in addition to this, academic study does not 
provide those who act in such a way with the credibility to continue their actions. 
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Appendix I 
My name is Yeganeh Morakabati and I am a doctoral researcher at Bournemouth oJ/ýNEMý 
University. The purpose for which this information being collected is to develop and m 
measure peoples' perceptions concerning travel risk. As I am interested in your views "" 
and opinions, I have created a short questionnaire which I would like you to complete. 
The questionnaire is simple to complete as it only requires you to express your opinions. 
ý/ 
Ve ýZSý 
The results of this research will be aggregated to examine the different perceptions of risk 
by people from different backgrounds. No single individual's response will be published. 
Thank you very much in advance for helping with this valuable research project! 
The following statements refer to your perception of destination risk. For each of the statements, 
please indicate the number that represents your perception of the level of risk when you travel using 
the following scale: 
4 3 2 1 
Greater than Lower than 
High risk Average risk Low risk 
average risk average risk 
When I travel to another country I think that..... 
Note: in the final column, could you please suggest up to 3 countries where you feel they have high 
risks. 
Physical risk 5 4 3 2 1 
High risk 
country 
examples 
Q1 The risk of getting food poisoning is... 
Q2 The risk of having health problem is ... 
Q3 The risk of being involved in a natural disaster (e. g. 
earthquake/storm) is 
Q4 The risk of getting injured in an accident (e. g. car, 
bus,... ) is 
Q5 The risk of crime (theft, robbery, pickpocket) is 
Q6 The risk to me by acts of terrorism is ... 
Q7 The risk of being exposed to danger due to political 
unrest (civil unrest) is... 
Financial risk 5 4 3 2 1 
Q8 The risk of not getting good value for money is ... 
Q9 The risk of incurring unexpected expenses is ... 
Q10 The risk of suffering as a result of credit card fraud 
344 
is... 
Performance risk 5 4 3 2 S'A I LIM, ti 
Q11 The risk of experiencing poor weather is ... 
Q12 The risk of having to put up with poor hotel 
accommodation is... 
Q13 The risk that the place will be overcrowded is ... 
Q14 The risk that I will not like the food is ... 
Q15 The risk that my travel will be disrupt because of 
possible industrial action/strike (e. g. at the airport, 
railways, and buses) is... 
Q16 The risk that the tourists facilities (e. g. beach) will not 
be acceptable is... 
Q17 The risk that the local population may not be friendly 
is ... 
Q18 The risk that my trip might change my own behaviour 
is... 
Q19 The risk that my code of dress and behaviour will not 
be well received by the local people is ... 
Q20 The risk of not being able to communicate with local 
people (language) is ... 
Q21 - Please order the following regions from 1 to 6 according to the level of perceived risk eg. 
Allocating 'T' to the regions with the highest perceived risk, "2" to the country with the second 
highest perceived risk and so on to "6". 
Ranking 
o Africa .......... 
o North Americas (USA and Canada) .......... 
o Latin America .......... 
o Europe .......... 
o Asia (excluding Middle East) .......... 
o Middle East .......... 
Q22 - Please list what you see as the major type of risks associated with each of the following 
regions 
1= Crime 2= Political unrest 3= Natural disasters 
4= Health risks (disease, epidemic) 5= Terrorism 6= Cultural barriers. 
Region e. g. 1,3 and 6... etc. 
Africa 
345 
North America 
Latin America 
Europe 
, 
Asia ( excluding Middle East) 
Middle East 
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Q23 - With respect to the Middle East and some selected countries can you indicate how 
'risky' you feel it is to travel to them. If you say a destination is a "very high risk" please 
specify why in the box marked other. 
(5 = very high risk; 4= high risk; 3= average risk; 2= low risk; 1= very low risk) 
Country 5 4 3 2 1 
Where you have given a "5" (the 
highest level of risk) to a country 
please comment briefly why? e. g. 
Disease, War, Crime levels, etc. 
Afghanistan 
Bahrain 
Egypt 
Iran 
Iraq 
Israel 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Oman 
Palestine 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Turkey 
UAE 
Yemen 
Finally, could you give a few bits of information about yourself so that your responses can be 
put into greater context. 
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a) 18< b) 18 - 29 c) 30 - 39 d) 40 - 49 e) 50 - 59 f) 60+ 
Q24) Age 
a) Male b) Female 
Q25) Sex 
a) Married b) Single c) Other 
Q26) Marital Status 
Q27 - Have you ever been involved in a risky situation on your travels? YES/ NO 
Example(s) 
......................................................................... 
Q28 - Have any of your close relatives ever been involved in a risky situation on their 
travels? YES/NO 
Example(s) ......................................................................... 
Q29 - How often do you travel: Number of times a year on average .............. 
Q30 - Do you generally travel (a) Alone (b) with family (c) with friend(s) 
Q31 - Your Occupation (e. g. Manager, student, Sales etc) ................................... 
Primary Secondary Degree Postgraduate 
Q32) Education 
Q33 - Country and Region of normal residence? 
Region Country 
Q34 - Can you please indicate, what is your religious affiliation? 
Christian Jewish Muslim Others( 
Not affiliated 
with formal please name) religion 
348 
Would you be willing to answer a few more questions related to travel and risk? If so can you 
provide a contact email or phone number? 
Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Should you 
have any questions at a later date please feel free to contact me at 
ymora(bournemouth. ac. uk 
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Text cut off in original 
Appendix 2 
The risk of 
getting food 
poisoning is... 
The risk of 
having health 
problems is.. 
The risk of 
being involved 
in a natural 
disaster(eg 
earthquake/Sto 
rm) is... 
The risk of 
getting injured 
in an 
accident(eg 
car, bus.... ) 
is... 
Thi 
c 
(the 
ry, p 
e 
Correlation The risk of getting food 1.000 . 573 . 498 . 
436 
poisoning is... 
The risk of having health 
problems is.. . 
573 1.000 . 459 . 455 
The risk of being involved 
in a natural disaster(eg . 498 . 459 1.000 . 519 earthquake/Storm) is... 
The risk of getting injured 
in an accident(eg . 
436 . 455 . 519 1.000 
car, bus.... ) is... 
The risk of crime 
(theft, robbery, pickpocket) . 368 . 
393 . 367 . 469 is... 
The risk to me by acts of 
terrorism is... . 380 . 332 . 577 . 375 
The risk of being exposed 
to danger due to political . 485 . 
411 
. 
656 
. 466 unrest(civil unrest) is... 
The risk of not getting good 
value for money is... . 
149 . 171 . 044 . 151 
The risk of incurring 
unexpected expenses is... . 
211 . 207 . 132 . 246 
The risk of suffering as a 
result of credit card fraud . 338 . 
364 . 324 . 340 is... 
The risk of experiencing 
poor weather is... . 
044 . 160 . 071 . 128 
The risk of having to put up 
with poor hotel . 238 . 270 . 
269 . 291 accommodation is... 
The risk that the place will 204 203 222 286 be overcrowded is... . . . . 
The risk that I will not like 
the food is... ... . 
189 229 . 184 . 210 
The risk that my travel will 
be disrupted because of 
possible industrial 
action/strikes(eg at the . 283 . 265 . 
373 . 327 
airport, railways, buses)is... 
The risk that the tourist 
facilities will not be 
. 271 . 293 . 272 . 
347 
acceptable(eg beach) is... 
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The risk that the local 
population may not be 
friendly is... 
The risk that my trip might 
change my own behaviour 
is... 
The risk that my code of 
dress and behaviour will 
not be well received by the 
local people is... 
The risk of not being able 
to communicate with local 
people (language) is... 
Sig. (1-tailed) The risk of getting food 
poisoning is... 
The risk of having health 
problems is.. 
The risk of being involved 
in a natural disaster(eg 
earthquake/Storm) is... 
The risk of getting injured 
in an accident(eg 
car, bus.... ) is... 
The risk of crime 
(theft, robbery, pickpocket) 
is... 
The risk to me by acts of 
terrorism is... 
The risk of being exposed 
to danger due to political 
unrest(civil unrest) is... 
The risk of not getting good 
value for money is... 
The risk of incurring 
unexpected expenses is... 
The risk of suffering as a 
result of credit card fraud 
is... 
The risk of experiencing 
poor weather is... 
The risk of having to put up 
with poor hotel 
accommodation is... 
The risk that the place will 
be overcrowded is... 
The risk that I will not like 
the food is... 
The risk that my travel will 
be disrupted because of 
possible industrial 
action/strikes(eg at the 
airport, railways, buses)is... 
The risk that the tourist 
facilities will not be 
acceptable(eg beach) is... 
. 261 . 
262 . 357 . 320 
. 240 . 
285 . 255 . 318 
. 302 . 
308 . 382 . 
322 
. 263 . 
232 . 293 . 
318 
. 000 . 000 . 000 
. 000 . 
000 . 000 
. 000 . 000 . 
000 
. 000 . 000 . 
000 
. 000 . 
000 . 
000 . 000 
. 000 . 
000 . 000 . 000 
. 000 . 
000 . 000 . 000 
. 000 . 000 . 
137 . 000 
. 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 
. 000 . 
000 . 000 . 000 
. 135 . 000 . 
037 . 001 
. 000 . 000 . 
000 . 000 
. 000 . 000 . 
000 . 
000 
. 000 . 000 . 
000 . 000 
. 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 
. 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 
351 
The risk that the local 
population may not be 
. 000 . 000 . 000 000 friendly is... . 
The risk that my trip might 
change my own behaviour 
is... . 
000 
. 000 . 000 . 000 
The risk that my code of 
dress and behaviour will 
not be well received by the . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 local people is... 
The risk of not being able 
to communicate with local 
. 000 . 
000 
. 000 . 000 people (language) is... 
a ueierminani = . uu1 
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Text cut off in original 
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Afghanistan Bahrain Egypt Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon LI 
Correlatio Afghanistan 1.000 . 038 . 304 . 352 . 642 . 221 . 241 . 
187 . 397 .3 n 
Bahrain 
. 038 1.000 . 324 . 290 . 128 . 119 . 536 . 542 . 
151 .3 
Egypt 
. 304 . 324 1.000 . 398 . 284 . 
189 . 372 . 357 . 387 .4 
Iran 
. 352 . 
290 . 398 1.000 . 435 . 203 . 394 . 418 . 
281 .4 
Iraq 
. 642 . 128 . 284 . 435 
1.000 . 359 . 317 . 287 . 424 .3 
Israel 
. 221 . 
119 . 189 . 203 . 359 1.000 . 359 . 216 . 
345 .1 
Jordan 
. 241 . 536 . 372 . 394 . 
317 . 359 1.000 . 660 . 395 .5 
Kuwait 
. 187 . 542 . 
357 . 418 . 287 . 216 . 660 1.000 . 431 .E 
Lebanon 
. 397 . 151 . 387 . 
281 . 424 . 345 . 395 . 431 1.000 .5 
Libya 
. 317 . 384 . 
420 . 498 . 308 . 184 . 523 . 645 . 514 
1.1 
Oman 
. 190 . 470 . 
257 . 409 . 156 . 078 . 483 . 611 . 321 .E 
Palastine 
. 478 -. 069 . 
213 . 334 . 549 . 375 . 238 . 242 . 489 .3 
Qatar 
. 050 . 
635 . 269 . 336 . 159 . 130 . 558 . 611 . 249 .4 
Saudi Arabia 
. 263 . 
379 . 405 . 455 . 246 . 151 . 471 . 519 . 270 .5 
Syrian Arab 
. 277 . 306 . 
410 . 492 . 283 . 
156 . 483 . 550 . 522 .E Republic 
Turkey 
. 076 . 
261 . 335 . 
293 . 151 . 187 . 320 . 346 . 223 .3 
UAE 
. 030 . 483 . 
239 . 321 . 077 . 149 . 428 . 606 . 213 .4 
Yemen 
. 260 . 
235 . 446 . 
395 . 153 . 141 . 358 . 443 . 339 .. r 
Sig. (1- Afghanistan 
. 271 . 000 . 
000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 001 . 000 C tailed) 
Bahrain 
. 271 . 
000 . 000 . 020 . 029 . 000 . 000 . 008 C 
Egypt 
. 000 . 
000 . 000 . 000 . 001 . 
000 . 000 . 000 C 
Iran 
. 000 . 000 . 
000 . 000 . 001 . 000 . 000 . 000 C 
Iraq 
. 000 . 
020 . 000 . 
000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 C 
Israel 
. 000 . 029 . 
001 . 001 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 C 
Jordan 
. 000 . 
000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 
000 . 000 . 000 C 
Kuwait 
. 001 . 000 . 000 . 
000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 C 
Lebanon 
. 000 . 
008 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 C 
Libya 
. 000 . 
000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 
002 . 000 . 000 . 000 
Oman 
. 001 . 
000 . 000 . 000 . 006 . 107 . 000 . 000 . 000 C 
Palastine 
. 000 . 
137 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 C 
Qatar 
. 214 . 000 . 
000 . 000 . 006 . 019 . 000 . 000 . 000 C 
Saudi Arabia 
. 000 . 
000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 008 . 000 . 000 . 000 C 
Syrian Arab 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 . 
006 . 000 . 000 . 000 C Republic . 
Turkey 
. 113 . 
000 . 000 . 000 . 008 . 
001 . 000 . 000 . 000 C 
UAE 
. 317 . 000 . 
000 . 000 . 
110 . 009 . 000 . 000 . 000 C 
Yemen 
. 000 . 000 . 
000 . 000 . 007 . 012 . 000 . 
000 . 000 
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Appendix 4 
The results of the analysis first round of Delphi exercise are as follows: 
1. When making a travel decision how important do you think the risk averseness 
is of the traveller? 
E- Very important Not important at all -3 
5 4 3 2 1 
17.9% 57.1% 17.9% 7.1% 0% 
12% 68% 12% 8% 0% 
8.7% 69.9% 13% 8.7% 0% 
Last round you answered . 
Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes 
above and briefly comment why you give it the score that you do? 
Your comment here: 
2. When making a travel decision how important do you think is the specific 
destination in determining the level of risk perceived`? 
E- Verv important Not important at all -* 
5 4 3 2 1 
64.3% 32.1% 3.6% 0% 0% 
64% 28% 8% 0% 0% 
Last round you answered . 
Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes 
above and briefly comment why you give it the score that you do'? 
Your comment here: 
354 
3. What do you think concerns travellers most? Risk of physical harm? Risk of 
financial loss? Risk of not being satisfied by their destination choice'? Please 
rank them in the order in which you perceive their relative importance. 
2 3 
Risk of physical harm 71.4% 21.4% 7. M% 
76% 12`%o 12% 
82.6% 8.7% 8.7% 
Risk of financial loss 14.3% 53.6% 32.1% 
8% 60% 32% 
8.7% 56.5 34.8 
Risk of not being satisfied by their destination choice 14.3% 25% 60.7% 
16% 24% 60% 
8.7% 30.40/0 60.9% 
Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes below and briefly comment 
why you give it the ranking that you do? 
joy 
Second 
round 
Third 
round 
Risk of physical harm 
Risk of financial loss 
Risk of not being satisfied by their destination choice 
Your comment here: 
4. Do you think that the relative importance of each type of risk discussed in Q. 3 
varies according to the region of the world from which the traveller originates? 
Yes No 
88.9% 11.1% 
91.7% 8.3% 
355 
Last round you answered . 
Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes 
above and briefly comment why you have answered in this way'? 
Your comment here: 
5. Do you think that the age of the traveller will influence their level of travel- 
risk averseness? 
Influence strongly no influence at all -+ 
4 3 2 1 
42.9% 39.3% 17.9% 0% 0% 
36% 56% 8% 0% 0% 
Last round you answered 4. Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes 
above and briefly comment why you give it the score that you do? 
Your comment here: 
6. Using your thoughts about age and risk averseness, please rank the following 
age groups 1 to 6 where 6 is the most risk averse and I is the least risk averse 
Age 4 3 2 1 
(%ý (%) (`%ý) (ý%o) (%) (%) 
a) 18< 11.5 11.5 15.4 7.7 7.7 46.2 
a) 18< 8.7 13 17.4 4.3 4.3 52.2 
b) 18 - 29 3.8 7.7 3.8 3.8 50 30.8 
b) 18 - 29 9.7 3.4 8.7 0 56.5 21.7 
c) 30 - 39 0 3.8 23.1 46.2 23.1 3.8 
c) 30 - 39 8.7 21.7 52.2 13 4.3 
d) 40 - 49 8 4 40 32 0 8 
d) 40 - 49 8.3 4.2 45.8 33.3 4.2 4.2 
35(6 
e) 50 - 59 0 61.5 15.4 7.7 7.7 7.7 
e) 50 - 59 0 60.9 8.. 7 8.7 13 8.7 
f) 60+ 70.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 
f) 60+ 70.8 4.2 4.2 4.2 8.3 8.3 
Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes below and briefly comment 
why you give it the ranking that you do? 
Age New 
answer 
a) 18< 
b) 18-29 
c) 30 - 39 
d) 40 - 49 
e) 50 - 59 
f) 60+ 
Your comment here: 
7. Can you estimate the relative levels of risk averseness exhibited by the different 
genders? 
E- High Risk Averseness Low Risk Averseness --> 
4 3 2 1 
Male 0% 16.7% 50% 29.2% 4.2 
Male 2 0% 19% 52.4% 23.8% 4.8% 
Male 3 0% 11.1 61.1 27.8 0 
Female 25% 58.3% 16.7% 0% 0% 
Female 19% 57.1% 23.8% 0% 0% 
Female 3 11.1% 66.7% 22.2% 0% 0% 
Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes below and briefly comment 
why you give it the score that you do? 
357 
Previous 
answer 
Male 
Female 
Your comment here: 
8. How important do you think previous negative experience is in determining the 
level of risk averseness? 
F- Very important Not important at all + 
4 3 2 1 
42.9% 46.4% 3.6% 7.1% 0% 
52% 44% 0% 4% 0% 
Last round you answered 2. Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes 
above and briefly comment why you give it the score that you do`? 
Your comment here: 
9. Do you think that the nature of the occupation of the traveller is likely to 
influence their level of travel risk averseness? 
Influence strongly No influence at all -+ 
5<"'a 4 3 2 1 
7.1% 39.3% 32.1% 17.9% 3.6% 
8% 56% 20% 12% 4% 
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4.3% 60.9% 17.4% 13.0% 4.3% 
Last round you answered . 
Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes 
above and briefly comment why you give it the score that you do? 
Your comment here: 
I O. Do you think that the level to which the traveller has been educated is likely to 
influence their level of travel-risk averseness? 
Influence strongly No influence at all -ý 
54321 
17.9% 64.3% 14.3% 3.6% 0% 
16% 80% 0% 4% 0% 
30.4% 65% 0% 4.3% 0% 
Last round you answered . 
Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes 
above and briefly comment why you give it the score that you do? 
Your comment here: 
I 1. Do you think the country from which the traveller originates is an important 
influence on their level of travel-risk averseness? 
<- Influence strongly No influence at all + 
k '..; 7° ;4321 
28.6% 39.3% 25% 3.6% 3.6% 
28% 56.0% 12% 0 4% 
21.7% 65.2% 8.7% 0 4.3% 
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Last round you answered . 
Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes 
above and briefly comment why you give it the score that you do'? 
Your comment here: 
12. How important do you think a traveller's religious affiliation is to their level 
of travel-risk averseness? 
4- Very important Not important at all -+ 
too 4 3 2 1 
3.7% 29.6% 40.7% 18.5% 7.4% 
11% 24% 50% 12% 4% 
0% 21.7 65.2 13% 
Last round you answered . Can I ask you to answer this question again 
in the boxes 
above and briefly comment why you give it the score that you do? 
Your comment here: 
13. Do you think people are more travel-risk averse if they travel on their own 
rather than with a party/family Yes...... or No......? 
Last round you answered . 
Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes 
above and briefly comment why you answer the way that you do'? 
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Your comment here: 
14. Do you think people are more travel-risk averse if they are travelling to a 
different region of the world rather than travelling within their own region'? 
Yes........ or No ......... '' 
Yes No 
92.6% 7.4% 
96% 4% 
Last round you answered. Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes 
above and briefly comment why you answer the way that you do? 
Your comment here: 
15. Do you think there is a high correlation between the level of travel-risk 
perception and the actual levels of risk Yes........ or No .........? 
Last round you answered. Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes 
above and briefly comment why you answer the way that you do? 
Your comment here: 
361 
16. In your opinion is the level of travel-risk greater now than it was 10 years ago? 
Does the region in which the destination is located affect your answer'? 
iviucn greater man iu years ago iviucn less man iu years ago 
5 4 3 2 1 
14.3% 39.3% 39.3% 7.1% 0% 
12% 48% 32% 8% 0% 
8.7% 60.9% 21.7% 8.7% 0% 
Last round you answered. Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes 
above and briefly comment why you give it the score that you do? 
Your comment here: 
17. Does the region in which the destination is located affect your answer 
Yes ...... or No...... 
? 
Yes No 
88% 12% 
92.6% 7.4% 
Last round you answered . Can I ask you to answer this question again 
in the boxes 
above and briefly comment why you answer the way that you do'? 
Your comment here: 
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18. Do you think people are more concerned about travel-risk related to acts of 
terrorism and political unrest than they are about travel-risk related to natural 
disasters Yes..... or No.....? 
ý:.. 
88% 
100% 
No 
12% 
0% 
Last round you answered . 
Can I ask you to answer this question again in the boxes 
above and briefly comment why you answer the way that you do'? 
Your comment here: 
19. What do you think is the greatest single type of event that generates travel-risk 
averseness (e. g. Accidents, Crime, Disasters, Health, Terrorism etc). 
Health Finance Crime 
57.5% 7.7% 7.7% 20.9% 
75% 4.2% 0% 02.85 
77.3 4.4% 0% 18.2% 
Last round you answered Political. Can I ask you to answer this question again in the 
boxes above and briefly comment why you answer the way that you do'? 
Your comment here: 
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20. Please order the following regions from 1 to 6 according to the level of overall 
perceived risk eg. Allocating "1" to the region with the highest perceived risk, "2" 
to the country with the second highest perceived risk and so on to "7" which is the 
region with the lowest perceived overall risk. 
Region 5 4 3 2 1 
Africa 0 9.1 4.4 4.5 27.3 31.8 22.7 
Africa 0 9.5 4.8 4.8 28.6 19 
North Americas (USA 
and Canada) 
22.7 36.4 18.2 9.1 4.5 9.1 0 
North Americas (USA 
and Canada) 
23.8 9.5 9.5 4.8 9.5 0 
Latin America 0 0 27.3 18.2 27.3 0 
0 0 23.8 28.6 14.3 33,3 0 
Europe 50 31.8 9.1 0 0 1. 4.4 
33.3 9.5 0 0 4.8 4.8 
East Asia 4.5 4.1 36.4 27.3 22.7 0 0 
9.5 4.8 28.6 14.3 0 0 
South Asia 4.5 9.1 13.6 40.9 22.7 9.1 0 
4.8 9.5 9.5 33.3 4.8 0 
Middle East 4.5 4.5 9.1 4.5 0 13.6 63.6 
4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 0 14.3 
Add any comment you may wish to make: 
21 - Please list what you see as the major types of risks associated with each of 
the following regions 
1= Crime 2= Political unrest 3= Natural disasters 
4= Health risks (disease, epidemic) 5= Terrorism 6= Cultural 
barriers. 
Region Natural 
disaster 
Ilealth 
risk 
Terroris 
ni 
Cultural 
barriers 
Africa 03 54.2 16.7 ti 3.3 16.7 4.2 
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Africa2 63.6 59.1 18.2 22.7 4.5 
North America 79.2 4.2 8.3 0 20.8 4.2 
North America? 4.5 9.1 4.5 18.2 4.5 
Latin America 95.8 50.0 16.7 33.3 16.7 16.7 
Latin America2 IOU 52.4 
LJ 
19 33.3 14.3 19 
Europe 58.3 4.2 4.2 0 33.3 8.3 
Europe2 68.2 4.8 4.8 0 31.8 4.5 
East Asia -5.0 29.2 33.3 16.7 37.5 
East Asiat 29 2 27.3 36.4 18.2 36.4 
39 1 43.5 43.5 47.8 39.1 14 3 South Asia . . 
South Asiat 42.9 47.6 47.6 38.1 18.2 
Middle East 18.2 77.3 9.1 22.7 86.4 40.9 
Middle East2 23.8 76.2 9.5 23.8 90. S'. 1 
Add any comment you may wish to make: 
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Appendix 5 Delphi panel 
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